Disciplinary Proceedings Against Hammis
2011 WI 3, 331 Wis 2d 19, 793 N.W. 2d 884 (2011)
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ATTORNEY disciplinary
proceeding. Attorney's license
suspended.
¶1 PER CURIAM. Attorney James E.
Hammis appeals a report filed by Referee
Lisa Goldman on January 7, 2010, concluding
that Attorney Hammis committed 10 of 13
alleged counts of professional misconduct,
recommending this court suspend him for a
period of four months, and recommending
imposition of costs. Attorney Hammis does
not appeal the referee's findings or
conclusions of law but seeks a shorter
suspension. The Office of Lawyer Regulation
(OLR) cross-appeals contending the referee
should not have recommended dismissal of one
of the disciplinary counts and seeks a
longer suspension. The court heard oral
argument in this matter on September 14,
2010.
¶2 Attorney Hammis was admitted to
practice law in Wisconsin in 1988. He has
not previously been disciplined. He
currently practices in Stoughton,
Wisconsin. The allegations contained in the
OLR complaint pertain to alleged misconduct
involving two clients, practicing law while
administratively suspended, and Attorney
Hammis' subsequent failure to cooperate with
the OLR investigation. On February 24,
2009, the OLR filed a 13-count complaint
against Attorney Hammis alleging misconduct
related to Attorney Hammis' representation
of S.H. in a parole revocation matter
(Counts 1 through 3); billing anomalies
related to the representation of S.H. (Count
4); practicing law and/or misrepresenting
his status while under suspension (Counts 5
through 8); failing to respond to the OLR
(Count 9); and Attorney Hammis'
representation of V.T. (Counts 10 through
13). Attorney Hammis admitted six of the 13
charges (Counts 2, 5, 7, 8, 9, and 12). He
contested the other seven allegations. The
referee conducted the evidentiary hearing on
September 10, 2009, and rendered her report
and her recommendation for a four-month
suspension.
¶3 The issues on this appeal involve
the appropriate discipline and whether the
referee should have recommended dismissal of
one of the charges. Thus, the parties do
not dispute the referee's factual findings
and we agree that the record supports those
findings.
¶4 Attorney Hammis accepted an
appointment from the Office of the State
Public Defender (SPD) to represent S.H. in a
parole revocation matter on February 8,
2007. Attorney Hammis provided S.H. with a
copy of the revocation materials and met
with S.H. twice prior to the revocation
hearing. During one of these meetings S.H.
told Attorney Hammis that he believed he had
a potential sentence credit issue. At the
revocation hearing, Attorney Hammis
requested additional time to investigate the
possible sentence credit issue.
¶5 On or about May 8, 2007, S.H. sent a
letter to Attorney Hammis specifically
asking Attorney Hammis for the case file if
Attorney Hammis was not going to assist S.H.
with the sentence credit issue.
¶6 Attorney Hammis responded in a
letter dated May 26, 2007, advising S.H.
that the sentence credit issues were beyond
the scope of his appointment and that S.H.
should contact the SPD for further
assistance.
¶7 S.H. testified that he never
received this letter. S.H. then sent
Attorney Hammis a written request for his
complete file. Attorney Hammis did not
respond to this request. On July 15, 2007,
S.H. filed a grievance with the OLR
regarding Attorney Hammis' representation.
The OLR duly sent Attorney Hammis a letter
regarding this grievance that stated in the
event Attorney Hammis was still representing
S.H. that he notify S.H. regarding the
status of the representation and send a copy
of such letter to the OLR. Attorney Hammis
did not respond to this or to several
subsequent written requests for information
from the OLR.
¶8 After terminating his representation
of S.H., Attorney Hammis billed the SPD for
his work on this file. The SPD challenged
Attorney Hammis' billing records in the S.H.
matter and in 93 other cases he handled for
the SPD. Eventually, at the SPD's
direction, Attorney Hammis conducted an
audit of some 63 cases he had handled for
the SPD. Attorney Hammis eventually
admitted that he had billed the SPD for work
on S.H.'s case, including an appeal, that he
did not actually perform.
¶9 Meanwhile, Attorney Hammis failed to
comply with his continuing legal education
(CLE) requirements. By letter dated March
30, 2007, Attorney Hammis was notified by
the Board of Bar Examiners (BBE) that he
would be automatically suspended from the
practice of law at 4:30 p.m. on May 29,
2007, if he did not comply with CLE
reporting requirements. Attorney Hammis
failed to comply and was administratively
suspended. On June 1, 2007, Attorney Hammis
personally signed for a certified letter
from the BBE which notified Attorney Hammis
of this suspension.
¶10 Attorney Hammis continued to
practice law after receiving notice of his
administrative suspension. He appeared in
several client criminal matters after May
29, 2007, in violation of his suspension.
¶11 On June 8, 2007, while his license
was under administrative suspension,
Attorney Hammis appeared before the
Honorable Randy Koschnick in a Jefferson
County case. Judge Koschnick had heard that
Attorney Hammis had been administratively
suspended. Before the scheduled hearing he
asked Attorney Hammis if this had been
resolved. Attorney Hammis claimed he had
cleared up the matter the previous
afternoon. Based on Attorney Hammis'
misrepresentation, Judge Koschnick allowed
Attorney Hammis to proceed with the
scheduled hearing.
¶12 Later that same day, Attorney Hammis
registered and signed in for a 3 1/2 hour
CLE class titled, "Agricultural and
Business" at the Wisconsin State Bar
Center. This class was scheduled to begin
one hour from the time Attorney Hammis
arrived at the center. Attorney Hammis then
left the State Bar Center and drove to the
BBE office to file his petition for
reinstatement. The petition for
reinstatement stated that Attorney Hammis
had completed the "Agricultural and
Business" class when, in fact, the course
had not begun at the time Attorney Hammis
filed his petition with the BBE. Attorney
Hammis then traveled to a meeting in
Portage, Wisconsin, and did not return to
the CLE course until after 2:15 p.m. The
BBE denied Attorney Hammis' petition for
reinstatement because it ascertained he had
filed his petition prior to completion of
the necessary CLE course.
¶13 On June 12, 2007, Attorney Hammis
did complete a two-credit CLE course. On
June 13, 2007, he filed a second petition
for reinstatement. In his second petition
he affirmed he had not practiced law during
his administrative suspension and claimed
that he had instructed his office to
continue matters that were scheduled for the
weeks of June 4, 2007, and June 11, 2007,
while he was suspended. The reinstatement
petition failed to disclose that Attorney
Hammis had actually appeared on behalf of
six separate clients during his suspension,
including the plea hearing before Judge
Koschnick. Attorney Hammis also failed to
notify clients, courts, and opposing counsel
in pending matters of his administrative
suspension between May 30, 2007, and June
14, 2007. The BBE, Judge Koschnick, and the
SPD each separately notified OLR that
Attorney Hammis had appeared in court while
suspended. Attorney Hammis then failed to
respond to multiple OLR inquiries regarding
these allegations.
¶14 Following an investigation the OLR
filed a 13-count complaint against Attorney
Hammis. As noted, Attorney Hammis conceded
some of the allegations and contested
others. On this appeal the only charge that
remains in dispute is Count 11.
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¶15 Count 1 of the OLR complaint alleged
that by failing to communicate with S.H.
between May and December of 2007, Attorney
Hammis violated former SCR 20:1.4(a) and
current SCR 20:1.4(a)(3) and (4).
¶16 Attorney Hammis contested this
allegation in proceedings before the
referee. The referee found that Attorney
Hammis had sent S.H. a closing letter on May
26, 2007, although it appears S.H. did not
receive the letter. The referee thus
concluded that OLR had failed to meet its
burden as to Count 1 and recommended
dismissal of this charge. OLR does not
appeal this conclusion.
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¶17 Count 2 alleged that Attorney Hammis
violated SCR 22.03(2), made actionable via
SCR 20:8.4(h), by his failure to respond to
numerous requests for information from the
OLR. Attorney Hammis conceded the ethical
violations described in Count 2.
¶18 Count 3 alleged that Attorney Hammis
violated former and current SCR 20:1.16(d)
by failing to provide S.H. with a copy of
his file upon request or take appropriate
steps after termination of his
representation. The referee noted that on
May 2, 2007, S.H. specifically requested
that Attorney Hammis forward all transcripts
and revocation materials to S.H. Attorney
Hammis testified that S.H. already had his
entire file. However, the referee noted
that nothing in the record indicated that
Attorney Hammis advised S.H. or the OLR that
he believed S.H. already had his entire
file. Therefore, whether or not S.H. had
his entire file, S.H. was left with the
impression that Attorney Hammis had failed
to provide him with documents he thought he
needed to pursue his sentence credit issue.
¶19 On January 7, 2008, nearly six
months later, Attorney Hammis provided OLR
with a copy of the entire S.H. file.
Attorney Hammis later admitted that he never
provided S.H. with a copy of his entire file
or sent a letter responding to the file
request. Thus, the referee concluded that
Attorney Hammis' conduct violated SCR 20:1.16
(d). Attorney Hammis did not appeal this
conclusion.
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¶20 Count 4 of the OLR complaint alleged
Attorney Hammis violated SCR 20:8.4(c) by
billing the SPD for work he did not perform
in S.H.'s case. Attorney Hammis' billing
statement included an entry for 2.8 hours to
draft and file an appeal as well as an entry
to obtain and review a transcript and a
reference to a letter to S.H. outlining the
transcript. Attorney Hammis did not
actually draft or file an appeal for S.H. or
send this letter. The referee concluded
that the OLR had showed by clear,
satisfactory, and convincing evidence that
Attorney Hammis violated SCR 20:8.4(c) by
engaging in a repeated pattern involving
dishonesty when he overbilled the SPD on
this case. Attorney Hammis does not appeal
this conclusion.
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¶21 Turning to the allegations related
to practicing law while under suspension,
the OLR complaint alleged in Count 5 that by
failing to comply with CLE attendance
requirements, and for appearing in court on
behalf of several clients after he knew his
license had been suspended for failing to
comply with CLE requirements, Attorney
Hammis violated SCR 31.10(1), made
actionable by former SCR 20:8.4(f).
¶22 Attorney Hammis conceded the
misconduct alleged in Count 5 of the
complaint. Despite his notice and his
acceptance of a certified letter from the
BBE on June 1, 2007, Attorney Hammis decided
to appear in multiple courts for clients
while he was suspended.
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¶23 Count 6 of the complaint alleged
that Attorney Hammis lied to Judge Koschnick
on June 8, 2007, about his suspension status
and proceeded to appear before his court
while suspended in violation of former SCR
20:3.3(a)(l). Attorney Hammis repeatedly
argued that he did not mislead Judge
Koschnick regarding his suspension status.
Attorney Hammis testified, "I looked right
in his eyes and I said It's being taken care
of today, Judge, exactly into his eyes and
he said it better be, and then he let me go
back to the desk."
¶24 The referee observed that this
statement implied that Judge Koschnick was
willing to bend the rules with Attorney
Hammis after realizing Attorney Hammis was
suspended. The referee explicitly found
Attorney Hammis' testimony in this regard
was "untruthful." The referee noted,
further, that Attorney Hammis' claims were
inconsistent with his later testimony at the
hearing. There, Attorney Hammis admitted
that at the time of the plea hearing, he
knew he was not authorized to practice law.
Attorney Hammis was asked, "Knowing that you
were suspended when you appeared in his
court, why did you go ahead at that point
and make that appearance?" Attorney Hammis
replied, "I wanted the client to be on
probation as soon as possible. I knew that
I was going to have it resolved that day or
thought in my mind I would have it resolved
that day, and I made a really bad mistake."
The referee thus found that Attorney Hammis
appeared before Judge Koschnick knowing he
was suspended. The referee observed:
Perhaps [Attorney Hammis] lied to Judge
Koschnick because he did not want the
hearing to be rescheduled. Perhaps, he
lied because he did not want to admit to his
client, his client's wife, and the district
attorney that his license to practice law
had been suspended. Regardless, I find that
Hammis' version of what he said to Judge
Koschnick when asked about his suspension
cannot be believed. I find Judge Koschnick
correctly reported to OLR the day of the
hearing, June 8, 2007, that Hammis falsely
stated he "'had taken care of it' yesterday
afternoon and that he was no longer
suspended."
The referee noted further that:
This count more than any of the other
counts
in the complaint cause one to pause and take
note of all the facts and circumstances
surrounding this incident. It is this count
which most clearly shows Attorney Hammis'
willingness to bend the rules, lie, and
proceed recklessly with his obligations and
responsibilities under SCR Chapter 20.
In sum, the referee found that Attorney
Hammis knowingly made a false statement of
fact to Judge Koschnick regarding his
ability to practice law on June 8, 2007.
Thus, the referee concluded that Attorney
Hammis violated former SCR 20:3.3(a)(1).
Attorney Hammis does not appeal this
conclusion.
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¶25 With respect to Count 7, the OLR
complaint alleged that Attorney Hammis
averred to the BBE that he had attended a 3
1/2 hour CLE course ("Agricultural and
Business") on June 8, 2007. In fact, the
program had not yet commenced when Attorney
Hammis filed his petition for
reinstatement. The referee concluded this
conduct violated SCR 20:8.4(c). Attorney
Hammis does not appeal this conclusion.
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¶26 Count 8 of the complaint alleged and
the referee concluded that Attorney Hammis'
failure to notify clients, courts, and
opposing counsel of his suspension violated
SCR 22.26(1), made actionable via former SCR
20:8.4(f) (effective through June 30,
2007). Attorney Hammis does not appeal the
conclusion that he committed the misconduct
described in Count 8 of the complaint.
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¶27 With respect to Count 9, the OLR
alleged that Attorney Hammis failed to
respond to the OLR's multiple requests for
information about the pending grievances.
The referee concluded that by failing to
provide a written response to grievance
matters until January 7, 2008, after three
requests for a written response, and after
this court ordered him to show cause why his
law license should not be suspended for his
failure to cooperate with OLR's
investigations, Attorney Hammis violated SCR
22.03(2) as actionable via SCR 20:8.4(h).
Attorney Hammis does not appeal this
conclusion.
¶28 The OLR complaint also alleged four
counts of misconduct relating to Attorney
Hammis' representation of V.T. Two
allegations involve failure to refund
unearned fees and failure to respond to the
OLR. Attorney Hammis conceded the
misconduct in these two counts (Counts 12
and 13). Attorney Hammis contested the
other two counts relating to his
representation of V.T.
¶29 V.T. hired Attorney Hammis in July
of 2007 to represent him in an action
against the Rock River Leisure Estates and
T.M. and C.M., residents of Rock River, for
their alleged failure to abide by homeowner
rules and regulations. Attorney Hammis
conducted some initial discovery. In
October of 2007 and January of 2008 Attorney
Hammis prepared draft complaints in this
matter, but it is undisputed that between
October 2007 and March 2008 Attorney Hammis
never filed the complaint, despite continued
urging by V.T. On March 11, 2008, V.T.
fired Attorney Hammis.
¶30 V.T. paid Attorney Hammis $2,000
between July 22, 2007, and March 11, 2008.
Attorney Hammis did not deposit these fees
in his trust account, and he did not provide
written notice to V.T. regarding any rights
V.T. had, or any obligations Attorney Hammis
had, upon termination of the
representation. V.T. subsequently filed a
grievance with the OLR regarding Attorney
Hammis' representation.
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¶31 In Count 10 of the complaint the OLR
alleged that Attorney Hammis violated SCR
20:1.1 when he failed to take reasonably
available steps to pursue V.T.'s civil
complaint. The referee acknowledged that
Attorney Hammis' "conduct and
procrastination with his client clearly fell
below his client's expectations of him as
his attorney." However, the referee
observed, a lawyer does not necessarily
violate supreme court rules each time a
client is dissatisfied with the
representation received. The referee
ultimately concluded that OLR had failed to
establish by clear, satisfactory, and
convincing evidence that Attorney Hammis
lacked the legal knowledge, skill,
thoroughness, and preparation reasonably
necessary for his representation of V.T.
The referee recommended dismissal of this
charge. OLR did not appeal this
recommendation.
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¶32 OLR does appeal the referee's
recommendation to dismiss Count 11. There,
the OLR alleged that by failing to pursue
V.T.'s case for a period of over seven
months from the time he was hired in July
2007 to the time of his discharge in March
2008, Attorney Hammis failed to proceed with
reasonable diligence and promptness in
representing a client, in violation of SCR
20:1.3. The OLR asserts that the referee's
analysis regarding Count 11 is clearly
erroneous. After careful consideration, we
disagree and accept the referee's
recommendation to dismiss Count 11.
¶33 Attorney Hammis and V.T. exchanged a
number of e-mails about the strategy and
timing of a cease and desist letter and the
drafting and filing of a separate summons
and complaint. On September 7, 2007, V.T.
and Attorney Hammis decided to file a
complaint. The record demonstrates that
over the following months V.T. asked, with
increasing frustration, about the status of
the complaint and Attorney Hammis responded
with excuses for the continuing delay and
promises of action that did not
materialize. Attorney Hammis and V.T.
exchanged messages on September 7, 2007,
September 26, 2007, October 2, 2007, and
October 16, 2007, and on October 20, 2007,
V.T. still had "yet to see the draft."
Three days later, V.T. again asked about the
status of the complaint. On October 28,
2007, Attorney Hammis made excuses for
another delay. After some further inquiries
V.T. complained on November 1, 2007,
that "getting anything substantive is
getting to be painful." On November 7,
2007, Attorney Hammis told V.T. he would
file the complaint "tomorrow." On November
19 V.T. again asked Attorney Hammis about
the status. By December 4, 2007, V.T., in
frustration, claimed communication appears
to be nonexistent and requested a refund of
his deposit. On December 23, 2007, he
inquired, "STATUS?????" By December 28,
2007, Attorney Hammis claimed he had the
complaint and it was drafted against both
parties. In V.T.'s letter to Attorney
Hammis of March 11, 2008, he referred to
Attorney Hammis' "empty promises" and all of
the delays over the past six months. He
asked for the return of his $2,000 deposit.
Ultimately, V.T. filed a grievance regarding
this matter.
¶34 The referee and the OLR view this
situation differently. The referee
acknowledges that Attorney Hammis' "conduct
may have been unproductive to resolving
[V.T.'s] case" and that "he did not
prioritize [the] case," but ultimately
concludes that such conduct does not rise to
the level of a violation of SCR 20:1.3. The
referee explains:
The record shows numerous [e-mails] back
and
forth between [V.T.] and Hammis. [V.T.] is
clearly asking Hammis to act, while Hammis'
actions are not satisfactory to [V.T.]. But,
Hammis responded to almost every [e-mail)
[V.T.] sent him. Hammis' conduct may have
been unproductive to resolving [V.T.'s] case
and it shows he did not prioritize [V.T.'s]
case. But it does not rise to the level of
a violation of SCR 20:1.3 for failing to act
with reasonable diligence and promptness.
[V.T.] was able to pursue his matter with
subsequent counsel and reach a resolution
satisfactory to him. [V.T.] was not harmed
by Hammis' inaction.
Therefore, the referee concluded the OLR
failed to demonstrate with clear,
satisfactory, and convincing evidence that
Attorney Hammis violated SCR 20:1.3 and
recommended dismissal of the charge.
¶35 The OLR contends this analysis is
clearly erroneous. According to the OLR,
Attorney Hammis' responses to V.T.'s e-
mails "only prolonged the client's
frustration." The OLR explains:
[V.T.] was looking for action, not empty
promises to act. The fact that he was later
able to pursue the case with another
attorney may represent a mitigating
circumstance as to sanction. It is not a
defense to the underlying charge.
The unchallenged evidence is that,
despite
continuous prodding from the client and his
own promises, Hammis, in fact, did nothing
to meaningfully pursue this case for his
client for a period of over seven months
from the time he was hired in July of 2007
until the time of his discharge in March of
2008. The referee admits this delay to be
factually proven. Her rationale as to why
it does not represent a violation of SCR
20:1.3 is flawed.
However, while we do not condone the
excessive delay or repeated excuses offered
by Attorney Hammis, Attorney Hammis did
communicate frequently with his client and
was apparently attempting to craft an
effective and accurate complaint. We
therefore accept the referee's
recommendation to dismiss the claim that
Attorney Hammis' conduct violated SCR 20:1.3.
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¶36 In Count 12, the OLR alleged, and
Attorney Hammis conceded, that Attorney
Hammis violated SCR 20:1.15(b)(4m) by
initially depositing V.T.'s unearned advance
fee payment in his business account rather
than holding the fees in his client trust
account until the fees were earned, without
providing V.T. with a written notice as
required pursuant to SCR 20:1.15(b)(4m).
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¶37 Finally, in Count 13, the OLR
alleged and the referee agreed that by
failing to refund V.T.'s unearned fee for
four months following the March 11, 2008,
letter terminating his services, Attorney
Hammis failed to timely refund an unearned
fee upon termination of representation in
violation of SCR 20:1.16(d). No appeal from
this recommendation was filed.
¶38 We turn to the question of the
appropriate sanctions for Attorney Hammis'
misconduct. Attorney Hammis asks the court
to consider a lesser sanction than the four-
month suspension recommended by the referee,
namely a 60-day suspension. The OLR asserts
that four months is inadequate and requests
a six-month suspension.
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¶39 Consideration of the appropriate
discipline requires evaluating the following
factors: (1) the seriousness, nature, and
extent of the misconduct; (2) the level of
discipline needed to protect the public, the
courts, and the legal system from repetition
of the attorney's misconduct; (3) the need
to impress upon the attorney the seriousness
of the misconduct; and (4) the need to deter
other attorneys from committing similar
misconduct. See, e.g., In re
Disciplinary
Proceedings Against Eisenberg, 2004 WI 14,
¶5, 269 Wis. 2d 43, 675 N.W.2d 747. As is
frequently the case, sanctions for
misconduct can vary depending on the precise
nature of the facts and any aggravating or
mitigating circumstances specific to the
case.
¶40 Attorney Hammis seeks a 60-day
suspension. He explains that he violated
the supreme court rules during a period of
stress and disruption in his solo practice,
that he maintains the confidence and trust
of his current clients, that the recommended
four-month suspension is not consistent with
this court's preference for progressive
discipline, and asserts that a 60-day
suspension would be more consistent with
recent disciplinary decisions of this court.
¶41 Attorney Hammis' appellate brief
provides context for the misconduct. He
explains that during 2007, when he committed
the bulk of the rule violations, two things
happened: (1) his assignment as a receiver
for a company in northern Wisconsin
ballooned from a two-day-per-week obligation
to more than full-time; and (2) his
partnership with another lawyer abruptly
ended when she cleaned out their offices
overnight, leaving him to find new office
space and reorganize his cases. Basically,
he states that he "made a serious error: he
tried to do too much; he tried to maintain
his commitments to his Public Defender
clients and to his private clients."
Attorney Hammis provides positive
testimonials from several clients and argues
that a 60-day sanction will permit him
to "still maintain his practice" while
a "penalty of four months would make it
virtually impossible for him to do so
without essentially starting his practice
over."
¶42 The OLR, however, responds that
stress is not a mitigating factor in
imposing discipline. Indeed, the OLR
asserts that the only mitigating factor as
to sanction is the absence of any prior
disciplinary record. OLR emphasizes the
pattern of deceit reflected in Attorney
Hammis' decisions and urges a six-month
suspension.
¶43 We consider appropriate discipline
de novo but we are guided by the referee's
thoughtful consideration and
recommendations. The referee stated:
I am deeply troubled by Hammis'
willingness
to lie in furtherance of his own personal
goals. He willingly misled a sitting
circuit court judge about whether or not he
had a valid law license. He repeatedly
erred in his systematic billing practices to
SPD to the point where he often billed for
more than 15 hours in a day. He lied on his
petition for reinstatement when he asserted
he had not practiced law without a license
during his suspension. An omission is as
much of a lie as a false statement. Hammis'
failure to notify other judges of his
suspension and his failure to notify his
clients of his suspension are lies too.
The referee was thus of the opinion that
Attorney Hammis had shown a repeated
willingness to lie to satisfy his own
interests or what he perceived as the
prevailing interest. She states:
The Rules of Professional Conduct,
without
equivocation, prohibit lying. Our system
relies upon the honesty of its
participants. It really [cannot] function
otherwise. Hammis has wholly failed in
these matters to follow that basic rule. It
is clear that Hammis was under considerable
stress after the demise of his law firm
partnership and the increased stress
associated with a particularly complicated
and difficult case. But, stress alone
should not cause an attorney to be
repeatedly untruthful.
In light of the record before us and the
referee's observations, we agree with the
referee and the OLR that the 60-day
suspension sought by Attorney Hammis is
simply inadequate, particularly in light of
the unacceptable pattern of lying and deceit
committed by Attorney Hammis.
¶44 Accordingly, we carefully consider
the OLR's request for a more lengthy six-
month suspension. It is important to note
that a six-month suspension involves more
than just an additional two-month period of
time. Pursuant to the supreme court rules,
a six-month suspension requires the
suspended attorney to formally petition the
supreme court for reinstatement pursuant to
SCR 22.28(3), a process which requires a
full evidentiary hearing and further delays
a suspended attorney's return to practice
for a significant length of time.
See SCRs
22.29-22.33. It was in part for this reason
the referee opined that a six-month
suspension would be too harsh considering
the fact that Attorney Hammis has not
previously been disciplined. Both parties
presented case law in support of their
respective positions but the cases are
highly fact specific. On balance, we
conclude that a four-month suspension is
sufficient to accomplish the objective of
professional discipline and is consistent
with our precedent.
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¶45 Attorney Hammis concedes he
committed these ethical violations at a time
of significant disruption to his legal
practice, while overextended professionally
and trying to maintain his practice during
the break-up of his legal partnership. He
acknowledges he "made a serious error: he
tried to do too much." Many of his ethical
infractions such as failing to timely
maintain compliance with CLE credits and
billing anomalies, suggest office management
issues. We conclude that our goal of
protecting the public from similar
misconduct would be served by imposing
certain conditions on Attorney Hammis'
license to practice law and seeking to
ensure better case handling practices in the
future. We direct him to successfully
complete a law office management class
approved by the OLR, such as the State Bar
of Wisconsin's Law Office Management
Program, within six months of the date of
this order. Finally, we accept the
referee's recommendation that we impose the
full costs of this proceeding on Attorney
Hammis.
¶46 IT IS ORDERED that the license of
James E. Hammis to practice law in Wisconsin
is suspended for a period of four months,
effective March 1, 2011.
¶47 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within
six months of the date of this order James
E. Hammis shall complete an OLR-approved
office management course. If James E.
Hammis fails to comply with this condition
absent a showing of his inability to do so,
James E. Hammis' license to practice law in
Wisconsin may be suspended until further
order of the court.
¶48 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60
days of the date of this order James E.
Hammis pay to the Office of Lawyer
Regulation the costs of this proceeding,
which total $16,526.73 as of September 28,
2010. If costs are not paid within the time
specified and absent a showing of his
inability to pay, James E. Hammis' license
to practice law in Wisconsin shall remain
suspended until further order of the court.
¶49 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that James E.
Hammis shall comply with the provisions of
SCR 22.26 concerning the duties of a person
whose license to practice law in Wisconsin
has been suspended.
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