A man convicted of two felonies in 1986 retained Attorney Reesa Evans of Madison in 1988 to at least evaluate the viability of seeking a modification of his sentence. Evans engaged in a consistent effort on the man's behalf from 1988 to 1990, reviewing court records, engaging in research, and meeting with the client. Thereafter, the attorney-client relationship continued, but Evans did not advance the case, failing to either pursue sentence modification or prepare an opinion regarding the viability of seeking such relief. The Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility ("Board") concluded that Evans violated SCR 20:1.3, which requires a lawyer to "act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client."

Subsequent to a March 1992 meeting with Evans, the client was unsuccessful in achieving contact with Evans, notwithstanding numerous attempts made by the client, the client's mother, and a representative of the Veterans' Administration. The Board concluded that Evans' lack of communication with the client violated SCR 20:1.4(a), which states, "A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information." The Board further concluded that by failing to provide the client with any meaningful report as to the viability of pursuing sentence modification or any clear statement that the actual pursuit of sentence modification (as opposed to its mere evaluation) would entail a separate phase of legal representation, Evans violated SCR 20:1.4(b), which states, "A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation."

In a separate matter, Evans represented the plaintiffs in a civil action filed in circuit court in March 1995, stemming from the alleged sexual assault of a minor at a public school. The named defendants included the city in which the school was located and the school district of which the school was a part. Counsel for the city promptly informed Evans that the city and the school district were distinct political entities and that the city had no responsibility or control over the operation of the school district. Counsel provided Evans with supporting law and requested that she voluntarily dismiss the city from the action, a request to which Evans did not accede, causing the city to file a motion to dismiss, which included a request for monetary sanctions. Evans did not file a responsive brief, stating that after she reviewed the city's motion and supporting materials, she came around to the city's position, and to argue otherwise at that point would entail the pursuit of a frivolous claim. Evans did not, however, inform the court of her decision not to contest the motion.

In an order filed on August 22, 1995, the court dismissed the claim against the city. On November 22, 1995, the court entered a judgment for costs against the plaintiffs and Ms. Evans in the amount of $4,537.26. Beginning on January 13, 1996, and continuing for some weeks after that date, there were several communications between Evans and counsel for the city regarding the scheduling of supplemental examinations to determine the ability of the plaintiffs to pay on the judgment. The clients were not informed of the judgment until March 1996, shortly before their March 7, 1996 supplemental examination.

The Board concluded that Evans violated SCR 20:1.3 in failing to promptly consider opposing counsel's arguments or relay her own intentions to counsel or the court. The Board further concluded that Evans violated SCR 20:1.4(a) by failing to promptly inform her clients of the entry of a judgment against them.

SCR 20:1.4(a)Evans received private reprimands from the Board in 1994 and 1995.