¶6 Following the refusal of the consensual reprimand, Attorney Fulkerson sent a lengthy letter to the OLR providing additional, highly personal mitigating information. In its memorandum in support of the current SCR 22.12 stipulation, the OLR asserts that Attorney Fulkerson has been "forthright and cooperative" throughout the OLR's investigation and that her letter did not attempt to avoid responsibility for or minimize her conduct. To the contrary, the OLR states that her letter demonstrated that she had understood her misconduct and was making changes in her life that will result in her being a better, more diligent lawyer. The OLR then submitted the matter to the Preliminary Review Committee, which found cause to proceed on six of the seven original counts. The OLR then reconsidered the sanction question, but ultimately determined that, especially in light of the mitigating information provided by Attorney Fulkerson and the totality of the information in the OLR's file, a public reprimand was still the most appropriate level of discipline to seek. The OLR then concluded that rather than submit a second consensual reprimand to a referee under SCR 22.09, it would pursue a SCR 22.12 stipulation with Attorney Fulkerson that would be submitted to this court for a decision.

¶7 In the resulting stipulation, Attorney Fulkerson represents that she understands the misconduct allegations against her and her right to contest them, that she admits them, and that she agrees with the OLR's recommended level of discipline. Attorney Fulkerson further states that she understands her right to consult with another attorney regarding these matters, that she understands the ramifications of the stipulated level of discipline, and that she is entering into the stipulation knowingly and voluntarily. The stipulation also states that it was not the product of plea-bargaining.

¶8 The counts of misconduct to which Attorney Fulkerson is stipulating arise from her representation of La.G. and Li.G. (collectively, "the G.s"). Li.G's illness and subsequent complications had caused her to spend nearly a year in various hospitals and nursing care facilities. The G.s' health insurance carrier had also denied coverage for approximately $27,000 in Li.G.'s medical expenses on the ground that certain services had been medically unnecessary. The G.s retained Attorney Fulkerson to pursue coverage for the unpaid medical expenses and to address a potential malpractice claim against certain health- care providers.

¶9 Attorney Fulkerson initially sent a letter to the health insurance carrier appealing the denial of coverage for the certain medical expenses. The insurer denied the appeal.

¶10 The G.s and Attorney Fulkerson then discussed proceeding with a lawsuit. Attorney Fulkerson agreed to represent the G.s on a contingent fee basis, but she failed to draft a written fee agreement memorializing that fee arrangement.

¶11 In November 2012 the G.s gave a check in the amount of $270 to Attorney Fulkerson to cover the filing fee for the anticipated civil action. Attorney Fulkerson (or someone on her behalf) negotiated that check on December 6, 2012, depositing the funds into Attorney Fulkerson's personal account. Attorney Fulkerson has acknowledged to the OLR that the funds should have been held in trust.

¶12 At the time she began her representation of the G.s, Attorney Fulkerson had no experience litigating medical malpractice cases. Early in the representation Attorney Fulkerson informed the G.s of her lack of experience in such cases, but told them that she believed that she was familiar with the standards of care required in medical facilities, as she had worked in the health-care field for 15 years. Prior to initiating the civil action, which contained medical malpractice claims, Attorney Fulkerson did not seek guidance concerning the specifics of litigating medical malpractice claims. During the course of the representation, Attorney Fulkerson did consult with several attorneys about general information concerning litigation procedures and tactics.

¶13 Attorney Fulkerson prepared a draft complaint, which she sent to the G.s for their review in October 2013. The G.s reviewed the complaint and returned it to Attorney Fulkerson within a month.

¶14 On June 2, 2014, Attorney Fulkerson filed a civil action in the Dane County circuit court on Li.G.'s behalf against the health insurer and a number of health-care providers. Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 655.445(1), because the complaint alleged claims for bodily injury resulting from the provision of professional services or the failure to provide professional services by health-care providers, Attorney Fulkerson should have filed a request for mediation with the director of state courts, but she failed to do so. It should also be noted that under Wis. Stat. § 655.445(3), where mediation must be requested, no discovery requests may be propounded and no scheduling or pretrial court conferences may occur until after the mediation period has expired.

¶15 In July 2014 Attorney Fulkerson sent a letter to the circuit court advising that she would be out of town from August 10 to October 1, 2014, and asking the court to hold any conference after that date. Attorney Fulkerson did acknowledge that she could be available by telephone if the court wished to meet with the parties before that time. Attorney Fulkerson did not send a copy of the letter to her clients or otherwise relay this information to them.

¶16 In August 2014 Attorney Fulkerson sustained an injury, making her unable to work full-time until February 2015.

¶17 The circuit court did conduct a scheduling conference on September 24, 2014. Attorney Fulkerson appeared by telephone. During the conference opposing counsel again reminded her of the need to file a request for mediation.

¶18 Attorney Fulkerson ultimately did file the mediation request, and a mediation session was scheduled for February 10, 2015. Attorney Fulkerson, however, was not adequately prepared for the mediation, which prevented the parties and the mediator from having a meaningful exchange and resulted in the mediation being terminated. Consequently, no written report was prepared.

¶19 In mid-February 2015 Attorney Fulkerson accepted employment with a large health insurance company. She began that position during the first week of March 2015. Attorney Fulkerson, however, did not inform the G.s of her new position and her inability to continue to represent them until May 7, 2015, approximately two months later. After having been informed of the situation, the G.s chose to have Attorney Fulkerson seek a dismissal of the pending complaint without prejudice. Attorney Fulkerson filed a motion to withdraw as counsel. During a subsequent telephone scheduling conference, Attorney Fulkerson moved to dismiss the complaint without prejudice, which the circuit court granted.

¶20 Attorney Fulkerson told the G.s that she would provide them with the names of other attorneys they could contact about taking over the representation. Attorney Fulkerson, however, failed to ever provide any such names, despite an email message from the G.s asking for that information.

¶22 On the basis of these stipulated facts, Attorney Fulkerson has admitted the following six counts of professional misconduct. First, by agreeing to represent the G.s on a contingent fee basis but failing to enter into a written fee agreement signed by the clients, Attorney Fulkerson violated SCR 20:1.5(c). Second, Attorney Fulkerson violated former SCR 20:1.15(b)(4) when she deposited the $270 check from the G.s into her personal account rather than into a client trust account. Third, by failing to acquire the legal knowledge needed to represent Li.G. in a medical malpractice action, including knowledge regarding the requirement of mediation in medical malpractice cases, Attorney Fulkerson violated SCR 20:1.1. Fourth, Attorney Fulkerson failed to pursue Li.G.'s claims with reasonable diligence, in violation of SCR 20:1.3. Fifth, Attorney Fulkerson's failure to inform the G.s that if the initial lawsuit on Li.G.'s behalf was dismissed without prejudice, they would have until September 13, 2015 to re-file the action constituted a violation of SCR 20:1.4(b). Finally, Attorney Fulkerson violated SCR 20:1.16(d) in multiple ways, including by failing to inform the G.s in a timely manner that she needed to withdraw from representing them due to her new employment; by failing to withdraw from the representation until two months after she had begun her new position; by failing to provide the names of possible successor counsel, as she had promised; and by failing to inform the G.'s of the date by which they would need to re-file the lawsuit to avoid the claims becoming time-barred.

¶24 In the end we agree with the OLR that a public reprimand is the appropriate level of discipline in this case. Attorney Fulkerson has been admitted to the practice of law in this state for approximately 17 years and has previously received only a private reprimand. While her misconduct here was serious, it did not involve intentional misconduct or dishonesty. It was limited to a single client representation, where Attorney Fulkerson unfortunately agreed to handle a matter in an area of the law where she lacked experience and competence. We also note the mitigating factors referenced by the OLR.

¶25 We believe that Attorney Fulkerson's misconduct is similar in nature and severity to the misconduct committed by Attorney Locke. Public Reprimand of Colleen J. Locke, No. 2013-3. Attorney Locke had received one prior public reprimand, while Attorney Fulkerson has a previous private reprimand. Like Attorney Fulkerson, Attorney Locke agreed to represent a client in an area of the law in which she had little experience (a bankruptcy proceeding). She repeatedly failed to file correct forms and schedules in the bankruptcy proceeding, which caused delays, a motion to dismiss from the bankruptcy trustee, and her termination from the representation. Attorney Locke admitted that she had violated SCRs 20:1.1 (lack of competence), 20:1.3 (lack of diligence), and 20:1.5(b) and (c) (failure to enter into written fee agreement and failure to properly explain basis and rate of the fee). In addition, unlike Attorney Fulkerson, in a separate matter Attorney Locke also admitted that she had violated SCR 20:8.4(c) by falsely testifying under oath that she had represented herself in a prior divorce proceeding. While Attorney Fulkerson has admitted to a couple more counts of misconduct than did Attorney Locke, the primary thrust of both matters is that the lawyers demonstrated a lack of competence and a lack of diligence, as well as failed to enter into proper written fee agreements. Given Attorney Locke's additional false testimony under oath, we cannot say that Attorney Fulkerson deserves a more severe level of discipline.

¶26 In its memorandum, the OLR states that it is not seeking restitution. It notes that the only money Attorney Fulkerson received from the G.s was the $270. While Attorney Fulkerson failed to maintain that amount in trust, she did ultimately use it to pay filing fees on behalf of the G.s. Thus, there are no funds belonging to the G.s that Attorney Fulkerson has wrongfully retained.

¶27 After carefully reviewing this matter, we accept the stipulation and impose the requested public reprimand. For the reasons given by the OLR, we do not impose any restitution obligation on Attorney Fulkerson. Finally, although a referee did review and refuse a prior proposed consensual reprimand, this disciplinary proceeding has been resolved at its outset through a stipulation without the need for the appointment of a referee or the incurring of legal fees by the OLR. Accordingly, we do not impose costs on Attorney Fulkerson.