Reinstatement Proceedings of Pleas
2022 WI 29, 5/10/22 (2022)
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ATTORNEY disciplinary proceeding.
Reinstatement granted.
¶1 PER CURIAM. The court has before it
the parties' joint stipulation for Attorney
Coral Dawn Pleas' reinstatement of her
license to practice law in Wisconsin.
¶2 Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule (SCR)
22.30(5)(b), the court may consider a
reinstatement petition by stipulation when,
as here, the Office of Lawyer Regulation
(OLR) concludes after investigation that the
petitioner has demonstrated, to the OLR's
director's satisfaction, that all of the
reinstatement criteria have been met.
See SCR 22.305 and SCR 22.29. The court
then considers the petition and stipulation
without the appointment of a referee. SCR
22.30(5)(b). The court may approve the
stipulation and reinstate the petitioner's
law license, or reject the stipulation and
refer the petition to a referee for a
hearing, or direct the parties to consider
modifications to the stipulation. Id.
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¶3 Upon consideration of Attorney Pleas'
reinstatement petition, the OLR's response
pursuant to SCR 22.30(4), the parties'
stipulation pursuant to SCR 22.30(5)(a), and
the OLR's memorandum in support of the
stipulation pursuant to SCR 22.30(5)(a), we
conclude that reinstatement is appropriate.
¶4 Attorney Pleas was admitted to
practice law in Wisconsin in 1993. On
September 29, 2020, based on a stipulation
between Attorney Pleas and the OLR, this
court suspended Attorney Pleas' Wisconsin law
license for six months for misconduct arising
out of her representation of a client, V.B.,
regarding two automobile accidents that
injured V.B. See In re Disciplinary
Proceedings Against Pleas, 2020 WI 77, 394
Wis. 2d 6, 948 N.W.2d 901. The court
determined that, during her representation of
V.B. regarding the first automobile accident,
Attorney Pleas committed misconduct by
failing to promptly notify V.B. and V.B.'s
health insurer of her receipt of $25,000 in
settlement funds; failing to promptly deliver
to V.B. and V.B.'s health insurer the funds
to which they were entitled; failing to hold
the settlement funds in trust; making
disbursements from her trust account via
internet banking transactions; failing to
provide V.B. and V.B.'s health insurer with
an accounting following final distribution of
trust property; and converting the $25,000 in
settlement funds to her own use. See
id., ¶¶18-19, 24. The court also
determined that, during her representation of
V.B. regarding the second automobile
accident, Attorney Pleas committed misconduct
by failing to file a personal injury lawsuit
prior to the expiration of the statute of
limitations. See id. The court also
determined that, during her representation of
V.B. regarding both automobile accidents,
Attorney Pleas committed misconduct by
failing to communicate sufficiently with
V.B., including regarding the fact that the
statute of limitations had expired on the
second accident claim. See id.
Finally, the court determined that Attorney
Pleas committed misconduct by failing to file
an overdraft notification agreement with the
OLR. See id.
¶5 In addition to imposing a six-month
license suspension, effective November 10,
2020, the court ordered Attorney Pleas to pay
restitution to V.B.'s health insurer in the
amount of $8,333.33 within 60 days of the
date of the disciplinary decision. Id.,
¶¶25-26. The court further ordered Attorney
Pleas to comply with the provisions of SCR
22.26 concerning the duties of a person whose
license to practice law in Wisconsin have
been suspended. Id., ¶27.
¶6 On November 5, 2021, Attorney Pleas
filed a petition for the
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¶7 On January 19, 2022, the OLR filed a
response to Attorney Pleas' reinstatement
petition, as required by SCR 22.30(4). In its
response, the OLR explains that it investigated
Attorney Pleas' petition and found she has
satisfied the criteria for reinstatement listed
in SCR 22.29(4)(a)-(m).
¶8 Examining SCR 22.29(4)(a)-(m) criteria
one by one, the OLR notes in its response that
Attorney Pleas desires to have her law license
reinstated, SCR 22.29(4)(a), and has not
practiced law during the period of suspension,
SCR 22.29(4)(b). She has instead done non-
legal work for a local community organization.
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¶9 As for the requirement in SCR
22.29(4)(c) that Attorney Pleas demonstrate
full compliance with the terms of the order
of suspension, the OLR notes in its response
that Attorney Pleas has met this requirement,
except for minor deviations that, in its
view, do not warrant the denial of Attorney
Pleas' reinstatement petition. One way the
OLR identifies that Attorney Pleas did not
strictly comply with our September 29, 2020
disciplinary decision is that, while we
ordered Attorney Pleas to pay $8,333.33 in
restitution to V.B.'s health insurer within
60 days of the decision date (i.e., by late
November 2020), Attorney Pleas did not pay
this amount until well later, in October
2021. In another deviation from the terms of
our disciplinary decision, while we required
Attorney Pleas to notify her clients of her
suspension by certified mail, she did so by
regular mail. The OLR also reports that,
while we required Attorney Pleas to file,
within 25 days after her suspension date, an
affidavit showing full compliance with her
post-suspension obligations, she filed this
affidavit belatedly.
¶10 Nevertheless, the OLR states in its
response that Attorney Pleas "in an overall
sense ultimately substantially complied with
the Court's September 2020 decision." The
OLR credits Attorney Pleas' explanation that
she satisfied her restitution obligation
beyond the date we ordered because she was
financially unable to do so earlier. The OLR
accepts Attorney Pleas' representation that
her finances were seriously compromised by
her personal health problems, the adverse
effect of COVID-19 on her pre-suspension
business income, and her limited post-
suspension income. The OLR notes that
Attorney Pleas' troubled finances are
documented in her tax returns and Chapter 13
bankruptcy filings. The OLR also notes that,
in Attorney Pleas' belated post-suspension
affidavit, she detailed the steps she took to
wind down her practice by her suspension
date, including successfully petitioning this
court for a 30-day extension to the
suspension date to allow her additional time
to wind down her practice, refraining from
taking any new cases, communicating with her
clients verbally and via mail (albeit not
certified mail) that she had been suspended,
assisting her clients in transitioning their
cases to successor counsel, advising all
courts and adverse counsel of her impending
suspension, and otherwise taking all
necessary steps to ensure her clients
suffered no prejudice due to her suspension.
¶11 As for the reinstatement criteria set
forth in SCR 22.29(4)(d)-(k), the OLR notes
in its response that Attorney Pleas has
maintained competence and learning in the law
by attendance at identified educational
activities, as evidenced by a January 12,
2022 memorandum from the Board of Bar
Examiners confirming her compliance with
continuing legal education and ethics and
professional responsibility requirements, SCR
22.29(4)(d); that her conduct since her
suspension has been exemplary and beyond
reproach, SCR 22.29(4)(e); that she has a
proper understanding of and attitude toward
the standards that are imposed upon members
of the bar and will act in conformity with
those standards, SCR 22.29(4)(f); that, as
evidenced by several character reference
letters, she can safely be recommended to the
legal profession, the courts, and the public
as a person fit to be consulted by others and
to represent them and otherwise act in
matters of trust and confidence and in
general to aid in the administration of
justice as a member of the bar and as an
officer of the courts, SCR 22.29(4)(g); and
that, as discussed above, she has complied
with the requirements set forth in SCR 22.26,
SCR 22.29(4)(h). The OLR also notes that, in
accordance with SCR 22.29(4)(j), Attorney
Pleas has explained her proposed use of her
license if reinstated: running a home-based
practice handling simple wills, municipal and
traffic matters, entity formation for small
businesses, and other small matters for
family and friends. The OLR also notes that
Attorney Pleas satisfactorily described her
business activities during her suspension in
accordance with SCR 22.29(4)(k), as she
explained that she works as a Program Coach
for the Martin Luther King Economic
Development Corporation in Milwaukee and has
served as a caretaker for her mother.
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¶12 The OLR next examines in its response
the requirement in SCR 22.29(4)(m) that
Attorney Pleas either: (1) show she has made
restitution to or settled all claims of
persons injured or harmed by her misconduct;
or (2) provide an explanation of her failure
or inability to do so. The OLR notes that it
received written comments on this point from
V.B., the client involved in Attorney Pleas'
earlier disciplinary matter. In her written
comments, V.B. states that she seeks
compensation for Attorney Pleas' failure to
timely file a personal injury lawsuit
regarding V.B.'s second automobile accident.
V.B. notes that she retained a lawyer who
brought a malpractice lawsuit against
Attorney Pleas, but her lawyer ultimately
dismissed this lawsuit because Attorney Pleas
had no malpractice insurance during the
relevant time period and had commenced
bankruptcy proceedings. V.B. notes that
Attorney Pleas sent her lawyer in the
malpractice action an offer to pay V.B. a
small amount of compensation under a payment
plan, but V.B.'s lawyer did not accept that
proposal. V.B. states that she does not
believe that Attorney Pleas has the moral
character to practice law. V.B. further asks
that, if this court reinstates Attorney
Pleas' Wisconsin law license, the
reinstatement should be conditioned on
Attorney Pleas reimbursing her for expenses
that she may have recovered had Attorney
Pleas timely filed a personal injury lawsuit
regarding V.B.'s second automobile accident.
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¶13 In its response to Attorney Pleas'
reinstatement petition, the OLR states that
V.B.'s objection should not preclude Attorney
Pleas' reinstatement. The OLR reasons that
Attorney Pleas has already been disciplined
for her failure to timely file a personal
injury lawsuit regarding V.B.'s second
automobile accident by way of the six-month
suspension imposed in this court's September
29, 2020 disciplinary decision. As for any
damages V.B. was unable to recover by virtue
of Attorney Pleas' failure to timely file
such a lawsuit, the OLR explains that these
are consequential damages, as opposed to
funds that were under Attorney Pleas' direct
control. Thus, the OLR writes, the situation
"did not meet OLR's restitution policy,
either when the disciplinary proceeding was
pending or at present."
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¶14 On February 14, 2022, the parties
filed a stipulation in which the OLR states
that Attorney Pleas has met her SCR 22.305
burden to prove by clear, satisfactory, and
convincing evidence:
(1) That she has the moral character to
practice law in Wisconsin.
(2) That her resumption of the practice of
law will not be detrimental to the
administration of justice or subversive of
the public interest.
(3) That her representations in the petition,
including the representations required by SCR
22.29(4)(a) to (m) and 22.29(5), are
substantiated.
(4) That she has complied fully with the
terms of the order of suspension or
revocation and with the requirements of SCR
22.26.
¶15 Also on February 14, 2022, the OLR
filed a memorandum in support of the
stipulation in which it reiterates that
Attorney Pleas has satisfactorily complied
with the criteria for reinstatement. The OLR
further notes that it did not identify any
adverse material issues during its
investigation of Attorney Pleas'
reinstatement petition that would justify
denial of reinstatement.
¶16 Upon consideration of all of the
above, we approve the parties' stipulation,
adopt the stipulated facts and conclusions of
law, and reinstate Attorney Pleas' Wisconsin
law license.
¶17 In doing so, we note that we agree
with the OLR's assessment that, despite some
missteps and delay, Attorney Pleas ultimately
complied with the terms of this court's
September 29, 2020 disciplinary decision.
See SCR 22.29(4)(c). There is no dispute
that Attorney Pleas served her period of
license suspension; that she fully paid the
restitution we ordered her to pay in what
appears to be as timely a manner as possible
given her troubled financial circumstances;
that she in fact notified clients of her
license suspension (albeit not by certified
mail); and that she filed a post-suspension
affidavit with the OLR director (albeit
belatedly). Under the circumstances
presented here, the court will not penalize
Attorney Pleas for her imperfect, but
ultimately effective, efforts to comply with
the terms of our September 29, 2020
disciplinary decision.
¶18 We further agree with the OLR that
V.B.'s written comments should not preclude
Attorney Pleas' reinstatement, nor trigger
the imposition of restitution to V.B. as a
condition of reinstatement. We did not order
Attorney Pleas to pay restitution to V.B. in
our September 29, 2020 disciplinary decision.
Although we recently denied reinstatement to
a lawyer for a failure to make restitution
even though restitution was not expressly
ordered in the original disciplinary
proceeding, see In re Disciplinary
Proceedings Against Parks, 2021 WI 10, 395
Wis. 2d 500, 953 N.W.2d 873, in that instance
the restitution at issue consisted of funds
that the lawyer had wrongfully obtained.
Id., ¶¶20-32 (denying reinstatement
petition
due to lawyer's failure to voluntarily
reimburse his former law firm for legal fees
he diverted from it, or his clients for an
improperly solicited "gift"). By comparison,
in this case, V.B. seeks consequential
damages; i.e., damages resulting from
Attorney Pleas' alleged malpractice in
failing to timely bring a personal injury
lawsuit regarding her second automobile
accident. The disciplinary process is
neither intended nor designed to handle the
questions of causation, contributory
negligence, mitigation, burdens of proof, and
other issues that would need to be resolved
in order to determine V.B.'s consequential
damages. As we have explained:
Whereas the goal of a legal malpractice
action is to put clients in the position they
would have occupied had the attorney not been
negligent, the goal of a disciplinary
proceeding is something else entirely: to
protect the public, the courts, and the legal
profession from attorneys who fail to meet
minimum standards of conduct. See In
re
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Harman,
137
Wis. 2d 148, 151, 403 N.W.2d 459 (1987). "It
is not the purpose of lawyer discipline," we
have noted, "to make whole those harmed by
attorney misconduct." Id.
In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against
Boyle,
2015 WI 110, ¶44, 365 Wis. 2d 649, 872 N.W.2d
637.
¶19 We note, too, that V.B. states in her
written comments that Attorney Pleas
contacted V.B.'s lawyer in her malpractice
action and offered to pay a small amount of
compensation to V.B. under a payment plan,
but V.B.'s lawyer did not accept this
proposal and dismissed the action. Thus, it
is not the case that Attorney Pleas "has made
no effort at all to make restitution to or
settle all claims of persons injured or
harmed by [her] misconduct," as was the case
for the respondent-lawyer in In re
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Parks, 395
Wis. 2d 500, ¶32. We therefore conclude
that, under the circumstances presented here,
Attorney Pleas has satisfied her burden to
demonstrate compliance with SCR 22.29(4)(m).
¶20 In sum, then, we conclude that
Attorney Pleas has the moral character to
practice law in Wisconsin, SCR 22.305(1);
that her resumption of the practice of law
will not be detrimental to the administration
of justice or subversive of the public
interest, SCR 22.305(2); that her
representations in her petition, including
the representations required by SCR 22.29(4)
(a) to (m) and SCR 22.29(5), are
substantiated, SCR 22.305(3); and that she
has complied fully with the terms of the
suspension order and with the requirements of
SCR 22.26, SCR 22.305(4). Accordingly, we
accept the parties' stipulation pursuant to
SCR 22.30(5)(b), and we reinstate Attorney
Pleas' license to practice law in Wisconsin,
effective the date of this order.
¶21 IS ORDERED that the petition for
reinstatement of Coral Dawn Pleas to practice
law in Wisconsin is granted, effective the
date of this order.
¶22 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that no costs
will be imposed in connection with this
reinstatement proceeding.
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