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ATTORNEY disciplinary
proceeding. Attorney's license
suspended.
¶1 PER CURIAM. We review referee Kim
M. Peterson's recommendation that the
license of Attorney Stephen M. Compton to
practice law in this state be suspended for
a period of 60 days due to his professional
misconduct.
¶2 We conclude that the referee's
findings of fact are supported by
satisfactory and convincing evidence. We
further determine that the seriousness of
Attorney Compton's misconduct warrants the
suspension of his license to practice law
for 60 days and that the costs of the
proceeding, which are $4,622.69 as of
January 24, 2007, should be assessed against
him.
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¶3 Attorney Compton was licensed to
practice law in Wisconsin in 1992. He was
publicly reprimanded in 2002 for falsely
recording time he had worked on a
contingency fee case. Public Reprimand of
Stephen M. Compton, 2002-6.
¶4 When the events giving rise to this
disciplinary proceeding occurred, part of
Attorney Compton's practice included
representing criminal defendants by
appointment of the Office of the State
Public Defender.
¶5 In the fall of 2000 Attorney Compton
was appointed to represent J.M. in
proceedings before the Wisconsin Supreme
Court. J.M. was ultimately incarcerated at
the Dodge County Correctional Institution.
In late 2001 or early 2002, while
incarcerated, J.M., a former paralegal,
informed Attorney Compton that he would be
interested in doing legal research work for
Attorney Compton. In January 2002 Attorney
Compton made arrangements whereby J.M. would
perform legal research for him. Attorney
Compton forwarded a case file to J.M. at the
Dodge Correctional Institution without his
client's prior knowledge or approval. J.M.
performed legal research on this file for
Attorney Compton. The referee specifically
found that while J.M. was incarcerated,
Attorney Compton did not have effective
procedures in place to supervise J.M., to
ensure that his conduct was compatible with
Attorney Compton's professional obligations,
or to ensure that J.M. would be able to
maintain the confidentiality of the client
matter while working from prison.
¶6 Upon J.M.'s release from prison in
May 2002, Attorney Compton hired J.M. as a
paralegal. From May 2002 to July 2002, J.M.
worked on a number of case files for
Attorney Compton. He performed legal
research, drafted correspondence, memos and
pleadings, and met with clients.
¶7 The billing policies of the Office
of the State Public Defender require that an
appointed attorney submit bills for
reimbursement for "reasonable hours" the
attorney has spent working on client matters
to which they have been appointed as
counsel. The policies provide further that
work done by another attorney will not be
reimbursed unless specifically approved by
the Office of the State Public Defender.
¶8 Despite this policy, Attorney
Compton billed the Office of the State
Public Defender for approximately 120 hours
of work for legal services on various client
matters when the work was actually performed
by J.M. In three cases, Attorney Compton
falsely certified to the Office of the State
Public Defender that he had done all the
legal work on the cases, when in fact J.M.
had done much of the work.
¶9 J.M.'s work on Office of the State
Public Defender case files was discovered
when successor counsel in one matter
reviewed a client's file and ascertained
that J.M. had performed considerable work on
the file.
¶10 In July 2004 the Office of the State
Public Defender and Attorney Compton entered
into a settlement agreement wherein Attorney
Compton acknowledged wrongfully billing the
Office of the State Public Defender for work
actually performed by J.M. He agreed to be
decertified from the appointment list
maintained by the Office of the State Public
Defender, and further agreed that the Office
of the State Public Defender could recoup
$4,800 from bills submitted by Attorney
Compton on outstanding cases. He self-
reported this matter to the Office of Lawyer
Regulation (OLR) in August 2004.
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¶11 On May 1, 2006, the OLR issued a
complaint alleging the misconduct described
herein. On November 1, 2006, the parties
executed a stipulation and no contest plea.
Attorney Compton agreed to withdraw his
answer and to permit the referee to use the
OLR complaint as the factual basis for a
finding of misconduct. A hearing was held to
consider the appropriate sanction.
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¶12 The referee concluded that by
billing the Office of the State Public
Defender for 120 hours of work at the
appointed attorney rate when that work was
actually performed by J.M., Attorney Compton
engaged in conduct involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation in
violation of former SCR 20:8.4(c). The
referee concluded further that by failing to
adequately supervise J.M. while J.M. was
performing legal work from prison, Attorney
Compton violated SCR 20:5.3(a) and (b),
which provided in relevant part:
20:5.3 Responsibilities regarding
nonlawyer assistants
With respect to a nonlawyer
employed or retained by or associated with a
lawyer:
(a) A partner in a law firm shall
make reasonable efforts to ensure that the
firm has in effect measures giving
reasonable assurance that the person's
conduct is compatible with the professional
obligations of the lawyer;
(b) A lawyer having direct
supervisory authority over the nonlawyer
shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that
the person's conduct is compatible with the
professional obligations of the lawyer.
¶13 Most of the discussion at the
disciplinary hearing was devoted to the
appropriate sanction for Attorney Compton's
misconduct. The OLR requested the referee
recommend a 90-day suspension. Attorney
Compton requested the referee recommend a
public reprimand.
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¶14 The referee noted that it was
troubling that Attorney Compton had engaged
in this misconduct while he was negotiating
his public reprimand in another disciplinary
matter, a time when he should have
been "extra vigilant." However, while not
excusing the ethical violation or the
potential harm to clients, the referee did
note that J.M., a former paralegal,
apparently performed competently and
obtained "good results" for the clients.
Ultimately, the referee concluded that a 60-
day suspension was warranted, along with the
payment of the costs of the disciplinary
proceeding. See, e.g., In re
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Glesner,
2000 WI 18, 233 Wis. 2d 35, 606 N.W.2d 173,
and In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against
Davison, 2002 WI 24, 251 Wis. 2d 1, 640
N.W.2d 508.
¶15 In his appeal, which he has since
dismissed, Attorney Compton sought to
distinguish his situation from Glesner
and Davison, asserting that he never
intended to deceive the Office of the State
Public Defender and maintaining that his
intentions were good. He self-reported the
violation and has advised this court that he
ceased practicing law as of August 1, 2007.
He asks the court to impose any suspension
retroactive to August 1, 2007.
¶16 The matter is submitted to the court
for review of the referee's report and
recommendation pursuant to SCR 22.17(2).
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¶17 In conducting our review, we will
affirm the referee's findings of fact unless
they are clearly erroneous. See In re
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Sosnay,
209 Wis. 2d 241, 243, 562 N.W.2d 137
(1997). We review the referee's conclusions
of law de novo. See In re
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Carroll,
2001 WI 130, ¶29, 248 Wis. 2d 662, 636
N.W.2d 718. In accordance with our
authority to supervise the practice of law
in this state, we determine the level of
discipline that is appropriate under the
particular circumstances, independent of the
referee's recommendation, but benefiting
from it. See In re Disciplinary
Proceedings Against Widule, 2003 WI 34,
¶44, 261 Wis. 2d 45, 660 N.W.2d 686.
¶18 The referee's findings of fact in
this case have not been shown to be clearly
erroneous, and we adopt them. We also agree
with the referee's conclusions of law. We
further agree with the referee's
recommendation for a 60-day suspension of
Attorney Compton's license to practice law
in Wisconsin. Finally, we find it
appropriate to require Attorney Compton to
pay the full costs of this proceeding. We
decline to impose the suspension retroactive
to August 1, 2007, but, given Attorney
Compton's assertion that he has ceased the
practice of law, the suspension is made
effective the date of this order.
¶19 IT IS ORDERED that the license of
Stephen M. Compton to practice law in
Wisconsin is suspended for a period of 60
days, effective the date of this order.
¶20 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60
days of the date of this order, Stephen M.
Compton pay to the Office of Lawyer
Regulation the costs of this proceeding. If
the costs are not paid within the time
specified, and absent a showing to this
court of his inability to pay the costs
within that time, the license of Stephen M.
Compton to practice law in Wisconsin shall
remain suspended until further order of the
court.
¶21 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, to the
extent he has not yet done so, Stephen M.
Compton comply with the provisions of SCR
22.26 concerning the duties of a person
whose license to practice law in Wisconsin
has been suspended.
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