1. PER CURIAM. We review the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendations of referee Rose Marie Baron for sanctions, pursuant to SCR 22.17(1). Attorney John A. Ward was found to have engaged in unprofessional conduct in the course of his practice of law in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct. The referee recommended a public reprimand.

3. Attorney Ward was licensed to practice law in Wisconsin in 1985. He received a private reprimand for a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct in 1999.

5. These counts involve Attorney Ward's representation, commencing in April 2001, of a woman from Kenosha in two matters. First, the client retained Attorney Ward to represent her in opposing a February 2001 motion filed in Milwaukee County by her former husband to establish visitation rights with their daughter. Second, the client retained Attorney Ward to commence a separate proceeding in Kenosha County to terminate her former husband's parental rights to the child. The client agreed to a "non-refundable minimum fee" of $10,000 to cover the first 50 hours of Attorney Ward's time with work beyond that to be billed at $200 per hour.

6. The client wanted Attorney Ward to immediately change the venue of the Milwaukee matter to Kenosha in order to cut down on his travel time and thereby reduce the hours he would have to spend on the case. She also believed that since she and the child lived in Kenosha, that was the appropriate county to litigate visitation. Finally, since the termination proceeding was going to be in Kenosha, she believed it was efficient to have all proceedings in that county.

7. There is a dispute whether Attorney Ward agreed with this strategy and consented to expeditiously attempt the venue change. In any event, Attorney Ward did not seek the venue change. At the initial May 2001 motion hearing before a Milwaukee County family court commissioner, he objected to venue but the commissioner advised him to raise it by written motion with the judge assigned to the case even assuming that could still be done in a timely fashion. Attorney Ward claims he had prepared a "rough draft" of a venue change motion before this hearing, but decided not to file it. The matter was adjourned to August 2001.

8. Attorney Ward filed the termination petition in Kenosha County later in May. A guardian ad litem was appointed for the child who soon advised Attorney Ward that she wanted to interview the child. However, the termination proceeding was adjourned in July by the Kenosha court to await the outcome of the visitation dispute that was still pending in Milwaukee.

9. When the visitation matter returned to court in August, the commissioner held it open for another month, sent it to the circuit court for resolution, and in the interim gave the former husband temporary visitation, at least in part because the client may have misrepresented the husband's alleged lack of contact with the child over the years and had impeded his past visitation. Throughout this period, Attorney Ward never sought the change of venue.

12. This court adopts the referee's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous. In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Charlton, 174 Wis. 2d 844, 498 N.W.2d 380 (1993). No deference is granted to the referee's conclusions of law and they are reviewed de novo. In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Norlin, 104 Wis. 2d 117, 310 N.W.2d 789 (1981). The court may impose whatever sanction it deems appropriate regardless of the referee's recommendation. In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Widule, 2003 WI 34, 261 Wis. 2d 45, 660 N.W.2d 686.

13. The referee concluded there had been a violation of SCR 20:1.13 due to Attorney Ward's failure to file a written motion seeking a change of venue as directed by his client.

14. Attorney Ward disputed that he had ever agreed to seek the venue change. He claims it was "not true" that it was in his client's interest to have the matter moved to Kenosha; that it was "absolutely simply a ploy" to even preliminarily raise a change of venue because he was only "testing the waters" and trying to feel out the opposition; that he initially did not "care one way or the other" whether there was a change of venue; that he eventually decided to "table" the idea because he thought things were going well in Milwaukee; and that this was "absolutely the type of tactical decision" that he-and not his client-should make.

15. Attorney Ward argued that there were several reasons why not seeking a venue change was a sound tactical decision. First, he claimed that the former husband's attorney-who would not have represented the husband had the case been transferred to Kenosha-was not particularly "aggressive" and Kenosha was a more litigious venue. Second, he claimed that his client had been uncooperative with the Kenosha guardian ad litem by not letting the guardian interview the child. Thus Attorney Ward supposedly believed it was better to keep the visitation dispute in Milwaukee. Third, Attorney Ward claimed that the Milwaukee action was going well, at least until August when the former husband got temporary visitation, and thus there was no reason to move it.

16. On the other hand, the client testified that Attorney Ward "assured me that that [change of venue] would be done" and that she was "of the impression" that the Milwaukee visitation matter would ultimately be moved to Kenosha which was her "main concern."

17. The referee acknowledged that an attorney is not liable under the Rules of Professional Conduct for errors in professional judgment that are made in good faith and/or are in the best interest of the client. Thus she acknowledged that the failure to seek the venue change was not misconduct per se.

18. However, the referee rejected Attorney Ward's defense stating:

19. Mindful of the applicable standard for our review of findings of fact and that the referee was best situated to judge the credibility of the witnesses, we conclude that these findings are not clearly erroneous. Further, we agree that these facts support the subsequent conclusion of law that this rule of professional conduct was violated.

20. There was a direct factual dispute between the client's understanding of what would occur by way of a venue change and Attorney Ward's insistence that he never agreed to take such action and that it would have been a bad tactical decision under the circumstances. The referee was obviously best situated to listen to the witnesses, assess their credibility, and resolve this factual dispute.

21. The referee concluded that Attorney Ward had charged an unreasonable fee in violation of SCR 20:1.5(a) and that a refund was in order under SCR 20:1.16(d). The Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) had not argued that the amount of the fee was unreasonable per se. Rather, it objected to it being nonrefundable under circumstances where the amount was not reasonable and here $10,000 was unreasonable in relation to the amount of time Attorney Ward put in on the case and the result he achieved.

22. The referee stated that Attorney Ward turned a "simple" visitation/termination dispute into a "complex legal endeavor" by allegedly spending over 36 hours to make a few appearances before a commissioner and never filing any written motions. Further, the referee found that much of the research Attorney Ward claimed he performed in this case-such as a memoranda after the second commissioner hearing-was at a time when he should have anticipated his imminent discharge as counsel. The referee also termed the research "of questionable necessity, not on point, and of no value." The referee observed that Attorney Ward had no documents in the file that reflected the 26.3 hours of research he claimed he performed in this case. For example, there were no bills for electronic legal services, no computer files, no copies of a daily time record for the days for which he billed, or any contemporaneous notes. The referee acknowledged that it was evident Attorney Ward did some research, but found that the alleged total of over 36 hours was "unreliable."

23. The referee further found that Attorney Ward had not performed in an acceptable professional fashion in this case:

24. As for the nonrefundability factor, the referee acknowledged that nonrefundable fees are not a per se violation but are typically permissible, in part, only where the nature of the reputation precludes the lawyer from accepting other representation, or the lawyer's experience, reputation, and skill may result in immediate benefit to the client without regard to whether extensive labor is performed. See Wisconsin Ethics Opinion E-93-4. Based on this, the referee concluded the nonrefundable aspect of this fee was unreasonable because Attorney Ward was not precluded from taking on other representation due to his representation of this client, and his experience, reputation, and skill were not at such a level as to give this client an immediate benefit.

25. The referee ultimately found that Attorney Ward performed 13.8 hours of legitimate research for a total time expenditure of 23.9 hours which at a rate of $200 per hour, amounted to $4780. The referee concluded that reasonable restitution to this client would thus be $5220.

26. The referee's findings with respect to this nonrefundable fee agreement are not clearly erroneous. The record does not support Attorney Ward's contention that the nature of the representation of this client precluded him from accepting other representation or that his experience, reputation and skill could result in immediate benefit to the client without regard to whether extensive labor was performed. Indeed, there certainly was no immediate benefit to this client.

27. Further, the referee's findings with respect to the amount to be refunded this client are not clearly erroneous. It obviously was difficult to create exactly what Attorney Ward legitimately did in this case, due in significant part to his lack of proper documentation. Again, the referee had the benefit of listening to the witnesses, examining any relevant documentation that did exist, and assessing Attorney Ward's assertions in his defense.

29. As previously noted, the referee also recommended restitution of $5220 to be awarded the client, plus interest at the statutory rate from the date Attorney Ward's services were terminated.

30. We adopt the referee's recommendation and therefore decide that a public reprimand is appropriate. Although there are indeed factual differences with similar prior cases, several are instructive. In Disciplinary Proceedings Against Tjader, 2002 WI 37, 252 Wis. 2d 94, 643 N.W.2d 87, resulted in a public reprimand for failure to act with reasonable diligence and return an unearned fee. Further, In Disciplinary Proceedings Against Koehn, 208 Wis. 2d 128, 559 N.W.2d 908 (1997), resulted in a public reprimand for failure to provide competent representation, failing to promptly file necessary documents, and failing to respond to a request for information from the client, under circumstances where the attorney had a prior disciplinary record. These, coupled with Attorney Ward's disciplinary record, indicate that a public reprimand is appropriate.

31. IT IS ORDERED that Attorney John A. Ward is publicly reprimanded.

32. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Attorney Ward's motion to dismiss the OLR complaint, objection to costs, motion to disallow or reduce costs, motion to hold in abeyance, and motion to supplement are denied.