¶3 Attorney Templin was admitted to practice law in Wisconsin in 2008 and practices in Milwaukee. His disciplinary history consists of a consensual private reprimand for failing to act diligently and failing to communicate appropriately in a client matter, and for failing to return files. Private Reprimand 2011-04.

¶5 Attorney Templin filed an answer to the complaint on March 13, 2015. Referee Dugan was appointed on March 31, 2015. On July 2, 2015, the parties sent the referee a stipulation that included a withdrawal of Attorney Templin's answer and his plea of no contest to all counts of misconduct. The parties sent the referee an amended stipulation on July 6, 2015. The amended stipulation provided that the referee could use the factual allegations of the complaint as an adequate basis in the record for a determination of misconduct as to all 12 counts.

¶6 The parties jointly recommended that the referee determine that a recommended sanction in the matter be a four-month suspension of Attorney Templin's Wisconsin law license. The parties further stipulated that Attorney Templin should be required to make restitution to two clients in the total amount of $500 and that he be required to complete six hours of CLE concentrating on civil procedure and/or appellate practice, with the coursework to be approved by the OLR, as a precondition to his reinstatement. Attorney Templin represented that he fully understands the misconduct allegations; that he fully understands his right to contest the matter; that he fully understands the ramifications of his entry into the stipulation; that he fully understands that he has the right to counsel and has chosen to represent himself; and that his entry into the stipulation is made knowingly and voluntarily and is not the product of plea- bargaining.

¶7 The referee issued her report and recommendation on September 29, 2015. The referee found that the OLR had met its burden of proof with respect to all counts of misconduct alleged in the complaint.

¶8 Counts 1-5 of the OLR's complaint arose out of Attorney Templin's representation of J.S. J.S. was divorced from M.S. in July 2008. Attorney Templin commenced his representation of J.S. in December 2008. In August 2011, approximately three years after the divorce judgment, Attorney Templin filed a notice of motion and motion for relief from the judgment of divorce or, in the alternative, to set aside the judgment of divorce for fraud on the court. Attorney Templin's motion challenged M.S.'s financial disclosures.

¶9 On October 10, 2011, M.S.'s attorney sent a letter to Attorney Templin, which included a motion for sanctions requesting that Attorney Templin withdraw his frivolous pleadings. The motion was based on legal grounds that included Wis. Stat. § 806.07, requiring a motion for relief from judgment to be filed within one year of the judgment.

¶10 On October 25, 2011, Attorney Templin filed an amended notice of motion and motion for relief from the judgment of divorce or to set aside the judgment of divorce for fraud on the court or, in the alternative, to create a trust under Wis. Stat. § 767.125(5). On November 1, 2011, a hearing was held before Calumet County Family Court Commissioner James Fitzgerald. The court commissioner determined that Attorney Templin's motion was not timely filed; that at least one of Attorney Templin's arguments involved "great leaps of reasoning that did not make sense;" and that there was no basis in fact for most of the allegations made by J.S. and that such allegations were frivolous. Accordingly, Attorney Templin's amended motion was dismissed with prejudice.

¶11 Attorney Templin filed a request for a de novo hearing. A hearing was conducted before Judge Wilber Warren III on March 27, 2012. Judge Warren issued a decision in August 2012 denying the motion to reopen the judgment and also denying the imposition of a constructive trust. Judge Warren found the claims for relief to be frivolous. In a September 10, 2012 order, Judge Warren ordered J.S. and/or Attorney Templin to pay $6,526.22 in attorneys fees to M.S.

¶12 J.S. filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition in April 2014, attempting to discharge the "attorneys fees" sanction. Attorney Templin's firm represented J.S. M.S.'s new attorney advised that the attorneys fees obligation was not a dischargeable debt under bankruptcy laws.

¶13 M.S. filed a grievance against Attorney Templin with the OLR. Attorney Templin repeatedly failed to respond to the OLR's requests for a response to the grievance. Attorney Templin did finally respond on September 12, 2013.

¶15 Counts 6-8 of the OLR's complaint arose out of Attorney Templin's representation of A.H. In 2009, the State of Wisconsin filed a petition to terminate A.H.'s parental rights to his son. Following a dispositional hearing in February 2011, A.H. involuntarily lost his parental rights to his son. Following an appeal and a subsequent trial on remand, the trial court entered an order terminating A.H.'s parental rights to his son. A.H. appealed this order. His appointed appellate counsel filed a no- merit brief on A.H.'s behalf.

¶16 On December 5, 2012, the court of appeals entered an order summarily affirming the trial court's order terminating A.H.'s parental rights.

¶17 Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 809.24(1), a motion for reconsideration of a court of appeals' decision must be filed within 20 days of the court of appeals' order. Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 808.10(1), a petition for review must be filed with this court within 30 days of the court of appeals' decision. A failure to comply with the 30- day deadline for filing a petition for review deprives this court of subject matter jurisdiction.

¶18 On January 4, 2013, A.H. met with Attorney Templin and paid him $300 in cash to review his case file for purposes of possibly filing a petition for review. A.H. believed he had until January 7, 2013, to file a petition for review. In fact, the filing deadline was January 4, 2013. Attorney Templin failed to advise A.H. that, subsequent to January 4, 2013, nothing further could be done on the case.

¶19 A.H. attempted to reach Attorney Templin in January and February of 2013 without success. In March 2013, A.H. submitted documents to Attorney Templin in an attempt to show his continued efforts to see his son. In April 2013, Attorney Templin met with A.H., returned his files, and stated there was nothing further to be done in the matter.

¶20 A.H. filed a grievance with the OLR against Attorney Templin. Attorney Templin failed to respond to the OLR's requests for a response to the grievance.

¶22 Count 9 of the OLR's complaint arose out of Attorney Templin's representation of V.K., who retained Attorney Templin in May 2013 to commence a divorce action. Attorney Templin prepared legal papers purportedly for the purpose of commencing the divorce action and mailed them to the Racine County Clerk of Court for filing. The clerk of court returned the divorce pleadings, unfiled, to Attorney Templin with a note indicating that the family court commissioner would not accept the documents for filing because Attorney Templin also needed to file an order to show cause and affidavit for temporary relief.

¶23 Attorney Templin prepared an order to show cause and affidavit for temporary relief and mailed the documents to the clerk of court. The documents were again returned with a statement that Attorney Templin had failed to properly follow local Racine County court rules. Thereafter, Attorney Templin downloaded the court documents that are accessible online for pro se litigants and filled out the information necessary to initiate the divorce action on behalf of V.K. Those documents were submitted to the clerk of court and were once again rejected. V.K. fired Attorney Templin via email on or about July 22, 2013.

¶25 Counts 10-12 of the OLR's complaint arose out of Attorney Templin's representation of C.B., a veteran who had a history of receiving medical care from the Veterans Administration (VA). In June 2008, C.B. was involved in a serious auto accident which resulted in him being flown to Froedtert Memorial Lutheran Hospital (Froedtert) where he remained for approximately three months. After payment of certain amounts by the VA, the amount owing from C.B. to Froedtert was $79,442.07.

¶26 On August 28, 2012, Froedtert filed a summons and complaint against C.B. in Milwaukee County circuit court. C.B. met with Attorney Templin on September 21, 2012, and discussed the need to file an answer and a third party summons and complaint against the VA.

¶27 Attorney Templin filed an answer and affirmative defenses on September 24, 2012. A pretrial conference was held on November 5, 2012. The scheduling order issued that day imposed a December 5, 2012 deadline for filing amendments to the pleadings, including the naming of any additional parties. The scheduling order imposed a deadline of March 5, 2013, for the parties to file all dispositive motions, imposed deadlines to identify witnesses and damage claims, and imposed a deadline for discovery, as well as a deadline to complete mediation.

¶28 On December 5, 2012, Attorney Templin filed a third party summons and complaint against the VA. Despite apparent efforts to obtain service on the VA, service was never obtained. Attorney Templin never filed a witness list on behalf of C.B.

¶29 On March 5, 2013, Froedtert filed a motion for summary judgment with supporting memorandum and affidavit. Attorney Templin did not file any responsive pleadings. On April 22, 2013, Attorney Templin sent an email to Froedtert's counsel indicating he never received the summary judgment motion. Another copy of the motion was sent to Attorney Templin.

¶30 On April 22, 2013, Attorney Templin sent a letter asking the judge for an adjournment of the April 24, 2013 summary judgment motion hearing. Attorney Templin's request was denied.

¶31 The scheduling order had also required the parties to complete mediation before April 4, 2013. The attorneys never communicated over the subject of mediation.

¶32 On April 24, 2013, the circuit court granted Froedtert's motion for summary judgment. Attorney Templin never adequately advised C.B. about the pending summary judgment motion or various legal options available to him concerning the motion. C.B. received no communication or contact from Attorney Templin after April 24, 2013. Ultimately, C.B. filed bankruptcy in 2014 and the judgment in favor of Froedtert was discharged.

¶36 The referee noted that Attorney Templin is a staff attorney employed at a nonprofit law firm directing services for economically disadvantaged clients who have few or no lawyer retention options. The referee also found a lack of remorse or acceptance of responsibility for Attorney Templin's actions, as well as a significant number of violations occurring in a relatively short period of time since he was licensed to practice law. The referee also expressed concern about Attorney Templin's understanding of his violation of supreme court rules, the seriousness of the violations, the inappropriateness of his conduct, and the effect of his violations of the rules. The referee noted that, while the disciplinary proceeding was pending, Attorney Templin attempted to voluntarily resign from the State Bar. His resignation request was held in abeyance pending the outcome of this disciplinary proceeding. The referee also commented that she was concerned about Attorney Templin's understanding and attitude towards meeting the professional standards imposed on a member of the bar, and said his "conduct during these proceedings raises substantial concerns about [his] understanding of and attitude toward court proceedings and toward future clients' needs and expectations."

¶38 A referee's findings of fact are affirmed unless clearly erroneous. Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Eisenberg, 2004 WI 14, ¶5, 269 Wis. 2d 43, 675 N.W.2d 747. The court may impose whatever sanction it sees fit, regardless of the referee's recommendation. See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Widule, 2003 WI 34, ¶44, 261 Wis. 2d 45, 660 N.W.2d 686.

¶39 There is no showing that any of the referee's findings of fact are clearly erroneous. Accordingly, we adopt them. We also agree with the referee's conclusions of law that Attorney Templin violated the supreme court rules set forth above.

¶40 With respect to the appropriate level of discipline, upon careful review of the matter, we agree with the referee's recommendation for a six-month suspension of Attorney Templin's license to practice law in Wisconsin. Although no two disciplinary proceedings are identical, a six-month suspension is generally consistent with the sanction imposed in In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Hartigan, 2005 WI 3, 277 Wis. 2d 341, 690 N.W.2d 831 (attorney's license suspended for six months for six counts of misconduct involving two client matters) and In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Boyd, 2009 WI 59, 318 Wis. 2d 281, 767 N.W.2d 226 (attorney's license suspended for six months for 13 counts of misconduct arising out of five client matters).

¶41 We agree with the referee's recommendation, based upon the parties' stipulation, that Attorney Templin be required to make restitution to A.H. in the amount of $300 and to V.K. in the amount of $200. We further agree that, as a precondition of license reinstatement, Attorney Templin be required to complete six hours of CLE, concentrating on civil procedure and/or appellate practice, as approved by the OLR. We also find it appropriate to impose the full costs of this disciplinary proceeding on Attorney Templin.

¶42 IT IS ORDERED that the license of Thor Templin to practice law in Wisconsin is suspended for a period of six months, effective May 3, 2016.

¶43 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, as a condition of the reinstatement of his license to practice law in Wisconsin, Thor Templin shall successfully complete six hours of continuing legal education, concentrating on civil procedure and/or appellate practice, as approved by the Office of Lawyer Regulation.

¶44 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date of this order, Thor Templin shall pay to the Office of Lawyer Regulation the costs of this proceeding, which are $7,564.50.

¶45 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date of this order, Thor Templin shall make restitution in the amount of $300 to A.H. and in the amount of $200 to V.K.

¶46 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the restitution specified above is to be completed prior to paying costs to the Office of Lawyer Regulation.

¶47 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Thor Templin shall comply with the provisions of SCR 22.26 concerning the duties of an attorney whose license to practice law has been suspended.

¶49 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J. (concurring). I join the per curiam. I write separately, however, to discuss a procedural issue posed in the instant case relating to current OLR practice: How should the OLR address multiple investigations of a lawyer during substantially the same time period? Should the OLR propose disciplining an attorney in one disciplinary proceeding only to support a different discipline or suspension of the license in the near future in another proceeding?

¶50 To understand the procedural issue, I state key dates relating to OLR's case against Attorney Thor Templin.

¶51 OLR's complaint in the instant matter was filed on February 15, 2015. OLR and Attorney Templin entered into a stipulation on July 6, 2015. The referee issued her report on September 29, 2015.

¶52 While the court was considering the instant OLR matter against Attorney Templin, on December 16, 2015, the OLR advised the court that it was investigating Attorney Templin on another matter. Notice of this other investigation is an open, public record.

¶53 This kind of issue arose in In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Osicka, 2014 WI 33, ¶36, 353 Wis. 2d 656, 847 N.W.2d 343. There the referee commented critically about the OLR's filing two complaints within about a year of each other complaining about conduct in which the attorney engaged during approximately the same period. The referee explained:

¶54 The instant case raises an anomaly similar to one the referee raised in the Osicka case. This anomaly and other issues in the OLR's procedures have been brought to the attention of the court. Several issues to be addressed have been described.

¶55 In this regard, I suggested that the court should institute a review of the OLR system, which is about 15 years old. Others have joined me in this suggestion. Since October 2013, Keith Sellen, Director of the OLR, and Justices Ann Walsh Bradley, N. Patrick Crooks, and David Prosser expressed interest in such a proposal. Justice Prosser commented at an open rules conference on January 20, 2015, that he favored a "top down" review of the OLR.

¶56 To put this suggestion before the court, I filed Rule Petition 15-01 on February 6, 2015, asking the court to create supreme court rules establishing a Lawyer Regulation Review Committee to undertake a comprehensive review of the Rules of Professional Conduct for Attorneys and the organization, operation, and procedures of the lawyer discipline system.

¶57 All commentators were supportive of the petition. Nevertheless, after treating the petition as a valid rule petition for almost a year, on November 16, 2015, five justices voted to dismiss the petition on the ploy that it was an improper subject matter for a rule petition: David T. Prosser, Patience Roggensack, Annette K. Ziegler, Michael J. Gableman, and Rebecca G. Bradley.

¶58 Justice Ann Walsh Bradley and I dissented from the dismissal.

¶59 The order dismissing the petition states that the dismissal does not necessarily end prospects for the appointment of a committee. Unfortunately, however, decisions about whether a committee will be established, the composition of the committee, the mission of the committee, and how the committee will function will be made behind closed doors. Yet lawyer discipline is of great importance to the court, to the lawyers of the state, and to the public.

¶60 I write separately to address an anomaly that was revealed in Osicka and to repeat my commitment to try to keep the bench, the bar, and the public generally informed as best I can about what progress (or lack thereof) is made in the appointment of the committee. As of this date, no progress has been made to create the committee.