Disciplinary Proceedings Against Stubbins
2014 WI 115, 10/14/2014 (2014)
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ATTORNEY disciplinary
proceeding. Attorney's license revoked.
¶1 PER CURIAM. In this matter, we
consider the petition of Attorney Joshua F.
Stubbins for the consensual revocation of
his license to practice law in Wisconsin
pursuant to Supreme Court Rule (SCR) 22.19.
Attorney Stubbins is the subject of ongoing
investigations by the Office of Lawyer
Regulation (OLR) regarding four separate
client matters. He acknowledges in his
petition that he cannot successfully defend
against the misconduct allegations that have
arisen out of those investigations.
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¶2 Attorney Stubbins was admitted to
the practice of law in this state in January
2007. During the time period relevant to
the investigations, Attorney Stubbins was
employed as an associate attorney with a
Milwaukee law firm, where he worked
primarily in the areas of defending consumer
protection and products liability claims.
Attorney Stubbins has not previously been
the subject of professional discipline. On
October 31, 2013, Attorney Stubbins's
license was administratively suspended for
failure to pay bar dues and assessments and
for failure to submit an annual trust
account certification. His license was also
subsequently suspended for failure to comply
with mandatory continuing legal education
reporting requirements. His license has
remained administratively suspended up to
the date of this opinion.
¶3 The OLR's summary of the pending
investigations involving Attorney Stubbins
that is attached to the petition for
consensual revocation indicates that the OLR
has received three grievances regarding four
separate client matters. They will be
briefly summarized below.
¶4 The first investigation involves
E.W., who was a partner in the law firm
where Attorney Stubbins worked. E.W.
requested that the firm represent him in
foreclosing on a land contract for a piece
of real property that E.W. and his wife
owned. In approximately the spring of 2009,
the firm assigned Attorney Stubbins to work
on the foreclosure of the land contract.
¶5 After Attorney Stubbins began
working on the first foreclosure, E.W. and
his wife entered into a second land contract
for the property. The buyers under this
second contract also defaulted.
Consequently, Attorney Stubbins was directed
to begin pursuing another foreclosure action
against these second buyers.
¶6 Attorney Stubbins was to have filed
the foreclosure complaints by October 2009.
He did not do so, however, until July 2011.
During the intervening nearly two years,
Attorney Stubbins made multiple
misrepresentations regarding the status of
the matters, including falsely suggesting
that certain actions, such as the service of
a complaint, had been accomplished. By his
evasion of certain questions and his
misrepresentations, Attorney Stubbins led
E.W. to believe that foreclosure actions had
been initiated and were proceeding.
Attorney Stubbins, however, filed the two
foreclosure complaints in July 2011 only
after E.W. had made numerous requests for
information about the status of the
foreclosure actions. Shortly after the
complaints were filed, E.W. terminated the
law firm's representation on both
foreclosure matters and retained other
counsel.
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¶7 The OLR's investigation summary
indicates that it is investigating possible
violations of SCRs 20:1.3, 20:1.4(a)(3),
20:1.4(a)(4), and 20:8.4(c) in this matter.
¶8 The second and third client
representations at issue have been addressed
in a consolidated OLR investigation. Both
of those matters were brought to the OLR's
attention by the former general counsel of
the law firm.
¶9 In the second client representation,
the law firm represented a company that was
a holdover tenant on a commercial lease.
The firm assigned Attorney Stubbins to
terminate the tenancy, return the keys to
the landlord, and assist with the
computation of damages connected to rent
payments during the holdover period.
Attorney Stubbins failed to return the keys
to the landlord, which led to the client
being held responsible for seven months of
double rent charges and the law firm having
to make a claim on its malpractice insurance
policy. In addition to not doing everything
that he was tasked to do, Attorney Stubbins
also billed the client for work that he
never performed. This ultimately caused the
law firm to reduce the client's bill by
$11,000.
¶10 In the third client representation,
the firm assigned Attorney Stubbins to
defend an auto finance company against a
claim that the finance company had
improperly seized the plaintiff's vehicle
and then had sold it at auction.
¶11 During the pretrial phase of the
litigation, the plaintiff's counsel served
on Attorney Stubbins a notice of deposition
for a finance company representative. After
the plaintiff's counsel sent a subsequent
confirming letter, Attorney Stubbins
responded that he had lost the deposition
notice and would be unable to appear on the
scheduled date. The plaintiff's counsel
thereafter scheduled the representative's
deposition for three separate subsequent
dates. Each time Attorney Stubbins falsely
told plaintiff's counsel that the client
representative was ill and could not be
deposed. On the last occasion, Attorney
Stubbins went so far as to claim that the
client representative was seriously ill and
required kidney dialysis. When the
deposition finally took place, the client
representative testified that she had been
unaware of the previously scheduled dates
for her deposition, that she did not have
any kidney-related health problems, and that
she was not on dialysis.
¶12 Attorney Stubbins also made other
misrepresentations to opposing counsel. For
example, he told opposing counsel that he
would produce certain information in
discovery but that he could not do so yet
because the client had not yet provided that
information to him. The client subsequently
acknowledged that it had provided the
information at issue to Attorney Stubbins
prior to his statement regarding the
inability to produce.
¶13 The circuit court denied a summary
judgment motion drafted by Attorney Stubbins
and granted partial summary judgment as to
liability to the plaintiff, leaving only the
issue of damages to be tried. Attorney
Stubbins failed to advise his client of
these rather significant developments in the
client's case.
¶14 In addition to filing the partial
summary judgment motion, the plaintiff also
filed a motion for sanctions against
Attorney Stubbins. The circuit court
granted the motion, which ultimately
resulted in a sanction of $9,600 being paid
by Attorney Stubbins personally. Attorney
Stubbins also failed to advise his client
that he had been sanctioned by the circuit
court.
¶15 Finally, Attorney Stubbins filed a
notice of appeal from the grant of partial
summary judgment to the plaintiff without
having obtained the client's consent to do
so. The appeal was subsequently dismissed
by the court of appeals.
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¶16 The OLR states that for the second
and third client matters, it is
investigating potential violations of SCRs
20:1.3, 20:1.4(a), 20:3.4, 20:4.1(a), 20:8.4
(c), and 20:8.4(f).
¶17 In the final client representation,
the law firm represented a defendant in a
civil action. A mediation session was
scheduled, but Attorney Stubbins failed to
advise the client of that fact. He attended
the mediation session on the client's behalf
without being accompanied by a client
representative. The mediation resulted in a
written settlement agreement, which Attorney
Stubbins signed on the client's behalf even
though he had no authority from the client
to enter into a settlement agreement.
Although Attorney Stubbins had a number of
subsequent email communications with the
client over the next couple of weeks, he
failed to inform the client that the
mediation session had occurred and that he
had entered into a settlement agreement on
behalf of the client. Indeed, Attorney
Stubbins led the client to believe that the
mediation had not yet occurred.
¶18 Attorney Stubbins's employment with
the law firm ended several weeks after the
mediation. The law firm and the client
subsequently learned that Attorney Stubbins
had settled the case without the client's
knowledge or consent. The law firm was able
to re-open the case and to settle the matter
at a second mediation session on terms
acceptable to the client.
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¶19 The OLR states that potential
violations arising out of this matter
include violations of SCRs 20:1.2, 20:1.3,
20:1.4(a), 20:4.1(a), 20:8.4(c), and 20:1.16
(a)(2).
¶20 In its recommendation in support of
Attorney Stubbins's petition, the OLR
acknowledges that Attorney Stubbins has
never been disciplined previously, but it
emphasizes that Attorney Stubbins repeatedly
lied to clients, to opposing counsel, and to
members of his own law firm. He also
engaged in a course of billing that was
misleading and unethical. The OLR also
points to two consensual revocation
petitions that it contends involved
misconduct that was similar or proportionate
to the misconduct committed by Attorney
Stubbins. See, e.g., In re
Disciplinary Proceeding Against Erlandson,
2005 WI 143, 286 Wis. 2d 53, 704 N.W.2d 910
(granting consensual revocation petition
involving allegations of ten potential
violations); In re Disciplinary
Proceedings Against Whitnall, 2003 WI 146,
267 Wis. 2d 28, 673 N.W.2d 674 (granting
consensual revocation petition involving six
potential ethical violations). The OLR
asserts that Attorney Stubbins's behavior
was a reflection of his character and
demonstrates that he is not fit to engage in
the practice of law in Wisconsin.
¶21 The OLR further states that it is
not seeking restitution for any of Attorney
Stubbins's misconduct. While it did find
evidence that Attorney Stubbins had
overbilled a client in one of the four
matters, there was no evidence that Attorney
Stubbins himself had ever been in possession
or control of client funds, and the law firm
subsequently reduced the client's bill.
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¶22 As noted above, Attorney Stubbins's
petition states that he cannot successfully
defend himself against the misconduct
allegations that have arisen from the OLR's
investigations. In the petition Attorney
Stubbins asserts that he is freely,
voluntarily, and knowingly (1) giving up his
right to contest the OLR's allegations of
misconduct and (2) asking for the revocation
of his license to practice law in this
state. He also acknowledges that he has the
right to retain counsel in this matter, but
states that he has chosen to represent
himself. Finally, Attorney Stubbins states
that he is aware of the consequences of the
revocation of his license, including his
obligation to follow the requirements of SCR
22.26 and the need to complete the formal
reinstatement process outlined in SCRs 22.29
through 22.33 in the event that he would
ever seek the reinstatement of his license.
¶23 After reviewing the petition, the
OLR's summary of misconduct allegations
under investigation, and the OLR's
recommendation, we conclude that the
petition should be granted. As shown by the
OLR's summary of its investigations,
Attorney Stubbins's repeated
misrepresentations to his clients, to his
law firm, and to opposing counsel; his
billing for work that he never performed;
his lack of diligence; and his multiple
decisions to take legally significant
actions (e.g., filing an appeal, settling a
lawsuit, etc.) on behalf of his clients
without their knowledge or consent
demonstrates that Attorney Stubbins does not
possess the necessary character to hold a
license to practice law in this state.
These were not one or two isolated
instances, but rather a pattern of deceitful
statements and unethical conduct.
¶24 Consistent with the OLR's
recommendation, we do not impose any
restitution obligation on Attorney
Stubbins. While his conduct certainly
harmed his clients, there is not a proper
basis in this matter for an order requiring
him to return money or property that he
received from his clients.
¶25 IT IS ORDERED that the petition for
consensual license revocation is granted.
¶26 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the
license of Joshua F. Stubbins is revoked,
effective the date of this order.
¶27 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, to the
extent he has not already done so, Joshua F.
Stubbins shall comply with the provisions of
SCR 22.26 concerning the duties of a person
whose license to practice law in Wisconsin
has been revoked.
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