Disciplinary Proceedings Against Alfredson
2017 WI 6, 2/1/2017 (2017)
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ATTORNEY disciplinary proceeding.
Attorney's license suspended.
¶1 PER CURIAM. We review a
stipulation filed pursuant to Supreme Court
Rule (SCR) 22.12 by the Office of Lawyer
Regulation (OLR) and Attorney Melinda R.
Alfredson. In the stipulation, Attorney
Alfredson admits that she committed
professional misconduct, and she agrees with
the OLR's request that her license to
practice law in Wisconsin be suspended for a
period of 60 days. Attorney Alfredson also
agrees that she should pay restitution
totaling $1,809.71 to two parties, divided
as set forth below.
¶2 After careful review of the matter,
we accept the stipulation and impose the
requested discipline. Because Attorney
Alfredson entered into a comprehensive
stipulation before the appointment of a
referee, we do not require her to pay the
costs of this proceeding.
¶3 Attorney Alfredson was admitted to
practice in Wisconsin in 2009. She has no
prior disciplinary history.
¶4 In July 2016, the OLR filed a
complaint alleging that Attorney Alfredson
had engaged in sixteen counts of misconduct
arising out of her representation of two
clients (K.H. and N.W.), her violations of
trust account rules, and her failure to
cooperate with the OLR's investigation into
these matters. In September 2016, the OLR
and Attorney Alfredson filed a stipulation
pursuant to SCR 22.12. We take the
following facts from the parties'
stipulation.
¶5 In January 2013, K.H. hired Attorney
Alfredson to represent him regarding two
claims he had unsuccessfully pursued with
the Social Security Administration (SSA).
Attorney Alfredson filed an appeal on behalf
of K.H. and attended a video hearing with
K.H. before a SSA Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ) in May 2013. In June 2013, the ALJ
denied K.H.'s claims.
¶6 K.H. and Attorney Alfredson received
a notice of the ALJ's decision, which
included instructions that a written appeal
must be filed within 60 days of June 30,
2013. K.H. instructed Attorney Alfredson to
file an appeal. Although Attorney Alfredson
claimed to the OLR that she sent a letter to
the local SSA office on August 9, 2013,
informing the SSA of K.H.'s intent to
appeal, the SSA office received no such
letter.
¶7 On August 13, 2013, Attorney
Alfredson drafted an appeal in letter form
and reviewed the draft with K.H. K.H.
requested revisions to the appeal letter.
Although Attorney Alfredson claimed to the
OLR that she made K.H.'s requested revisions
and submitted the appeal letter to the local
SSA office on August 13, 2013, the SSA
office received no such letter.
¶8 Between August 2013 and October
2014, K.H. asked Attorney Alfredson to check
the status of the appeal multiple times.
Although Attorney Alfredson claimed to the
OLR that she contacted the local SSA office
multiple times, and that each time she was
told the appeal was open and pending, the
SSA office has no documentation of any phone
calls from Attorney Alfredson. The SSA's
file also shows that no appeal was filed and
that the case was closed. Had Attorney
Alfredson called the SSA office to request
the status of K.H.'s case, she would have
been informed that the case was closed.
¶9 In October 2014, K.H. contacted the
SSA office to check on the status of his
appeal. He was told that the case was
closed because no appeal was filed.
¶10 K.H. left Attorney Alfredson a
voicemail informing her that the SSA office
had closed his file. Attorney Alfredson
claimed to the OLR that she called the SSA
office to check on the status of K.H.'s
appeal, and that she was told that the
matter was still open and that she should
file the appeal again if there was
uncertainty about whether the appeal had
been filed. Attorney Alfredson also claimed
to the OLR that she filed a duplicate copy
of the appeal letter on October 20, 2014.
However, the SSA office has no documentation
of any phone calls from Attorney Alfredson
in October 2014, nor of an appeal letter
from Attorney Alfredson dated October 20,
2014. Despite requests for a copy of the
purported appeal letter, Attorney Alfredson
did not provide it to the OLR.
¶11 In the stipulation, Attorney
Alfredson admits that she committed the
following counts of professional misconduct
during her representation of K.H.:
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• Count One: By failing to pursue the
appeal as agreed upon with K.H., Attorney
Alfredson violated SCR 20:1.3.
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• Count Two: By failing to provide
accurate case status information upon K.H.'s
request, Attorney Alfredson violated SCR
20:1.4(a)(3) and (4).
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• Count Three: By providing false case
status information to K.H., Attorney Alfredson
violated SCR 20:8.4(c).
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• Count Four: By providing false
information regarding the filing of the
appeal to the OLR, Attorney Alfredson
violated SCR 22.03(6), enforced via SCR
20:8.4(h).
¶12 In mid-April 2014, N.W. retained
Attorney Alfredson to represent him in a
custody and paternity matter. This matter
arose after a domestic incident occurred
between N.W. and the mother of his children,
D.N. As a result of the incident, N.W. was
taken into custody. D.N. moved to the State
of Oregon with the children.
¶13 D.N. filed for, and obtained, a
restraining order against N.W. After being
served with the restraining order, N.W.
entered into a retainer contract with
Attorney Alfredson, which provided that she
would represent him on custody and placement
issues for an advanced fee of $1,500. N.W.
also entered into a fee agreement with
Attorney Alfredson, which provided that the
advanced fee would be placed into Attorney
Alfredson's business account. N.W.'s mother
made an initial payment of $400 by credit
card, which was deposited into Attorney
Alfredson's business account. The remaining
$1,100 of the advanced fee was later paid to
Attorney Alfredson and deposited into her
business account.
¶14 Attorney Alfredson drafted court
papers, including a petition for custody,
placement, and child support, but did not
file the paperwork in a Wisconsin circuit
court until almost three months later, in
July 2014. Attorney Alfredson told the OLR
that she delayed filing the paperwork
because she did not know where to serve D.N.
¶15 Attorney Alfredson and N.W. never
discussed the delay in filing the legal
action. Had Attorney Alfredson told N.W.
that she did not know where to serve D.N.,
N.W. would have provided Attorney Alfredson
with an address at which he had recently and
successfully served D.N. in a different
legal matter. In addition, both N.W. and
Attorney Alfredson were aware of D.N.'s
address in Oregon because it was included on
the restraining order that had been served
upon N.W.
¶16 After filing the petition for
custody, placement, and child support,
Attorney Alfredson made no effort to obtain
service on D.N. Nevertheless, she claimed
that a process server in Oregon had twice
attempted to obtain service on D.N., and she
billed N.W. $75 for a service fee in August
2014. In a letter to the OLR, Attorney
Alfredson claimed that "service was not
delayed" until August 2014; rather, that was
"simply when the bill was paid." In a
subsequent letter to the OLR, Attorney
Alfredson stated that she never received a
bill from a process server and that she was
unable to provide proof of attempted
service.
¶17 In late August 2014, N.W. requested
that Attorney Alfredson refund the full
advanced fee of $1,500. Attorney Alfredson
responded that she was unable to return the
fee and that "monies have to be transferred
from the trust account (where your retainer
sits) and a grace period is required to be
waited." This statement was false, as the
funds had been deposited into Attorney
Alfredson's business account.
¶18 On August 28, 2015, Attorney
Alfredson sent a letter to N.W. stating that
she was terminating her representation of
N.W. and closing her file. She did not
include in the closing letter any
information about the ability to contest the
fee.
¶19 During the course of the OLR's
investigation, Attorney Alfredson told the
OLR in an email that N.W. "never contested"
his bill, even though she had sent him "a
letter upon closing that stated that he had
30 days to let me know if he contested his
bill, per the terms of our retainer
agreement." This statement was false, as
Attorney Alfredson did not include in the
closing letter any information about N.W.'s
ability to contest the fee. Moreover, far
from having "never contested" his bill, as
Attorney Alfredson claimed, N.W. had
requested a full refund of the $1,500
advanced fee. Although Attorney Alfredson
acknowledged to the OLR during the course of
its investigation that N.W. is entitled to
some sort of refund, Attorney Alfredson has
not refunded any portion of the $1,500 fee
to N.W.
¶20 In early September 2014, N.W. asked
a different attorney to take over his case
in place of Attorney Alfredson. On
September 9, 2014, successor counsel sent
Attorney Alfredson a Consent and Order for
Substitution of Attorneys. On September 14,
2014, N.W. sent Attorney Alfredson an email
asking her to "sign off on my case."
Attorney Alfredson replied to N.W.'s email
by stating that she had received the Consent
and Order for Substitution of Attorneys on
September 11, 2014, and that she had "turned
it in" on September 12, 2014. However,
Attorney Alfredson did not file the Consent
and Order for Substitution of Attorneys
until October 9, 2014. Her signature on the
document was dated September 8, 2014——a day
before successor counsel sent her the
document and three days before she received
the document.
¶21 In the stipulation, Attorney
Alfredson admits that she committed the
following counts of professional misconduct
during her representation of N.W.:
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• Count Five: By failing to ever serve
D.N. and delaying the filing of the court
papers in the Wisconsin circuit court case
until July 2014, Attorney Alfredson violated
SCR 20:1.3.
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• Count Six: By failing to provide
written notice to N.W. regarding his ability
to dispute the fee and participate in binding
arbitration to resolve any dispute over the
amount of the fee at the termination of her
representation, Attorney Alfredson violated
SCR 20:1.15(b)(4m)(b).
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• Count Seven: Having acknowledged that
N.W. is entitled to a refund of an unspecified
amount, by failing to refund to N.W. any
portion of the advanced fee, Attorney
Alfredson violated SCR 20:1.16(d).
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• Count Eight: By asserting to N.W.
that she was unable to refund an advanced fee
because the fee was located in trust when the
fee had been deposited directly into her
business account, Attorney Alfredson violated
SCR 20:8.4(c).
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• Count Nine: By asserting to the OLR
that upon termination of representation she
provided N.W. with written notice of his
ability to contest the fee when she had not
done so, Attorney Alfredson violated SCR
20:8.4(c).
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• Count Ten: By charging N.W. a $75
service fee and asserting that she was billing
for attempted service when she was never
billed by a process server, Attorney Alfredson
violated SCR 20:8.4(c).
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• Count Eleven: By providing false case
status information to N.W. regarding her
filing of the Consent and Order for
Substitution of Attorneys, Attorney Alfredson
violated SCR 20:8.4(c).
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• Count Twelve: By failing to timely
file the Consent and Order for Substitution
of Attorneys, Attorney Alfredson violated
SCR 20:1.16(d).
VIOLATIONS OF TRUST ACCOUNT RULES
¶22 Attorney Alfredson practiced as
Alfredson Law Offices for just over two
years, from mid-November 2013 through late
January 2016. Attorney Alfredson was the
only attorney affiliated with that firm.
Attorney Alfredson maintained a trust
account at U.S. Bank.
¶23 During the time that she operated
Alfredson Law Offices, Attorney Alfredson
represented L.Z. in a divorce matter. L.Z.
removed and partially spent about $5,000
from the couple's joint bank account. The
circuit court ordered L.Z. to provide an
accounting of the money that had been spent,
pay $1,000 to the opposing counsel for
attorney fees, and deposit the balance of
the money in Attorney Alfredson's trust
account. Notwithstanding this court order,
no funds related to L.Z.'s case were ever
deposited in Attorney Alfredson's trust
account.
¶24 The opposing counsel in the matter
repeatedly tried to contact Attorney
Alfredson to determine the status of the
accounting and the payment of his $1,000 fee
award. Attorney Alfredson did not respond
to the opposing counsel's inquiries.
¶25 At a subsequent court hearing,
Attorney Alfredson told the opposing counsel
that her trust account contained $900 of the
funds at issue, which she would in turn
forward to him in partial payment of his fee
award. This statement was false; Attorney
Alfredson had no funds relating to L.Z. in
her trust account, and the balance in the
account was $11.49.
¶26 Approximately two months after
making this statement, Attorney Alfredson
disbursed a $900 check from her trust
account to opposing counsel, even though
there were no funds relating to L.Z. in her
trust account and the balance in the trust
account at that time was $1.29. The check
cleared several days later, after Attorney
Alfredson deposited a $284 check from the
State Public Defender's Office for earned
legal fees to the trust account, as well as
$640 in cash.
¶27 Several other trust account
discrepancies are at issue in this
disciplinary proceeding. Between September
5, 2014, and April 3, 2015, Attorney
Alfredson deposited six checks totaling
$1,698.29 to her trust account that
consisted of earned fees or other funds
belonging to her. Between September 5,
2014, and April 15, 2015, Attorney Alfredson
made six disbursements totaling $1,783 from
her trust account for personal purposes; she
wrote one trust account check for her law
office rent, and five trust account checks
to family members (her father, brother-in-
law, and husband). Starting on April 2,
2015, Attorney Alfredson's trust account was
overdrawn. Attorney Alfredson did not
attempt to rectify the deficit in her trust
account. The account had a negative balance
of $309.71 until June 3, 2015, when the bank
charged off the negative balance and closed
the trust account.
¶28 In addition, between September 2014
and April 2015, Attorney Alfredson made
seven internet deposits to her trust account
via her cell phone, totaling $1,733.29.
¶29 Finally, Attorney Alfredson failed
to timely cooperate with the OLR's
investigation of the above-described trust
account discrepancies. She either failed to
respond to the OLR's inquiries, or when she
did respond, she provided incomplete or
contradictory information.
¶30 In the stipulation, Attorney
Alfredson admits that she committed the
following counts of professional misconduct:
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• Count Thirteen: By depositing at
least $1,698.29 in earned fees and personal or
law firm funds to her trust account, by paying
her law office rent for September 2014 from
the trust account, and by issuing a total of
five trust account checks to her father,
brother-in-law, and husband, Attorney
Alfredson deposited and retained funds
belonging to herself or her law firm in her
client trust account and used those funds to
pay personal and business expenses, in
violation of SCR 20:1.15(b)(3).
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• Count Fourteen: By making seven
internet deposits to her trust account,
totaling $1,733.29 between September 5, 2014
and April 3, 2015, Attorney Alfredson violated
SCR 20:1.15(e)(4)c.
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• Count Fifteen: By failing to address
the overdrafts of her trust account for more
than a month, resulting in the bank having to
close the trust account and absorb the
negative balance of $309.71, Attorney
Alfredson violated SCR 20:8.4(c).
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• Count Sixteen: By failing to timely
cooperate with the OLR's investigation of her
trust account discrepancies, Attorney
Alfredson violated SCR 22.03(2) and (6), as
enforced via SCR 20:8.4(h).
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¶31 The parties' stipulation provides
that Attorney Alfredson does not contest the
facts and misconduct alleged by the OLR or
the discipline that the OLR is seeking. The
stipulation further provides that Attorney
Alfredson fully understands the misconduct
allegations against her, her right to
contest those allegations, and the
ramifications that would follow from this
court's imposition of the stipulated level
of discipline. The stipulation further
provides that Attorney Alfredson understands
her right to counsel, that she is entering
into the stipulation knowingly and
voluntarily, and that her entry into the
stipulation represents her admission of the
misconduct described above. Attorney
Alfredson agrees in the stipulation that it
would be appropriate for this court to
impose a 60-day suspension of her license to
practice law in Wisconsin. Attorney
Alfredson further agrees that a restitution
award in the amount of $1,500 to N.W. and
$309.71 to U.S. Bank would be appropriate.
¶32 The OLR filed a memorandum in
support of the stipulation. The OLR cited
several cases that it claims support its
request for a 60–day suspension: In re
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Bartz,
2015 WI 61, 362 Wis. 2d 752, 864 N.W.2d 881
(60-day suspension for five counts of
misconduct related to one client matter;
lawyer had one prior private reprimand);
In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against
Paul, 2007 WI 11, 298 Wis. 2d 629, 726
N.W.2d 253 (60-day suspension for eight
counts of misconduct related to one client
matter; lawyer had no prior discipline);
In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against
Bowe, 2011 WI 48, 334 Wis. 2d 360, 800
N.W.2d 367 (public reprimand for five counts
of misconduct related to one client matter;
lawyer had one prior private reprimand);
In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against
Tishberg, 2014 WI 118, 358 Wis. 2d 483,
860 N.W.2d 263 (public reprimand for five
counts of misconduct related to one client
matter; lawyer had no prior discipline).
¶33 The OLR acknowledges that these
cited cases are distinguishable from the
facts at hand in certain respects. For
example, Attorney Alfredson engaged in
significantly more counts of misconduct than
the disciplined lawyers in the cited cases;
the sixteen misconduct counts here far
exceed the five involved in Bartz,
Bowe, and Tishberg, and the eight
involved in Paul. This case also
involves more extensive misconduct——spread
over multiple matters——than the cited cases,
each of which involved misconduct committed
in a single client matter.
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¶34 The OLR additionally notes that
there are more aggravating than mitigating
factors here. On the aggravating side of
the ledger, the OLR notes that Attorney
Alfredson engaged in dishonest conduct with
selfish motives by making misrepresentations
to K.H., N.W., and the OLR, each of which
was designed to conceal her misconduct or
delay refunding unearned fees. The OLR also
notes that Attorney Alfredson engaged in a
pattern of inappropriate behavior, has
expressed no remorse, and appears
indifferent to making restitution, having
failed to refund any portion of N.W.'s fee
advance or to refund U.S. Bank for the
overdrafts on her trust account. Only one
factor is present on the mitigating side of
the ledger: the fact that Attorney
Alfredson does not have a prior disciplinary
record.
¶35 The central issue for this court is
whether a suspension greater than the 60-day
minimum suspension is in order. See
In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against
Grady, 188 Wis. 2d 98, 108-09, 523 N.W.2d
564 (1994) (explaining that generally the
minimum length of a license suspension is 60
days). After careful review, we accept the
stipulation and impose the jointly requested
sanction of a 60-day suspension of Attorney
Alfredson's Wisconsin law license, plus
restitution payments of $1,500 to N.W. and
$309.71 to U.S. Bank. We note that this
sanction, on these facts, is modest. We
also note that Attorney Alfredson has no
prior disciplinary history. If she had been
previously disciplined, a longer suspension
would be in order. We remind Attorney
Alfredson that the court may impose
progressively severe sanctions when an
attorney engages in repeated misconduct. We
impose the sanction to which the parties
stipulated with the expectation that
Attorney Alfredson will not commit future
misconduct subjecting her to additional
discipline.
¶36 Because Attorney Alfredson entered
into a comprehensive stipulation, thereby
obviating the need for the appointment of a
referee and a full disciplinary proceeding,
we do not impose costs in this matter.
¶37 IT IS ORDERED that the license of
Melinda R. Alfredson to practice law in
Wisconsin is suspended for a period of 60
days, effective March 15, 2017.
¶38 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60
days of the date of this order, Melinda R.
Alfredson shall make restitution in the
amount of $1,500 to N.W. and $309.71 to U.S.
Bank.
¶39 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Melinda
R. Alfredson shall comply with the
provisions of SCR 22.26 concerning the
duties of an attorney whose license to
practice law has been suspended.
¶40 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that
compliance with all conditions of this
decision is required for reinstatement.
See SCR 22.28(2).
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¶41 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.
(concurring). I write separately to
point out that this decision seems to
continue a trend of this court's imposing
too light discipline following the parties'
entry into a stipulation. See, e.g.,
In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against
Krogman, 2015 WI 113, 365 Wis. 2d 628, 872
N.W.2d 657 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting);
In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against
Crandall, 2015 WI 111, 365 Wis. 2d 682,
872 N.W.2d 649 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
¶42 I am concerned that the stipulation
has become a way to engage in plea
(including sentencing) negotiations
forbidden by this court. The court has
written:
[W]e note that the OLR is not
authorized to plea bargain disciplinary
matters, although it may enter into
stipulations of fact and law and jointly
request the imposition of a certain level of
discipline that is supported by the
particular facts of a matter. See,
e.g., In re Disciplinary Proceedings
Against Barrock, 2007 WI 24, ¶5, 299 Wis.
2d 207, 727 N.W.2d 833; In re Disciplinary
Proceedings Against Robinson, 2007 WI 17,
¶5, 299 Wis. 2d 49, 726 N.W.2d 896; In re
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Paul,
2007 WI 11, ¶22, 298 Wis. 2d 629, 726 N.W.2d
253; In re Disciplinary Proceedings
Against Morrissey, 2005 WI 169, ¶27, 286
Wis. 2d 579, 707 N.W.2d 142; In re
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Malloy,
2002 WI 52, ¶13, 252 Wis. 2d 597, 644 N.W.2d
663.
¶43 I concur rather than dissent because
it is too cumbersome for the court to reject
a stipulation.
¶44 I advocated for the creation of a
committee to review the procedures of the
OLR and recommend changes. A majority of
the justices finally created such a
committee. I would hope that the Office of
Lawyer Regulation Procedure Review Committee
studies both plea negotiations and
stipulations.
¶45 Unfortunately, the Committee was
formed without any input from the bench,
bar, or public.
¶46 The members of the Committee are:
• Hon. (ret.) Gerald Ptacek
(chair)
• Attorney Michael Apfeld (Godfrey &
Kahn)
• Mr. Mark Baker (WS Darley &
Co.)
• Attorney Rick Esenberg (Wisconsin
Institute for Law & Liberty)
• Attorney Edward Hannan (Hannan Legal
LLC)
• Attorney Amy Jahnke (Anderson,
O'Brien, Bertz, Skrenes & Golla LLP)
• Attorney Terry Johnson (Peterson,
Johnson & Murray SC)
• Attorney Catherine La Fleur (La
Fleur Law Office SC)
• Attorney Frank LoCoco (Husch
Blackwell LLP)
• Professor Michael McChrystal
(Marquette University Law School)
• Attorney David Meany (Wisconsin
Department of Justice)
• Attorney Jennifer Nashold (Wisconsin
Division of Hearings & Appeals)
• Attorney Joseph Ranney (DeWitt Ross
& Stevens SC)
• Attorney Jacquelynn Rothstein (Board
of Bar Examiners)
• Attorney Carrie Schneider (Outagamie
County District Attorney's Office)
• Attorney Paul Schwarzenbart
(Stafford Rosenbaum LLP)
• Attorney Christopher Sobic (State
Public Defender's Office)
• Attorney Rod Rogahn (Rogahn Jones
LLC)
• Hon. David Wambach (Jefferson County
Circuit Court Judge)
¶47 Unfortunately the Committee has only
one public member. No charge was provided
to the Committee, but it has adopted a
mission statement. No time has been
proposed within which the committee is to
complete its work. Unfortunately, the
committee has no web site and does not
publicly announce its meetings or distribute
its minutes widely. Fortunately, the
committee has an able reporter——Attorney
Marsha Mansfield of the University of
Wisconsin Law School faculty.
¶48 I hope that the Committee's work
will be more public and will benefit from
public participation to improve the
procedures for disciplining lawyers, for
both the public and for lawyers.
¶49 For the reasons set forth, I write
separately.
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