Before Carroll was retained, J.A.’s previous counsel and guardian ad litem had negotiated a settlement. The judge refused to approve the settlement, however, when P.W. objected on the basis that the amount designated as reimbursement to Price County for its medical assistance lien exceeded the amount she felt was appropriate. The settlement had called for payment of $3,966.17 to Price County, approximately half of the lien. P.W. believed Price County should receive reimbursement only for J.A.’s hospital bill, which totaled $1,556.80. After the settlement failed, P.W. discharged J.A.’s counsel and retained Carroll.

On February 2, 1998, Carroll wrote to P.W., informing her that he was “attempting to reduce the claim of the State to nothing.” Carroll, however, took no action to negotiate a reduction or elimination of the lien until after reaching a settlement with the defendant’s insurer on November 30, 1999. Carroll did not contact the attorney for Price County, Bruce Marshall, until December 1, 1999, when he wrote to Marshall and informed him that, in satisfaction of the Price County’s lien, J.A. client was willing to pay the exact amount due for medical treatment.

On December 13, 1999, Marshall wrote to Carroll in response, stating that Price County had withdrawn its 1997 offer to accept 50% of its lien, and that Price County was now willing to accept $5,299.84, the amount of all medical expenses incurred by J.A. Marshall also discussed Carroll’s assertion, in a phone conversation earlier that day, that Carroll had sent a letter to Marshall early in his representation confirming that Price County would stand by its 50% offer. Marshall indicated that he had searched his file and could not find Carroll’s letter but agreed to honor the original agreement if Carroll could produce the letter. After Carroll received Marshall’s letter, he had no further contact with him.

In subsequent correspondence, Carroll failed to inform his client and the court of Marshall’s position that Price County would no longer accept 50% of its lien. Carroll advised his client, in letters of January 10, 2000, January 13, 2000, January 25, 2000, and April 12, 2000, that he was still attempting to get the lien reduced. In a March 19, 2000 letter to the court, Carroll stated that Marshall had agreed to accept payment of 50% of the original lien but was unwilling to go lower.

In his April 24, 2000, initial response to the grievance, Carroll informed OLR that Price County was to be paid “a stipulated amount of 50% of their lien.” In later correspondence to OLR, Carroll admitted that the only action he took to negotiate a reduction of the lien was his one letter of December 1, 1999, to Marshall and their one phone conversation of December 13, 1999.

Carroll did not inform his client, until October 23, 2000, that Price County would no longer honor the original agreement regarding the MA lien.

On December 1, 2000, Carroll wrote to J.A. and informed her that Price County had been paid $5,299.84. This was the amount of J.A.’s actual medical costs, approximately $1,300.00 more than Price County’s original offer. Carroll further informed her that if she wanted to enforce the original agreement regarding the MA lien, she would need to petition the state and Price County.

In failing to take sufficient steps to pursue a reduction of the MA lien owed by his client, Carroll failed to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client in violation of SCR 20:1.3.

In representing to Marshall that he had previously written a letter confirming the original agreement regarding the MA lien when he had written no such letter and in representing to OLR and the court that Marshall had agreed to accept 50% of the original MA lien when no such agreement had been reached, Carroll engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation in violation of SCR 20:8.4(c).

On February 10, 1999, D.S. retained Carroll to represent him in a civil action arising from a car accident.

On February 28, 1999, D.S. signed an affidavit wherein he stated that, as a condition of his representation, he was requesting that Carroll loan him money for living and other miscellaneous expenses. D.S. further agreed to repay Carroll from any amounts recovered from the lawsuit but also stated that he would repay the loans regardless of the outcome of the lawsuit. D.S. also stated that the loans were necessary for him to be able to effectively pursue his case.

Beginning on February 29, 1999, and continuing through March 17, 2001, Carroll made loans to D.S., totaling $37,796.07, for living and other miscellaneous expenses. The loans were not for court costs or expenses of the litigation.

In a letter to OLR dated June 25, 2001, Carroll admitted to having made the loans to D.S. and provided an itemized list of all loans made to D.S.

In making loans to D.S. for the payment of living and other miscellaneous expenses, Carroll provided financial assistance to a client in connection with pending litigation, in violation of SCR 20:1.8(e).

On April 6, 1999, M.R. retained Carroll to represent him on charges of sexual assault of a child and possessing videotapes depicting nudity. On September 17, 1999 M.R. was sentenced to 20 years in prison and five years of probation. Carroll also represented M.R. on his appeal.

On December 23, 2000, M.R. wrote to Carroll, discharging him as counsel and requesting that Carroll send him his file. On January 5, 2001, Carroll wrote to M.R. and stated that he would retrieve M.R.’s file and send it to him as soon as possible. On January 12, 2001, M.R. again wrote Carroll and stated that his was still waiting for his file.

On February 10, 2001, M.R. sent a document he entitled “Request for Court to Compel” to the court requesting that the judge compel Carroll to produce his file for him. On February 16, 2001, the judge returned a copy of M.R.’s request to him with a handwritten note indicating that the court could not compel Carroll to return the file and suggesting that if M.R. did not receive his file, he may want to contact BAPR (OLR’s predecssor).

On February 21, 2001, Carroll wrote a letter to M.R. stating that, as he had informed M.R. in January, he could not send M.R. his file until he spoke with M.R.’s girlfriend, S.K. The letter also stated that Carroll had enclosed all the documents he had in his possession. Although addressed to M.R., the letter was apparently delivered to S.K.

On March 14, 2001, M.R. wrote to Carroll stating that S.K. had forwarded him his letter of February 21, 2001. M.R. again requested his file, as neither he nor S.K. had received it, and disputed Carroll’s assertion that he was told Carroll needed to speak with S.K. before sending his file. On that same day, M.R. also wrote to the judge, informing him of the February 21, 2001 letter and again stating he had never been told Carroll needed to speak with S.K. before sending the file.

On March 15, 2001, Carroll wrote to M.R. and stated that he had sent his file C.O.D. but the institution where M.R. was incarcerated would not accept it. Carroll also stated that he would resend it. On March 22, 2001, Carroll wrote to the judge informing him that he was resending M.R.’s file. M.R. finally received his file on March 28, 2001.

By failing to return M.R.’s file to him for over three months after being discharged, Carroll failed, upon termination of representation, to surrender papers to which his client was entitled, in violation of SCR 20:1.16(d).

In 1992, Carroll was privately reprimanded for failing to hold disputed funds in trust in violation of SCR 20:1.15(d). In 1997, Carroll was privately reprimanded for misrepresenting that he had filed a motion in violation of 8.4(c) and for filing a motion on his client’s behalf after being discharged in violation of SCR 20:1.16(a)(3). In 1999, Carroll was publicly reprimanded for failing to act diligently and failing to communicate with a client in violation of SCR 20:1.3, SCR 20:1.4(a) and SCR 20:1.4(b). In 2001, Carroll’s license to practice law was suspended for one year for violations of SCR 20:1.3, SCR 20:1.4(a), SCR 20:1.15(a), SCR 20:1.15(b), SCR 20:1.15(d), SCR 20:1.16(d), SCR 20:8.4(c), and SCR 22.07(2), in connection with his representation of four separate clients.

In accordance with SCR 22.09(3), Attorney John Miller Carroll is hereby publicly reprimanded.