Disciplinary Proceedings Against Meisel
2017 WI 40, 4/26/2017 (2017)
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ATTORNEY disciplinary proceeding.
Attorney's license suspended.
¶1 PER CURIAM. Attorney Christopher
E. Meisel has appealed Referee Hannah
Dugan's recommendation that his license to
practice law in Wisconsin be suspended for
two years for 15 counts of misconduct, which
included converting approximately $175,000
from two estates and two guardianship
proceedings. Attorney Meisel stipulated to
all counts of misconduct but asserts that,
rather than a two-year suspension, a five-
month suspension of his law license is an
adequate sanction.
¶2 Upon careful review of this matter,
we uphold the referee's findings of fact and
conclusions of law. We conclude, however,
that rather than a two-year suspension,
Attorney Meisel's license to practice law
should be suspended for 18 months. We
further agree with the referee that Attorney
Meisel should be required to pay the full
costs of this proceeding, which are
$10,831.67 as of February 7, 2017. Although
the referee recommended that various
conditions be imposed upon Attorney Meisel,
we find that the imposition of conditions
would be better addressed in a future
reinstatement proceeding.
¶3 Attorney Meisel was admitted to
practice law in Wisconsin in 1994. He has
no prior disciplinary history. In October
of 2006, Attorney Meisel was diagnosed with
brain cancer and days later underwent brain
surgery to remove a tumor. Following
surgery, he received chemotherapy and
radiation treatments, which treatments
continued until 2008. Although his
condition is currently stable, Attorney
Meisel will require constant monitoring. He
is not able to work long hours. While prior
to his brain surgery he was earning over
$100,000 per year, in recent years he has
earned approximately $45,000 per year.
¶4 In 2008 Attorney Meisel and his wife
decided to pursue international adoption of
two children from Guatemala. One of the
children was later diagnosed with a number
of medical issues, including significant
brain formation issues, legal blindness, and
learning disabilities. In order to provide
that child with the resources she needed,
the family moved from the school district in
which they were living to a different school
district that they believed had better
resources to educate the child. The
purchase price of the home in the new school
district was $125,000 more than the price of
the house the family sold.
¶5 In addition to his personal health
problems and the medical issues of his
daughter, Attorney Meisel was also under
financial distress due to a real estate
business called King Park Investment
Company, LLC, (King Park), which he owned
with another man. King Park is a real
estate venture in the Marquette University
area in Milwaukee.
¶6 The Office of Lawyer Regulation
(OLR) filed its 15 count complaint against
Attorney Meisel on March 10, 2015. Counts
one through three of the complaint arose out
of Attorney Meisel's handling of the estate
of B.T., who died in October 2008. Attorney
Meisel was retained to handle the estate and
pursue a potential wrongful death claim. In
June 2009, he filed a petition for special
administration of the estate in Milwaukee
County Circuit Court. Following a
settlement of the wrongful death claim, in
March 2011 Attorney Meisel filed a petition
for formal administration of the estate.
The OLR's complaint alleged that Attorney
Meisel disbursed numerous checks from his
trust account for the benefit of King Park
from funds belonging to the estate.
¶7 The specific counts of misconduct
alleged in the complaint arising out of
B.T.'s estate were as follows:
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Count 1: By failing to hold
$50,003.29 in
trust belonging to the Estate of B.T.,
Attorney Meisel violated SCR 20:1.15(b)(1).
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Count 2: By converting to his own
purposes $50,003.29 in trust funds belonging
to the estate of B.T., Attorney Meisel
violated SCR 20:8.4(c).
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Count 3: By depositing $47,244.20
in personal and law firm funds into his
trust account in April 2012, to replace the
bulk of the funds that he had converted from
the B.T. Estate, Attorney Meisel violated
SCR 20:1.15(b)(3).
¶8 Counts 4 through 14 of the OLR's
complaint arose out of Attorney Meisel's
appointment as guardian of the estates of
D.C. and Y.M., step-sisters whose parents
died in an automobile accident in February
of 2006. D.C. was five years at the time of
the accident, and Y.M. was close to one year
old. A Milwaukee County probate court
commissioner appointed Attorney Meisel as
guardian of the girls' estates in October
2007. Attorney Meisel established separate
guardianship accounts for the children.
¶9 Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 54.62, a
guardian is required to file with the court
an annual accounting for a guardianship
prior to April 15 of the following year.
Amy Wochos, legal counsel and senior
administrator for the Milwaukee County Clerk
of Circuit Court, testified at the
evidentiary hearing before the referee that
she oversees filings in probate court. She
testified that in 2013 she became aware that
an order to show cause had been issued
against Attorney Meisel by the probate court
because he had failed to file the annual
accountings for the children's guardianship.
¶10 Ms. Wochos testified that in early
2014 Attorney Meisel came to the probate
office and asked to speak with her. She
said Attorney Meisel indicated he had taken
money from the minor guardianship accounts,
that he had self-reported this behavior to
the OLR, and that he had either put the
money back or was in the process of putting
it back and understood he needed to be
relieved of his duties as guardian for the
girls. Attorney Meisel converted money from
the estate of J.D. to replace the funds he
took from the guardianship accounts.
¶11 OLR's complaint alleged the
following counts of misconduct with respect
to the two guardianship proceedings and the
second estate proceeding:
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Count 4: By failing to hold as much
as $21,000
in the D.C. Account at times between March
2009 and November 2012, Attorney Meisel
violated SCR 20:1.15(j)(l).
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Count 5: By converting and re-
converting D.C. Guardianship funds to his own
purposes between March 2009 and March 2012,
Attorney Meisel violated SCR 20:8.4(c).
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Count 6: By depositing into the D.C.
Account
$57,800.61 in King Park funds and funds
converted from his trust account and the
Estate of J.D., Attorney Meisel violated SCR
20:1.15(j)(l).
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Count 7: By depositing into the D.C.
Account
$57,800.61 in King Park funds and funds
converted from his trust account and the
Estate of J.D., thereby concealing his
conversion and re-conversion of funds
belonging to D.C., Attorney Meisel violated
SCR 20:8.4(c).
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Count 8: By failing to hold as much
as
$21,455.25 in the Y.M. Account between March
2009 and November 2012, Attorney Meisel
violated SCR 20:1.15(j)(l).
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Count 9: By converting and re-
converting Y.M.
Guardianship funds to his own purposes between
March 2009 and March 2012, Attorney Meisel
violated SCR 20:8.4(c).
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Count 10: By depositing into the
Y.M. Account
$70,056.12 in King Park funds and funds
converted from his trust account and the
Estate of J.D., Attorney Meisel violated SCR
20:1.15(j)(1).
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Count 11: By depositing into the
Y.M. Account
$70,056.12 in King Park funds and funds
converted from his trust account and the
Estate of J.D., thereby concealing his
conversion and re-conversion of funds
belonging to Y.M., Attorney Meisel violated
SCR 20:8.4(c),
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Count 12: By filing annual
accountings with
the Milwaukee County Probate Court for the
D.C. and Y.M. Guardianships, which failed to
disclose the disbursements that he made from
those guardianships and included documentation
of account balances that had been
deliberately, and temporarily, inflated to
document the required balances and conceal his
conversions, Attorney Meisel violated SCR
20:3.3(a)(l).
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Count 13: By failing to hold as
much as
$31,201.48 in the fiduciary account for the
Estate of J.D., Attorney Meisel violated SCR
20:1.15(j)(1).
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Count 14: By converting to his own
purposes
as much as $31,201.48 in the fiduciary account
for the Estate of J.D., Attorney Meisel
violated SCR 20:8.4(c).
¶12 Count 15 of the OLR's complaint
alleged:
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Count 15: By failing to maintain a
transaction register and client ledgers with
running balances, and by failing to perform
monthly reconciliations of his trust
account, thereby failing to maintain
complete records of a trust account,
Attorney Meisel violated SCR 20:1.15(f)
(l)a., (f)(l)b., and f(i)g.
¶13 Attorney Meisel filed an answer to
the complaint in April 2015. In December of
2015, Attorney Meisel and the OLR entered
into a stipulation whereby Attorney Meisel
withdrew his answer to the complaint and
pled no contest to each allegation of
misconduct set forth in the complaint. The
parties agreed that the complaint could
serve as the factual basis for the referee's
determination of misconduct and the
referee's recommendation as to discipline.
The parties further agreed that the
evidentiary hearing would be limited to
taking additional evidence and argument to
facilitate the referee's recommendation to
this court as to the appropriate amount of
discipline. The OLR's complaint had sought
a three-year suspension of Attorney Meisel's
law license.
¶14 The evidentiary hearing took place
on January 25, 2016. In addition to Amy
Wochos, Heather Coning, an insurance and
bonding agent, and Attorney Meisel testified
in person. Dr. Mark G. Malkin testified by
telephone.
¶15 Attorney Meisel testified that if he
were to lose his license to practice law for
two or three years, he did not believe he
would ever be able to return to the practice
of law. When asked by the referee about his
conversion of the funds, Attorney Meisel
said:
I did it. It was wrong. The whole
world was in a fog. I know I did it – it
was wrong. I was bonded at all times. I'm
not making a justification for it, but I
didn't think it would come to a problem. . .
.
I knew I did it. I have never denied that.
Why? It's hard to say. I was juggling so
many things that I just did it without
really thinking, you know. I just figured
that money would be coming in or – I don't
know. It was dumb.
¶16 Dr. Malkin's December 31, 2015,
letter/report to Attorney Terry E. Johnson,
Attorney Meisel's counsel in this matter,
was received into evidence at the hearing.
The letter indicates that Dr. Malkin was
Attorney Meisel's attending neuro-oncologist
from November 2006 through August 2013, at
which time Dr. Malkin relocated from
Milwaukee to Richmond, Virginia. Dr.
Malkin's report explains Attorney Meisel's
medical history. Dr. Malkin said:
I am aware, from conversations with
Mr. Meisel's attorneys, of some of the
circumstances surrounding the fiscal
decisions Mr. Meisel made which have
resulted in the disciplinary proceedings
brought against him. I am aware that he
missed time from work which would have left
him with less time and more stress to
complete the work which he had taken on. I
am aware that he turned away clients because
he could not keep up with the case load to
which he had been accustomed before he
became ill. I am aware that his practice
declined, adding financial burden and
stress. I am aware that certain real-estate
investments were devalued, and that he fell
out with his partner, adding further stress.
I am aware that he did not share these
concerns at work with his wife, and he
certainly didn't with me. I am aware that
he was not willing to seek professional help
to manage distress. Under these
circumstances anybody would have been
overwhelmed, and certainly Mr. Meisel was
especially susceptible to making errors in
judgment as a maladaptive strategy to deal
with the multiple stressors, given his
medical history, the medications he was on,
and the permanent damage to his brain from
the tumor and treatment thereof. It was a
'perfect storm'. . . .
All of us are subject to stress, and
much of this stress is external and beyond
our control. Mr. Meisel is no different.
However, his brain tumor and the treatment
thereof created brain damage that
predisposed him to inappropriate, non-
constructive cognitive responses to stress.
I cared for Mr. Meisel for almost seven
years, and therefore I believe I know him
quite well. I believe the behavior that led
to the inappropriate fiscal decisions that
he made was an aberration and not likely to
repeat itself. That said, it is my
recommendation that he undergo a
comprehensive neuropsychological evaluation,
. . .. I recommend that he receive formal
psychotherapy to help him manage stress in a
constructive way, . . .. Finally, I
recommend that Mr. Meisel continue to be
followed on a scheduled basis by a neuro-
oncologist with MRI scans of the brain to
monitor his brain tumor status, . . ..
¶17 In his telephone testimony at the
evidentiary hearing, Dr. Malkin said:
Well, I would sum it up by saying that
we have a situation here where, beyond the
usual stressors in anyone's life, Mr. Meisel
was affected by a potentially fatal brain
tumor, which necessitated surgery to remove
the tumor and part of the surrounding brain,
radiation therapy, which affected the brain
volume and function, chemotherapy, and other
medications to control symptoms of the brain
tumor, like seizures, and the stressors,
like anxiety and depression, are associated
with this diagnosis and treatment, all of
which conspired to create a perfect storm
such that his injured brain, under extreme
stress, has reacted to a situation, his
judgment was affected, and he made a
financial decision which I'm sure he
regrets.
¶18 When asked by Attorney Meisel's
counsel whether those opinions were held to
be true to a reasonable degree of medical
probability, Dr. Malkin answered in the
affirmative.
¶19 On cross-examination by the OLR's
counsel, the following exchange occurred:
Q: Can you state to a reasonable
degree of medical probability that Mr.
Meisel's medical conditions relating to the
brain tumor caused him to repeatedly convert
trust funds, and reconvert trust funds, over
a three-year period?
Q: And what's the basis for that
conclusion?
A: The basis is that the damage we
are looking at on the MRI scan of 2011 is
permanent damage. It's never going to
change. It will always look at least that
bad. It's a static problem, not one that
evolved overnight nor one that is ever going
to get better.
So it stands to reason that this impaired
brain will be susceptible, or predisposed,
as I wrote, to making the same error in
judgment, or memory, or executive function
over and over again.
Q: But being predisposed to doing
something is different than causing it to
happen, right? They're not necessarily the
same thing, you testified to?
Q: Okay. So not everyone who is
predisposed to alcoholism, for example,
becomes an alcoholic, correct?
Q: So on one hand in your report we
talked about the predisposed section, and
you testified in response to Mr. Johnson's
question that the – the damage is permanent,
it's not going to change, but then in the
last paragraph of your report, the – the
fourth sentence of the last paragraph on
your report you state, 'I believe the
behavior that led to the inappropriate
fiscal decisions that he made was aberration
and not likely to repeat itself.' Did you
put that statement in your report?
Q: So how can you on one hand tell us
that he's predisposed to engaging in these
activities, and has engaged in these
activities, the damage is permanent, and
things are not likely to improve, yet in the
next paragraph you're telling us presumably
what you believe to a medical – high degree
of medical probability, that he's not likely
to re-engage in the same conduct? How do
you reconcile that?
A: The reconciliation is based upon
the fact that Mr. Meisel is not under
anywhere near the kind of stress that he was
under when these events occurred. His tumor
is in remission. It is not impossible that
it won't come back, but it is unlikely.
That's number one.
As his attorney has just told all of
us, his financial situation is more stable,
his child situation is more stable. These
are important stressors which were in effect
at the time but no longer operable.
And at the time, despite this
predisposition, Mr. Meisel did not avail
himself of the kind of support and
professional help that might have prevented
him, given this predisposition, from acting
in the way he did.
Now, if Mr. Meisel didn't do anything
about his stress, and ignored
recommendations to find constructive ways to
manage stress, then I would say there would
be a concern that it could happen in the
future.
But I think the circumstances of his
life now are very different than they were
then. And – and that's how I would
reconcile the two paragraphs.
Q: But as I understand it, your
position that it's not likely to recur, the
behavior – the inappropriate behavior is not
going to recur, is largely based upon the
reduction of stress in Mr. Meisel's life,
correct?
A: I don’t think we should
underestimate the importance of that. I
really don't.
Q: Okay. Accepting that, wouldn't
the opposite then be true, that if the
stress – if the high level of stress
returned to his life, we should reasonably
expect that he's predisposed to commit the
same misconduct that he did previously?
A: We should be concerned about that
risk and do what can be done to prevent
that. And that is why I recommend the
neuropsych evaluation, to better understand
it, and to objectify it, and the
psychotherapy intervention.
Because the stress that comes into our lives
is not always under our control. Sometimes
we bring it upon ourselves, but more often
than not it's an external thing. And that
needs to be managed. That's the missing
link in Mr. Meisel's care.
¶20 The parties filed post-hearing
briefs regarding the appropriate sanction.
The referee filed her report and
recommendation on July 15, 2016. The
referee said Attorney Meisel's violations of
supreme court rules were made more egregious
because 11 counts involved the guardianship
of funds of orphaned children. The referee
also said the three counts related to the
B.T. estate reflected a serious breach of
trust to the estate beneficiaries and to the
court. The referee acknowledged:
The confluence of personal and medical
matters Attorney Meisel faced beginning in
2006 were substantial, life-changing. The
long term cognitive effects of the brain
cancer and treatments are balanced
sympathetically in favor of Attorney Meisel,
for misconduct that would otherwise call for
a much greater sanction, especially because
the actual misconduct did not occur until he
returned to active practice a couple of
years later.
The misconduct related to sustaining
the King Park project is not viewed as
sympathetically; options in handling the
business partnership were available and the
nature of that business deal is not so
compelling as to warrant much mitigation for
substantial misconduct involving substantial
conversions. Additionally, it cannot go
without note that Attorney Meisel presented
his defenses regarding his misconduct in
matters he handled which affected only these
four vulnerable people and estates; even
while during the same time period he carried
forth on other client matters without
engaging in similar misconduct.
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¶21 As part of her report, the referee
discussed in detail the American Bar
Association's standards for imposing lawyer
sanctions. With respect to aggravating
factors, the referee found that Attorney
Meisel demonstrated a dishonest or selfish
motive since he used converted client funds
for his own personal benefit. The referee
also found a pattern of misconduct in that
Attorney Meisel's repeated conversions and
unreported replenishments of the money
occurred over a three-year period, involved
four separate matters – two vulnerable wards
and two estates over which he had exclusive
control – and eventually were determined to
total more than $175,000. The referee noted
that Attorney Meisel's conduct involved
multiple offenses. She said that Attorney
Meisel had substantial experience in the
practice of law, having practiced for almost
15 years when he first converted funds.
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¶22 The referee also found a number of
mitigating factors, including Attorney
Meisel's lack of a prior disciplinary record;
his significant personal and emotional
problems; the fact that he made full
restitution to the clients from which he
converted funds; the fact that he was
cooperative during the OLR proceedings and
eventually entered into a stipulation; and the
fact that he expressed remorse for his
misconduct.
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¶23 Although the OLR included physical
and mental disability in its list of
mitigating factors, the referee found that
the record did not support placing much
weight on those factors as mitigating the
misconduct. In the referee's opinion,
Attorney Meisel did not provide clear,
satisfactory, and convincing evidence of the
nexus between his medical condition and the
repeated proactive misconduct of converting
client funds that occurred over the course
of several years.
¶24 The referee went on to say that
although the record supported the finding
that Attorney Meisel had and has mental
health conditions, the record did not
establish that those conditions were mental
disabilities. The referee noted that Dr.
Malkin ultimately testified that Attorney
Meisel's health condition may have
predisposed him to less acute judgment
and executive function, but Dr. Malkin
acknowledged that predisposition is not the
same as causation. Accordingly, the referee
concluded that Dr. Malkin did not
satisfactorily draw the required causal
connection between Attorney Meisel's health
issues and his misconduct. The referee
noted that in In re Disciplinary
Proceedings Against Sosnay, 209 Wis. 2d
241, 243, 562 N.W.2d 137 (1997), this court
said that absent a causal connection between
an attorney's medical condition and the
attorney's professional misconduct, the
medical condition may not be considered a
factor mitigating either the seriousness of
the misconduct or the severity of the
discipline to be imposed for it.
¶25 The referee also noted that even
when an attorney has been able to establish
a direct causal connection between a medical
condition and professional misconduct, the
fact that the attorney was apparently able
to serve other clients free of misconduct,
as the record shows Attorney Meisel was able
to do, was significant in determining the
sanction and the mitigating effects of
medical conditions. See In re
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Jacobson,
2004 WI 152, ¶79, 277 Wis. 2d 120, 690
N.W.2d 264; In re Disciplinary Proceedings
Against Karlsson, 2001 WI 126, ¶48, 248
Wis. 2d 681, 635 N.W.2d 771.
¶26 Due to the lack of a causal
connection between the medical condition and
the misconduct, the referee found that
Attorney Meisel failed to present persuasive
arguments that would support a five-month
suspension. The referee concluded that a
two-year suspension of Attorney Meisel's
license to practice law was an appropriate
sanction. In support of this
recommendation, the referee cited In re
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Edgar,
230 Wis. 2d 205, 601 N.W.2d 284 (1999); In
re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Edgar
(Edgar II), 2003 WI 49, 261 Wis. 2d 413,
661 N.W.2d 817; In re Disciplinary
Proceedings Against Brown, 2012 WI 51, 340
Wis. 2d 527, 814 N.W.2d 172; and In re
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Carter,
2014 WI 126, 359 Wis. 2d 70, 856 N.W.2d 595.
¶27 The referee noted that the law
licenses of Brown and Edgar were suspended
for two years, and Carter's license was
suspended for three years. All three cases
involved conversion of funds and comingling
of trust and personal funds to pay personal
expenses. The amounts of the conversions in
those cases were significantly less than at
issue here, with the Edgar case
involving about $11,000, Brown $13,000,
and Carter $75,000. The referee noted
that as in Carter, Attorney Meisel
entered into a stipulation to resolve the
matter. She also noted that Attorney Meisel
has made restitution and returned the
converted funds.
¶28 In addition to concluding that a
two-year suspension, was appropriate, the
referee also recommended the imposition of
the following conditions upon Attorney
Meisel:
(1) demonstration that he has his
medical conditions and stress and any other
emotional or psychological problems under
control, by his submission of documentation
of fitness pursuant to a medical examination
by a health provider approved by the OLR, at
his own expense;
(2) that he remain in treatment as
recommended by his treating physician and
obtain evaluations and neuro-oncologist
monitoring pursuant to the written medical
report included in the record as Exhibit 117
and via trial testimony, and that his
medical treatment be monitored by the OLR
via submission of quarterly reports for a
period of two years following his
reinstatement;
(3) that his practice of law be
monitored by an attorney approved by OLR for
a period of two years following
reinstatement, unless he is either employed
by a law firm, corporate office or
practicing with another attorney aware of
his disciplinary and medical history;
(4) that he obtain six Continuing
Legal Education credits in trust account
and/or law office management, and six
Continuing Legal Education credits in
business and professional conflict of
interest, to be approved by OLR and
monitored by OLR for compliance.
¶29 Attorney Meisel's appeal raises
three issues:
1. Did Attorney Meisel present clear,
convincing, and satisfactory evidence of a
causal connection between Attorney Meisel’s
medical condition and his misconduct?
2. Did the aggravating factors of
Attorney Meisel’s conduct weigh more heavily
than the mitigating factors?
3. Is a two-year suspension
disproportionate for the alleged
offenses?
¶30 Attorney Meisel argues that his
testimony at the evidentiary hearing,
combined with the testimony of Dr. Malkin,
presented clear, convincing and satisfactory
evidence that Attorney Meisel's medical
condition caused him to engage in the
misconduct. He argues that the referee
erroneously found otherwise.
¶31 Attorney Meisel further argues that
the referee's finding that the aggravating
factors in this case weigh more heavily than
the mitigating factors is not supported
either by the record or by applicable case
law. He asserts there is simply no evidence
to support any contention that his actions
were made with a selfish motive. He asserts
that the mitigating factors in this case far
outweigh any aggravating factors and he says
the contrary conclusion of the referee is
based on mere speculation.
¶32 Attorney Meisel also argues that the
referee's recommendation of a two-year
suspension is disproportionate to the
allegations of misconduct. Attorney Meisel
acknowledges that what he did was wrong, but
he notes that the actions were taken during
a very bad time in his life when he was
undergoing very stressful situations
involving his health and his family. He
says his contrition, his appreciation of the
error of his ways, and his understanding of
what he needs to do to return to being a
productive member of the bar were evident in
his testimony at the evidentiary hearing.
¶33 Attorney Meisel acknowledges that
one factor the court considers when
assessing the appropriate level of
discipline to impose is the need to deter
other attorneys from engaging in similar
misconduct. He says not only are the unique
medical, personal, emotional, and financial
circumstances that led to the series of
terrible, stupid mistakes he made extremely
unlikely to ever be repeated by any other
attorney, the experience which he has
already gone through will strongly motivate
him to avoid any such conduct in the future.
He asserts that no other attorney is ever
going to be placed in the same situation he
was and in the extremely unlikely event
someone was placed in a similar situation,
that attorney's impaired judgment
capabilities would not make it possible to
fully take into account the circumstances
and discipline imposed in this case.
¶34 Attorney Meisel argues that when
viewed in its entirety, the appropriate
sanction for his misconduct would be a
suspension of no more than five months.
Attorney Meisel notes that the difference
between a five-month suspension and a six-
month suspension is significant since,
pursuant to SCR 22.28, suspensions of less
then six months permit reinstatement upon
application and execution of documents
indicating compliance with the requirements
of the suspension. By contrast, suspensions
of six months or more require the attorney
to file a petition for reinstatement and go
through a full reinstatement proceeding,
which can add as much as one to two years on
to the suspension.
¶35 Attorney Meisel argues that the
decision in Jacobson should guide this
court in its analysis of the case. Attorney
Jacobson received a five-month suspension
for multiple counts of misconduct, which
included failure to communicate with clients
and keep them informed; trust account
discrepancies; misuse of client funds; and
misrepresentation to and failure to
cooperate with the OLR. The referee in that
case found that Attorney Jacobson's ongoing
depression was the cause of the misconduct
that led to the disciplinary proceedings. A
psychiatrist testified at Attorney
Jacobson's evidentiary hearing that, to a
reasonable degree of medical probability,
there was a direct relationship between
Attorney Jacobson's depression and his
misconduct.
¶36 The OLR argues that Attorney
Meisel's egregious misconduct involving
conversions in excess of $175,000 over a
three-year period warrants a two-year
suspension of his license to practice law.
According to the OLR, Attorney Meisel's
misconduct more closely approaches the
standards for revocation, and it says the
minimally appropriate discipline in this
case should be a very lengthy suspension.
¶37 As to Attorney Meisel's claim that
Dr. Malkin established a causal connection
between Attorney Meisel's health issues and
his misconduct, the OLR says that Dr. Malkin
wrote in his expert report and said in
testimony at the evidentiary hearing
initially consistent with the report, that
Attorney Meisel's health condition may have
predisposed Attorney Meisel to less acute
judgment and executive function. The OLR
says Dr. Malkin then dramatically detoured
from his report in his hearing testimony and
opined that the medical issues actually
caused Attorney Meisel's three year pattern
of misconduct. The OLR says in attempting
to justify that opinion on cross-
examination, Dr. Malkin apparently
recognized the dearth of any medical basis
to support it and promptly retreated to his
theory of predisposition, not causation.
¶38 The OLR notes that in her findings
of fact, the referee found that Dr. Malkin
clarified on cross-examination that his
ultimate opinion was that Attorney Meisel
was merely predisposed to bad decision
making and the doctor did not provide
testimony of a causal relationship between
the medical condition and the conversions.
The OLR asserts the referee's findings of
fact are supported by Dr. Malkin's own
testimony and should be upheld by this
court.
¶39 The OLR argues that Attorney
Meisel's proposed discipline of a suspension
of less than six months would undermine
multiple goals of attorney discipline,
particularly recognition of the seriousness
of the misconduct and the need to deter
other attorneys from engaging in similar
misconduct. The OLR says the referee
appropriately cited the Edgar,
Brown, and Carter cases as support
for the imposition of a two-year suspension
of Attorney Meisel's law license. As to the
conditions recommended by the referee, the
OLR says they all relate to appropriate
reinstatement concerns and the OLR suggests
that this court refrain from ordering the
conditions as part of the disciplinary case
and rather allow the particulars of
appropriate treatment and monitoring to be
addressed in the context of a future formal
reinstatement proceeding.
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¶40 A referee's findings of fact are
affirmed unless clearly erroneous.
Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo.
See In re Disciplinary Proceedings
Against Eisenberg, 2004 WI 14, ¶5, 269
Wis. 2d 43, 675 N.W.2d 747. The court may
impose whatever sanction it sees fit,
regardless of the referee's recommendation.
See In re Disciplinary Proceedings
Against Widule, 2003 WI 34, ¶44, 261 Wis.
2d 45, 660 N.W.2d 686.
¶41 After careful review of the matter,
we conclude there has been no showing that
any of the referee's findings of fact,
including her finding that Dr. Malkin did
not provide testimony showing a causal
relationship between Attorney Meisel's
medical condition and the conversions, are
clearly erroneous and, accordingly, we adopt
them. We further agree with the referee's
conclusions of law that Attorney Meisel
violated all of the supreme court rules set
forth above.
¶42 Turning to the question of the
appropriate sanction, the four primary goals
of attorney discipline are to address the
seriousness of the misconduct; to protect
the public, courts, and the legal system
from repetition of misconduct; to impress
upon the attorney the seriousness of the
misconduct; and to deter other attorneys
from engaging in similar misconduct.
See In re Disciplinary Proceedings
Against Arthur, 2005 WI 40, ¶78, 279 Wis.
2d 583, 694 N.W.2d 910. Both aggravating
and mitigating factors may be taken into
consideration in determining the appropriate
sanction for attorney misconduct.
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¶43 We disagree with Attorney Meisel's
claim that there is no evidence in the
record to support a finding that his actions
were made with a selfish motive or to gain
advantage. In the referee's words:
Attorney Meisel used converted client
funds for his own personal benefit,
including but not limited to sustaining King
Park, even though his business partner was
not pressuring him to maintain payments.
Further, Attorney Meisel camouflaged his
conversions replacing converted funds with
those converted from other client funds and
by mingling personal funds and law firm
funds. The timing of the conversions was
deliberate and, with respect to the
guardianships, often very close to
accounting time frames. The actual
conversions further demonstrated dishonesty
when Attorney Meisel further concealed his
misconduct by filing falsified annual
accountings with the Milwaukee County
Probate Court that intentionally omitted
disclosure of the converted and replenished
fund transactions.
¶44 We find that the record supports the
referee's conclusions. We also agree with
the referee that Attorney Meisel's repeated
conversions and unreported replenishments,
which occurred over a three-year period,
involved four separate matters, and totaled
more than $175,000, evidenced a pattern of
misconduct. We also share the referee's
concern that Attorney Meisel converted funds
from vulnerable victims. All of these are
aggravating factors.
¶45 We agree that this case also
presents a number of mitigating factors.
Specifically, we agree with Attorney Meisel
that his medical condition and other
personal and financial issues do constitute
mitigating factors. We view Dr. Malkin's
characterization of the multiple stressors
facing Attorney Meisel as being a "perfect
storm" as being an apt description of the
situation in which Attorney Meisel found
himself.
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¶46 Although we agree with the referee
that Attorney Meisel failed to prove that
his medical condition caused his
professional misconduct, the referee and the
OLR acknowledge that Dr. Malkin opined that
the medical condition may have pre-disposed
Attorney Meisel to less acute judgment.
¶47 We noted in Sosnay that absent a
causal connection between an attorney's
psychological condition and professional
misconduct the referee properly declined to
consider the psychological condition in
mitigation either of the seriousness of the
misconduct or the severity of the discipline
warranted. In the instant case, however,
the OLR concedes that Attorney Meisel's
serious medical condition should be
considered a mitigating factor. In its
appellate brief, the OLR said:
Despite the absence of the required
causal connection between Meisel's medical
condition and his misconduct . . . OLR does
not contest that Meisel's health issues
contributed to increased stress on his
everyday life.
¶48 In addition, although the referee
found the record did not support placing
"much weight" on Attorney Meisel's medical
issues, she did agree that, "[t]he
confluence of personal and medical matters .
. . were substantial, life-changing" and the
long term effects of Attorney Meisel's
medical condition were "balanced
sympathetically" in his favor.
¶49 We agree with the OLR and the
referee that the unique medical and personal
issues facing Attorney Meisel should be
considered mitigating factors. We also
agree with the OLR and the referee that
absent those medical and personal issues a
very lengthy suspension, or perhaps even
revocation, would be under consideration.
Although no two disciplinary proceedings are
ever identical, this court does, to the
extent possible, endeavor to impose a
similar level of discipline in fact
situations that are somewhat analogous. In
support of his argument that a two-year
suspension is excessive, Attorney Meisel
notes that in In re Disciplinary
Proceedings Against MacLean, 2016 WI 45,
369 Wis. 2d 59, 879 N.W.2d 767, an attorney
who intentionally misappropriated over
$450,000 received a two-year suspension.
Although we find that the clients in this
case were more vulnerable than the client in
MacLean, the amount of the conversions
in this case is less than half of the amount
converted in MacLean. After careful
consideration of the aggravating and
mitigating factors present in this case, we
deem it appropriate to impose a lesser
suspension in this case than was imposed in
MacLean and find it appropriate to
impose an 18-month suspension of Attorney
Meisel's license to practice law in
Wisconsin.
¶50 We agree with the OLR that it would
be premature to develop conditions for
Attorney Meisel's reinstatement at this
juncture. We find that the issue of
conditions would be best addressed in the
context of a future reinstatement
proceeding. Since Attorney Meisel has
already made full restitution of all
converted funds, no restitution award is
sought. As is our general practice, we
agree that Attorney Meisel should be
required to pay the full costs of this
disciplinary proceeding.
¶51 IT IS ORDERED that the license of
Christopher E. Meisel to practice law in
Wisconsin is suspended for a period of 18
months, effective June 7, 2017.
¶52 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that
Christopher E. Meisel shall comply with the
provisions of SCR 22.26 concerning the
duties of a person whose license to practice
law in Wisconsin has been suspended.
¶53 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60
days of the date of this order, Christopher
E. Meisel pay to the Office of Lawyer
Regulation the costs of this proceeding,
which are $10,831.67. If the costs are not
paid within the time specified, and absent a
showing to this court of his inability to
pay the costs within that time, the license
of Christopher E. Meisel to practice law in
Wisconsin, shall remain suspended until
further order of the court.
¶54 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that
compliance with all conditions of this order
is required for reinstatement. See SCR
22.29(4)(c).
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¶55 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.
(dissenting). Attorney Meisel has had
more than his share of medical problems and
has obviously suffered immensely. I could
go along with the referee's recommendation
of a two-year suspension. The referee
already considered mitigating factors. In
In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against
Sosnay, 209 Wis. 2d 241, 562 N.W.2d 137
(1997), this court said that absent a causal
connection between an attorney's medical
condition and the attorney's professional
misconduct, the medical condition may not be
considered a factor mitigating either the
seriousness of the misconduct or the
severity of the discipline to be imposed for
it. The per curiam opinion undermines
Sosnay. I am unwilling to do that.
What is left of Sosnay? Lawyers, the
OLR, and referees ought to know what factors
are mitigating factors.
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