¶21 The OLR's complaint alleged the following counts of misconduct with respect to Attorney Gonzalez's representation of J.C.:

¶22 The remaining four counts of misconduct alleged in the OLR's complaint arose out of Attorney Gonzalez's representation of D.J. In January 2013, D.J. was charged with three counts of sexual assault of a child. D.J. hired Attorney Gonzalez to represent him in February 2013. In March 2013, D.J. was charged with four felonies, including three for child enticement. At least one of the child enticement counts was for an attempt. Attorney Gonzalez agreed to represent D.J. in the child enticement case.

¶23 The OLR's complaint alleged that with respect to the child enticement case, Attorney Gonzalez did not perform legal research on whether D.J.'s actions constituted an "attempt."

¶24 On May 9, 2014, D.J. pled no contest to one count of attempted child enticement and one count of exposing a child to harmful materials in the child enticement case. The State dismissed the charges in the sexual assault case. In July of 2014, D.J. was sentenced to six years in prison, followed by six years of extended supervision.

¶25 In August 2014, Attorney Gonzalez filed a Notice of Intent to Pursue Postconviction Relief on behalf of D.J. In November 2014, the state public defender appointed Attorney Cole Ruby to represent D.J. in the postconviction matter. In October 2015, Attorney Ruby moved the court to vacate D.J.'s conviction and withdraw his guilty plea. One of Attorney Ruby's arguments was that Attorney Gonzalez had been ineffective because the attempted child enticement charges lacked a factual basis and could have been dismissed.

¶26 On January 12, 2016, Attorney Gonzalez testified at a hearing on the postconviction motion that he had not done any case law research on the meaning of "attempt." In April of 2016, the circuit court granted D.J.'s motion to withdraw his plea, citing as the basis Attorney Gonzalez's failure to understand and explain "attempt" to D.J. In May 2016, the circuit court vacated D.J.'s conviction and reopened both the sexual assault case and the child enticement case.

¶27 In 2013, Attorney Gonzalez also agreed to represent D.J. in an ongoing paternity and child support matter. Attorney Alicia Nall represented the petitioner.

¶28 In January 2015, the circuit court held a hearing on placement and granted D.J. telephone contact with his daughter. Attorney Gonzalez was ordered to prepare a written order but failed to do so.

¶29 On January 22, 2015, Attorney Gonzalez and D.J. discussed D.J.'s ability to telephone his daughter. Attorney Gonzalez told D.J. he would contact Attorney Nall.

¶30 In February 2015, D.J. made numerous attempts to contact Attorney Gonzalez about having telephone contact with his daughter, without success. In March 2015, D.J. wrote to the circuit court requesting a hearing about telephone contact with his daughter.

¶31 In March 2015, the circuit court contacted Attorney Nall about the order which Attorney Gonzalez was supposed to have prepared. Attorney Nall drafted an order and submitted it to the court. In May 2015, Attorney Nall moved the circuit court for attorney's fees and sanctions against Attorney Gonzalez for his failure to draft the order.

¶32 On May 11, 2015, D.J. wrote to Attorney Gonzalez about his lack of communication and inquired about setting up the telephone calls with his daughter.

¶33 D.J. filed a grievance against Attorney Gonzalez in March 2015. By letter dated May 19, 2015, the OLR notified Attorney Gonzalez that his written response to the grievance was required. Attorney Gonzalez provided his written response to the OLR on July 5, 2015. Attorney Gonzalez said D.J. had not attempted to contact him since he was incarcerated in 2014 and that it was up to D.J., not Attorney Gonzalez, to arrange telephone contact between D.J. and his daughter.

¶34 Attorney Gonzalez did not disclose to the OLR his failure to prepare and submit the written order effectuating the ruling made in January 2015 that D.J. be allowed telephone contact with his daughter. Attorney Gonzalez did not disclose to the OLR Attorney Nall's motion for sanctions based upon Attorney Gonzalez's failure to prepare the order as directed.

¶36 The OLR's complaint alleged the following counts of misconduct with respect to Attorney Gonzalez's representation of D.J.:

¶37 The parties filed a stipulation of facts on August 29, 2017. A hearing was held before the referee on August 31, 2017. The referee issued his report and recommendation on November 6, 2017. The referee found that the OLR had met its burden of proof on counts two, four, five, seven, and nine of the complaint, but had not met its burden of proof on counts one, three, six, and eight.

¶38 With respect to count two, the referee said based on the long spans of Attorney Gonzalez having no communication with J.C. and his failure to respond to J.C.'s requests in a substantive way, the OLR demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that Attorney Gonzalez violated SCR 20:1.4(a)(4). With respect to count four, the referee said that Attorney Gonzalez admitted that he lied to J.C. when he said he had filed the pleas to the City of Horicon citations and when he told J.C. he did not have to appear on the hearing date because not guilty pleas had been entered.

¶39 The referee said Attorney Gonzalez did nothing to defend the citations after the matter was reopened, and J.C. was found guilty of the two citations. The referee also said Attorney Gonzalez's testimony at the disciplinary hearing that he would not apologize to J.C. for lying to him was a troubling indication of a lack of remorse. The referee found by clear and convincing evidence that by failing to enter not guilty pleas to J.C.'s municipal citations, Attorney Gonzalez violated SCR 20:1.3.

¶40 With respect to count five, the referee noted that J.C. was sometimes without a phone and at times was not accessible during regular hours. In addition, J.C. changed his address several times during Attorney Gonzalez's representation. The referee found that Attorney Gonzalez did not misrepresent to the OLR that he sent an October 30, 2014 closing letter, and the referee termed this an administrative error that occurs in all businesses.

¶41 The referee said there was nothing in the record to indicate that when Attorney Gonzalez represented to the OLR that he had sent the letter he was not being truthful. The referee found, however, that Attorney Gonzalez did misrepresent to the OLR that he was "assisting" as opposed to representing J.C. regarding the City of Horicon citations, and the referee said the facts of record demonstrated that Attorney Gonzalez was serving the function of representing J.C., not merely "assisting" him. Thus, the referee found by clear and convincing evidence that, when Attorney Gonzalez represented to the OLR that he "assisted" J.C. and did not represent him regarding the citations, Attorney Gonzalez violated SCR 22.03(6), enforced via SCR 20:8.4(h).

¶42 With respect to count seven, the referee found that Attorney Gonzalez was working to obtain a facilitator for D.J. to arrange telephone contact with his daughter. The referee found that Attorney Gonzalez's explanation that he could not draft the order pursuant to the circuit court's direction because he could not find a facilitator was not credible. The referee noted that Attorney Nall was able to draft the order without obtaining a facilitator. The referee found that by failing to prepare the court order to permit D.J. to have telephone contact with his daughter, Attorney Gonzalez failed to act with reasonable diligence and promptness, in violation of SCR 20:1.3.

¶43 Finally, with respect to count nine, the referee said Attorney Gonzalez admitted that his statement to the OLR that D.J. had not contacted him since he was incarcerated was untrue. While Attorney Gonzalez argued this was a misstatement and that he provided a letter contradicting the statement to the OLR, the referee said this was not the only misrepresentation contained in Attorney Gonzalez's response to the OLR regarding his representation of D.J. in the paternity matter.

¶44 The referee said Attorney Gonzalez stated it was up to D.J. to arrange telephone contact between D.J. and his daughter when this was not true. The referee also said that Attorney Gonzalez neglected to notify the OLR of his failure to prepare and submit the written order effectuating the circuit court's January 13, 2015 order. Finally, the referee said that Attorney Gonzalez failed to notify the OLR that Attorney Nall had filed a motion for sanctions against him for his failure to file the order and that the motion had been granted. The referee found, based on these misstatements and omissions, that Attorney Gonzalez violated SCR 22.03(6), enforceable via SCR 20:8.4(h).

¶45 The referee concluded that a public reprimanded was an appropriate sanction for Attorney Gonzalez's misconduct. The referee also recommended that the full costs of the proceeding should be assessed against Attorney Gonzalez.

¶46 In his appeal, Attorney Gonzalez says he concedes count 2, i.e. that he failed to promptly respond to J.C.'s request for information. He also concedes the substance of count 4 and admits that he failed to enter not guilty pleas for J.C.'s municipal citations and that he told J.C. he had done so. However, Attorney Gonzalez takes issue with the referee's conclusion that Attorney Gonzalez's invocation of the phrase "excusable neglect" in his motion to reopen the municipal citations was an untruthful statement to the municipal court. He also challenges the referee's statement that Attorney Gonzalez's unwillingness to apologize to J.C. represents a troubling lack of remorse. He asks the court to take notice of these points insofar as they bear on the referee's findings that Attorney Gonzalez violated SCR 22.03(6), enforceable via SCR 20:8.4(h).

¶47 Attorney Gonzalez also argues that the referee's conclusion of law with respect to count five is without support in the record. Attorney Gonzalez does not dispute the referee's conclusion related to his sending a closing letter to J.C. dated October 30, 2014. He does dispute the referee's finding that he misrepresented to the OLR that he was "assisting" as opposed to "representing" J.C. with respect to the City of Horicon citations. Attorney Gonzalez continues to argue that his involvement with the citations was a favor to J.C., and he says neither party viewed the relationship as an attorney/client relationship. Attorney Gonzalez asks this court to overturn the referee's conclusion that Attorney Gonzalez violated SCR 22.03(6), enforced via SCR 20:8.4(h) when he stated he did not represent J.C. regarding the City of Horicon citations.

¶48 Attorney Gonzalez also argues that the referee's findings of fact with respect to count seven are clearly erroneous because they relied on evidence not in the record. He says that SCR 20:1.3 requires that an attorney "shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client." He says the record reflects that D.J. did not want Attorney Gonzalez's representation. He says pursuant to a request by D.J., Attorney Gonzalez filed a motion to withdraw as D.J.'s counsel. The motion was granted but the circuit court subsequently reappointed Attorney Gonzalez as counsel to avoid a delay. Once D.J. entered a guilty plea and was sentenced, Attorney Gonzalez was replaced by Attorney Cole Ruby. Attorney Gonzalez argues that once his involvement with D.J.'s criminal matters ended, so did the need for his involvement in the paternity action.

¶49 Attorney Gonzalez says he has always acknowledged that he failed to prepare a court order regarding D.J.'s telephone contact with his daughter. He argues that under the circumstances he believed it was impossible to complete the task as assigned since he was unable to find a person acceptable to the child's mother who was willing to serve as a chaperone for calls between D.J. and his daughter. Attorney Gonzalez says he has conceded he could have taken some action, but he argues anything he could have done would not have fulfilled the court's order.

¶50 Attorney Gonzalez notes the referee found the explanation that he could not find a facilitator to be "not credible" since Attorney Nall was able to draft the order without obtaining a facilitator. Attorney Gonzalez argues the referee's finding in this regard is partially made on facts not in the record since neither party offered either the order drafted by Attorney Nall or any testimony about its contents into evidence. Attorney Gonzalez argues that because the referee's conclusion regarding count seven assumes facts not in evidence, this court should overturn the referee's conclusion of law with respect to count seven.

¶51 Finally, Attorney Gonzalez argues that the referee's findings of fact with respect to count nine are clearly erroneous. He concedes he made misstatements, but he argues they were never intended to mislead the OLR and that he corrected them and complied with any follow up investigation. He argues his mistakes in disclosing information, while unfortunate, were not an attempt to hinder or deceive the OLR.

¶52 Attorney Gonzalez acknowledges that aspects of the record reflect poorly on him, but he says that to the extent he is to be disciplined, the discipline should be on the basis of legally and factually correct determinations and should be proportional to the degree of misconduct actually proved. He says given his "otherwise untroubled history" the sanction "should be relaxed." In his reply brief, Attorney Gonzalez suggests that a private reprimand would be an appropriate sanction.

¶53 The OLR argues that the record supports the referee's findings of fact with respect to all of the counts on which the referee found the OLR met its burden of proof. With respect to count four, the OLR says the record supports the referee's factual finding that Attorney Gonzalez indicated to the Horicon municipal court that the reason for the default on the citations was excusable neglect when that was not true. The OLR says the referee's finding of fact in this regard is not clearly erroneous, and it is reasonable for the referee to infer that Attorney Gonzalez was being evasive during his testimony at the disciplinary hearing when he said, "I don't reference whose neglect it was or whether it was excusable." The OLR also says the referee's finding that Attorney Gonzalez is not remorseful with respect to his handling of J.C.'s cases is clearly supported by the record.

¶55 A referee's findings of fact are affirmed unless clearly erroneous. Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Eisenberg, 2004 WI 14, ¶5, 269 Wis. 2d 43, 675 N.W.2d 747. The court may impose whatever sanction it sees fit, regardless of the referee's recommendation. See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Widule, 2003 WI 34, ¶44, 261 Wis. 2d 45, 660 N.W.2d 686.

¶56 After careful review of the matter, we conclude there has been no showing that any of the referee's findings of fact are clearly erroneous. Accordingly, we adopt them. We further agree with the referee's conclusions of law that Attorney Gonzalez violated the supreme court rules set forth above.

¶57 With respect to the appropriate level of discipline, we also agree with the referee that a public reprimand is an appropriate sanction. Although Attorney Gonzalez has no disciplinary history, and even though the referee found that the OLR did not meet its burden of proof on all counts alleged in the complaint, the counts that were proven are serious enough to warrant public discipline. We find the misconduct at issue here somewhat analogous to the Public Reprimand of Sarah Clemment, No. 2011-6 (electronic copy available at https:// compendium.wicourts.gov/app/raw/002365.html) , in which an attorney was publicly reprimanded for giving a client an incorrect date for a removal hearing, making a misrepresentation in a motion to reopen an order denying an asylum petition and ordering the client's deportation, failing to follow statutory requirements in pursuing an appeal, and lying to the client.

¶58 Finally, we find it appropriate to follow our usual practice of imposing the full costs of the disciplinary proceeding on Attorney Gonzalez. The OLR does not seek restitution, and we do not impose any.

¶59 IT IS ORDERED that Jason C. Gonzalez is publicly reprimanded.