¶2 We conclude that the referee's findings of fact are supported by satisfactory and convincing evidence. Since Attorney Moss failed to present a defense despite being given the opportunity to do so, we declare him to be in default. Based on our independent review of the record, we conclude that a two-year suspension of Attorney Moss's license to practice law in Wisconsin, rather than the nine months recommended by the referee, is an appropriate sanction. We also agree that Attorney Moss should be ordered to make restitution to the Fund and that he should be assessed the full costs of the proceeding.

¶3 Attorney Moss was admitted to practice law in Wisconsin in 2009 and practiced in Galesville. According to the record, he now lives in the state of Oregon. Attorney Moss's Wisconsin law license is currently suspended for failure to cooperate with OLR grievance investigations, failure to pay State Bar of Wisconsin (State Bar) dues, and non- compliance with trust account certification requirements.

¶4 On September 19, 2013, the Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) issued a complaint against Attorney Moss alleging 35 counts of misconduct with respect to his handling of eight client matters.

¶6 On April 28, 2012, Attorney Moss sent a letter to the OLR saying he would not respond to any grievances. He enclosed his State Bar membership card to serve as his resignation from the State Bar. On May 25, 2012, the OLR wrote to Attorney Moss informing him that voluntary resignation is governed by Supreme Court Rule (SCR) 10.03 (7) and that the OLR would continue to notify him of any grievance filed against him.

¶7 In June of 2012, the OLR notified Attorney Moss of the grievance S.H. had filed against him and requested a written response. Attorney Moss failed to respond. On November 14, 2012, this court temporarily suspended Attorney Moss's law license.

¶8 S.H. filed a claim against Attorney Moss with the Fund, and the Fund approved the claim for $1,000.

¶9 Counts Six through Ten of the OLR's complaint arose out of Attorney Moss's representation of G.H., who hired Attorney Moss to represent him in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding. Attorney Moss charged G.H. a $750 flat fee, but never initiated bankruptcy proceedings. The Fund approved G.H.'s claim for $750.

¶10 Counts Eleven through Fifteen of the OLR's complaint arose out of Attorney Moss's representation of S.J. and J.J., who hired Attorney Moss to represent them in a joint Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding. Attorney Moss charged them a $1,000 flat fee. The bankruptcy petition was never filed. The Fund approved a claim for S.J. and J.J. for $1,000.

¶11 Count Sixteen of the OLR's complaint arose out of Attorney Moss's representation of S.K., who hired Attorney Moss to represent him in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding. Attorney Moss charged S.K. a $500 flat fee. Attorney Moss did file a bankruptcy petition on behalf of S.K. S.K. subsequently hired Attorney Moss to represent him in a post-divorce matter in which a $5,600 money judgment had been entered against S.K. Attorney Moss agreed to request sanctions through the bankruptcy court for the issuance and enforcement of the money judgment and agreed to file a Section 1983 lawsuit. Attorney Moss never requested sanctions through the bankruptcy court and never filed the promised lawsuit.

¶12 Counts Seventeen and Eighteen of the OLR's complaint arose out of Attorney Moss's representation of S.L., who hired Attorney Moss to represent him in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding. Attorney Moss charged S.L. a $1,600 flat fee. In September of 2010, S.L. purged a bench warrant, issued as a result of an order for contempt in a Trempealeau County case, by posting a $1,000 bond. Attorney Moss filed the bankruptcy petition on behalf of S.L., and he also represented S.L. in two adversary proceedings. As a result of an adversary proceeding filed by Attorney Moss in January of 2011, the $1,000 was returned to Attorney Moss as a preference. Attorney Moss told S.L. he would hold the $1,000 in trust until the bankruptcy was resolved. S.L. tried to contact Attorney Moss regarding the status of his bankruptcy and the $1,000 preference in early February 2011, but Attorney Moss failed to return S.L.'s phone calls.

¶13 In July of 2011, pursuant to SCRs 22.02(6)(b) and 22.10(4), Attorney Moss entered into a diversion agreement with the OLR related to S.L.'s grievance. Attorney Moss breached the conditions of the diversion agreement when he failed to provide to the OLR verification of his attendance at six continuing legal education/ethics credit hours of instruction by July 1, 2012. On August 8, 2012, the OLR director notified Attorney Moss that he was terminating the diversion agreement and referring the matter to investigation. The record indicates that Attorney Moss returned the $1,000 to S.L.

¶14 Counts Nineteen through Twenty-Three of the OLR's complaint arose out of Attorney Moss's representation of C.L. and S.L., who hired Attorney Moss to represent them in a joint Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding. Attorney Moss charged them a $1,400 flat fee. The L.s informed Attorney Moss that S.L.'s wages were being garnished as a result of a money judgment entered against them in Trempealeau County. Attorney Moss agreed to take his flat fee from the previously garnished wages and returned the leftover funds to the L.s. Attorney Moss also agreed to negotiate with the L.s' mortgage lender in an attempt to lower their interest rate as part of the representation.

¶15 Attorney Moss filed a bankruptcy petition on behalf of the L.s in March of 2011. In May of 2011, Attorney Moss filed a reaffirmation agreement regarding the L.s' mortgage. Attorney Moss also filed an adversary proceeding to collect S.L.'s garnished wages. As a part of the proceeding, the entire preference payment was returned to Attorney Moss. Attorney Moss failed to account for and return any of the leftover funds to the L.s. In September 2011, Attorney Moss filed a revocation of the reaffirmation agreement. He failed to inform the L.s of the status or results of his purported negotiations with their mortgage lender. He also failed to inform the L.s that he was terminating his representation and/or closing his law office and moving to Oregon, and failed to return their client file.

¶16 Counts Twenty-Four through Twenty- Nine of the OLR's complaint arose out of Attorney Moss's representation of K.Q. and J.Q., who hired Attorney Moss to represent them in a joint Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding. Attorney Moss charged them a $1,500 flat fee. He did not have them sign a written fee agreement.

¶17 In February 2012, after missing several scheduled meetings with the Q.s, Attorney Moss met with them and told them he was closing his law office and moving to Oregon. He agreed to continue representing them after the move. The bankruptcy petition was never filed. In April 2012, K.Q. terminated the representation via email and asked Attorney Moss to return her client file and unearned fees. The Fund approved a claim for the Q.s for $1,200.

¶18 Counts Thirty through Thirty-Five of the OLR's complaint arose out of Attorney Moss's representation of K.S. and her then- husband G.G., who hired Attorney Moss to represent them in a joint Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding. Attorney Moss charged them a $1,500 flat fee. He did not have them sign a written fee agreement. Despite agreeing to do so, Attorney Moss failed to contact the couple's mortgage lender in an attempt to negotiate a reaffirmation agreement. From September 2010 through August 2011, Attorney Moss failed to return most of the couple's phone calls regarding the status of their bankruptcy. The parties' mortgage lender filed a foreclosure action in February 2011, and a default judgment was granted in April 2011.

¶19 The parties filed for a divorce in June 2011. In August 2011, Attorney Moss filed the bankruptcy petition. In October 2011, Attorney Moss had G.G. sign three reaffirmation agreements, which were filed in December 2011. Attorney Moss informed G.G. that K.S. would need to sign a reaffirmation agreement for her motorcycle, but Attorney Moss failed to take any further action regarding the motorcycle.

¶20 From October 2011 through March 2012, Attorney Moss failed to return K.S.'s numerous phone calls. The parties' divorce was finalized in December of 2011.

¶21 In February of 2012, G.G. and K.S. met with Attorney Moss at his Galesville law office. During the meeting they saw a handgun in Attorney Moss's lap and in his hand as he was sitting behind his desk. Attorney Moss told them he was carrying the handgun for protection from people who were hounding him and from clients who stalked and harassed him.

¶22 Attorney Moss was personally served with the OLR's complaint on September 20, 2013. He did not file an answer to the complaint. On December 18, 2013, the referee sent a letter to Attorney Moss setting a telephone scheduling conference for January 15, 2014. Attorney Moss failed to respond to the letter or appear at the scheduling conference.

¶23 On January 8, 2014, the OLR filed a motion for default judgment. At the January 15, 2014 scheduling conference, of which Attorney Moss had notice, the referee recommended that Attorney Moss be declared in default.

¶24 Attorney Moss has not filed an appeal from the referee's report and recommendation.

¶27 There is no showing that the referee's findings of fact are clearly erroneous. Accordingly, we adopt them. We also agree with the referee's conclusions of law that Attorney Moss violated the following supreme court rules, some of them in multiple instances: 20:1.3; 20:1.4(a)(3) and (4); 20:1.5(a); 20:1.5(b)(1) and (2); 20:1.15(d)(1) and (2); 20:1.16(d); 20:8.4 (g); and 22.03(2) and 22.03(6), enforced via 20:8.4(h).

¶28 After careful review of this matter, we conclude that the nine-month suspension sought by the OLR and recommended by the referee is an insufficient sanction for Attorney Moss's misconduct. Although Attorney Moss had a license to practice law in Wisconsin for only slightly more than three years before his license was suspended, during that short timeframe he engaged in repeated misconduct where he took fees from clients, failed to perform the work for which he was retained, failed to communicate with the clients regarding the status of their matters, and failed to return fees and client files upon request. The incident in which Attorney Moss was brandishing a handgun during a client meeting is disturbing. We believe that a two-year suspension of his license to practice law in Wisconsin is a sanction more commensurate with the misconduct at issue in this case.

¶29 A two-year suspension is also consistent with the level of discipline imposed in prior cases. For example, in In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Cooper, 2013 WI 55, 348 Wis. 2d 266, 833 N.W.2d 88, we imposed a two-year suspension in a case involving 42 counts of misconduct arising out of nine separate client matters. In In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Lucius, 2008 WI 12, 307 Wis. 2d 255, 744 N.W.2d 605, we imposed a two-year suspension in a case where the attorney was found to have committed ten counts of misconduct arising out of six client matters. Attorney Moss was found to have committed 35 counts of misconduct in his handling of eight client matters. A two- year suspension of his license to practice law in Wisconsin is an appropriate sanction.

¶30 We agree with the referee that Attorney Moss should be required to make restitution to the Fund and that he should be required to pay the full costs of this proceeding.

¶31 IT IS ORDERED that the license of David V. Moss to practice law in Wisconsin is suspended for a period of two years, effective the date of this order.

¶32 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date of this order, David V. Moss should make restitution to the Wisconsin Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection as follows: $1,000 attributable to S.H.; $750 attributable to G.H.; $1,000 attributable to S.J. and J.J.; and $1,200 attributable to K.Q. and J.Q.

¶33 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date of this order, David V. Moss shall pay to the Office of Lawyer Regulation the costs of this proceeding, $1,123.44.

¶34 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the restitution specified above is to be completed prior to paying costs to the Office of Lawyer Regulation.

¶35 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that David V. Moss shall comply with the provisions of SCR 22.26 concerning the duties of an attorney whose license to practice law has been suspended.