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On March 17, 2016, Enright filed a civil suit
on behalf of a client against the client’s
ex-husband. That same day, Enright sent to
the client a contingent fee agreement for his
representation, which the client signed on
March 25, 2016.
In the civil case, the client alleged that on
March 18, 2013, the client’s ex-husband
physically assaulted and battered her, which
resulted in serious injuries and damages. The
complaint stated that the damages “should be
paid by the defendant in accordance with law
and include, but are not limited to pain,
suffering, medical expense, mental anguish
and possible permanent disability and
possible future losses for the aforesaid.” On
October 11, 2016, the court dismissed the
civil case without prejudice because Enright
failed to serve the defendant with an
authenticated copy of the summons and
complaint within the required statutory time
period. Enright acknowledged this failure
in his August 17, 2021 response to the Office
of Lawyer Regulation (OLR), stating, “The
case that was dismissed because of failure to
timely serve the summons and complaint was
[the civil case] and I have no excuse. I had
it on my desk and simply neglected to have it
served.”
On January 18, 2018, Enright filed a second
civil suit on the client’s behalf against the
client’s ex-husband. The complaint again
alleged that on March 18, 2013, the client’s
ex-husband physically assaulted and battered
her, resulting in serious injuries and
damages that should be paid by the client’s
ex-husband. Enright hoped that the client’s
ex-husband had “paid for some medical expense
through his work health insurance or a
payment of that nature,” which would have
extended the original statute of limitations.
Enright did not know at the time of filing
the second civil case that a restitution
payment stemming from a criminal case could
extend the statute of limitations.
On February 5, 2018, the client’s ex-husband
filed an answer to the complaint arguing that
the client’s claim was time-barred. Section
893.54 of the Wisconsin Statutes states that
an action to recover damages for injuries to
the person must be commenced within three
years. On February 6, 2018, the client’s ex-
husband filed a Motion to Dismiss, again
asserting that the client’s claim was time-
barred by Wis. Stat. § 893.54.
The client’s ex-husband’s February 2018
filings were made pro se. On January 18,
2019, counsel entered a notice of appearance
for the client’s ex-husband in the second
civil case. On February 15, 2019, the defense
filed an amended answer with affirmative
defenses. Among the listed affirmative
defenses were that the applicable statute of
limitations barred the client’s claims, and
that the client’s claims “may be barred by
virtue of an accord and satisfaction for
payments received, in whole or in part.”
On June 13, 2019, the defense filed a Motion
to Dismiss Based on Statute of Limitations.
The Motion to Dismiss argued that the
incident alleged in the complaint was an
intentional tort that took place on March 18,
2013. Section 893.57 of the Wisconsin
Statutes states, “An action to recover
damages for libel, slander, assault, battery,
invasion of privacy, false imprisonment or
other intentional tort to the person shall be
commenced within 3 years after the cause of
action accrues or be barred.” Based on the
date of the incident alleged in the
complaint, the original statute of
limitations expired on March 18, 2016.
However, the defendant’s June 13, 2019 Motion
to Dismiss stated:
The defendant recognizes that advance
payments have the effect of extending the
Statute of Limitation. Pursuant to section
893.12 Stats., the period fixed for the
limitation of commencement of actions “shall
be either the period of time remaining under
the original statute of limitations or 3
years from the date of the last payment made
under s. 888.285(1), whichever is
greater.
The defendant’s June 13, 2019 Motion to
Dismiss went on to argue that under the
relevant case law, restitution payments made
by the client’s ex-husband, while he was on
probation in a criminal case stemming from
the March 18, 2013 incident, could have
extended the original statute of limitations.
In the criminal case, the client’s ex-husband
pled guilty to one count of Disorderly
Conduct with a Domestic Abuse modifier, and
one count of Battery with a Domestic Abuse
modifier was dismissed but read in. However,
only payments made prior to the original
statute of limitations expiring, March 18,
2016, would have such an effect of extending
the original statute of limitations. The
defense argued that the client’s ex-husband
had made one payment in October 2014 and one
on July 22, 2016. The July 22, 2016 payment
was made outside the original statute of
limitations; therefore, only the October 2014
payment could have triggered the extension.
The defense concluded:
To date, the plaintiff has neither
alleged
nor provided any evidence of payments made
prior to the original Statute of Limitations
that would have extended the same. The
evidence that the defendant has been able to
gather shows that the Statute of Limitations,
even as extended, would have expired in
October of 2017, months prior to commencement
of this action.
On January 15, 2014, the court in the
criminal case had ordered the client’s ex-
husband to pay restitution in the amount of
$7,690, plus a $769 surcharge. The
restitution order specifically noted that
restitution could be amended after a
restitution hearing. Enright provided OLR
with a copy of a Unit Receipt for a $500
restitution payment made by the client’s ex-
husband on September 23, 2014. A comment on
the Unit Receipt states: “Requesting a hold
be entered on this payment as a restitution
hearing is being scheduled and disbursement
of this payment is pending the outcome of the
hearing.” On April 24, 2015, the court issued
a Decision from Restitution Hearing ordering
the client’s ex-husband to pay restitution in
the amount of $7,690. The Decision did not
mention the client’s ex-husband’s September
23, 2014 $500 payment.
Enright stated to OLR his belief that the
statute of limitations could have been
extended three years from the date the court
entered a decision from the restitution
hearing, but he was not aware of that at the
time. Enright stated:
I had only a vague idea of these dates
because I was not aware of their
significance. It was not until [opposing
counsel] filed his motion to dismiss on
6/3/19 that I realized restitution payments
could extend the statute of limitation but by
then it was too late for us to use those and
what we were trying to find was payments made
by [the client’s ex-husband] for [the
client’s] injuries or property damages
related to her claim but we were
unsuccessful.
On October 28, 2019, while the case was still
open, Enright and the client entered into an
agreement intended to limit Enright’s
liability for his handling of the client’s
claims against her ex-husband. The document,
titled “Stipulation for Full Release of All
Claims,” stated:
This agreement is made and entered into
by
the undersigned parties, on their own behalf,
in full and final settlement of any and all
claims, known or unknown, currently existing
or arising in the future which arise from or
are related to legal services with were to be
provided by Daniel A. Enright (the “Released
Party”), to [the client] (the “Claimant”)
concerning an action against [the client’s
ex-husband], for alleged personal injuries to
the Claimant . . . .
In return, Enright agreed to pay the client
$15,000 “in full settlement of the said
claims by January 31, 2020.” According to the
Stipulation, if Enright failed to pay the
client $15,000 by January 31, 2020, the
Stipulation was void and had no legal effect
of any claims the client may have against
Enright. The client was not independently
represented in making the October 28, 2019
agreement, and Enright did not advise her in
writing of the desirability of seeking such
independent counsel.
On March 5, 2020, the court accepted the
parties’ stipulation to dismiss the second
civil case on the merits without costs to
either party. Enright ultimately paid the
client $5,000 in August 2020, but made no
further payments.
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By failing to timely serve the defendant with
an authenticated copy of the summons and
complaint within the required statutory time
period in Chippewa County case no. 16CV76,
Enright violated SCR 20:1.3, which states, “A
lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and
promptness in representing a client.”
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By failing to properly determine the
expiration date of the applicable statute of
limitations, and by failing to understand how
the expiration date for that statute of
limitations may have been extended, resulting
in the dismissal of Chippewa County case no.
18CV17, Enright violated SCR 20:1.1, which
states, “A lawyer shall provide competent
representation to a client. Competent
representation requires the legal knowledge,
skill, thoroughness and preparation
reasonably necessary for the representation.”
By entering into an agreement with his client
that absolved Enright of any liability
arising from his representation without
advising the client of the appropriateness of
independent representation, and without the
client obtaining such independent
representation, Enright violated SCR
20:1.8(h)(1), which states, “A lawyer shall
not make an agreement prospectively limiting
the lawyer's liability to a client for
malpractice unless the client is
independently represented in making the
agreement.”
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Enright had no prior discipline.
In accordance with SCR 22.09(3), Attorney
Daniel A. Enright is hereby publicly
reprimanded.
Dated this 23 day of March, 2022.
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