¶3 Attorney Boyle was licensed to practice law in Wisconsin in 1995 and practices in Milwaukee. In 2008 Attorney Boyle was privately reprimanded for failing to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client; failing to keep the client reasonably informed about the status of a matter; failing to promptly comply with reasonable requests for information; and failing to explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.

¶7 The remaining seven counts concerned Attorney Boyle's level of cooperation and honesty during the OLR's investigation in 2009 into the two client grievances described above, as well as a third client grievance that did not result in charges of misconduct. During the OLR investigations, Attorney Boyle failed to provide timely and complete responses to the client grievances and to the OLR's queries for information. Attorney Boyle also dated letters to the OLR on or before the deadlines imposed by the OLR to give the false appearance that she had complied with the established deadlines, when in fact she had not. The OLR complaint alleges two counts of failing to cooperate with an OLR investigation and failing to fully and fairly disclose all facts and circumstances pertaining to alleged misconduct, in violation of SCR 22.03(2), enforced via SCR 20:8.4(h); three counts of willfully failing to provide relevant information, to answer questions fully, or to furnish documents to the OLR, in violation of SCR 22.03(6), enforced via SCR 20:8.4(h); and two counts of engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, in violation of SCR 20:8.4(c).

¶8 Following a hearing on the complaint, the referee determined that the OLR had proven misconduct in all 11 counts charged.

¶9 In support of her recommendation for a 60-day suspension, the referee noted that, in both this disciplinary matter and Attorney Boyle's earlier private reprimand, Attorney Boyle displayed a pattern of failing to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing her clients and failing to communicate appropriately with her clients. The referee also noted that in this disciplinary matter, Attorney Boyle consistently refused to cooperate with the OLR and back-dated documents to make it appear as though she had timely cooperated with deadlines set by the OLR. The referee also noted that during the hearing, Attorney Boyle expressed very little remorse with respect to her conduct toward her clients and the OLR.

¶10 As to the appropriate monetary sanctions, the referee recommended that Attorney Boyle should be assessed the entire costs of the disciplinary proceeding, which total $10,971.70 as of January 27, 2012. The referee further recommended that Attorney Boyle be required to make restitution to the Fund in the amount of $5,000 plus legal interest.

¶11 Attorney Boyle appeals. The level of discipline is the only dispute. In particular, Attorney Boyle challenges the appropriateness of the recommended 60-day suspension and the recommended $5,000 restitution award to the Fund. She urges the court to issue a public reprimand and impose "a restriction on her license concerning post-conviction practice for a period of time not exceeding two years." She objects to paying any restitution to the Fund.

¶12 Attorney Boyle does not specifically challenge the referee's findings of fact. Instead, she argues that the recommended discipline does not sufficiently take into account various mitigating factors, which include her allegation that she was not deliberately indifferent toward either the grievants or the OLR, and her allegation that she experienced medical issues during a portion of the time that the OLR was investigating her conduct, and her allegation that any apparent back-dating of her responses to the OLR was the result of typographical errors or postage delays that were beyond her control. She also challenges the referee's recommendation that she pay restitution to the Fund for its reimbursement to her client for the $5,000 advance fee he paid to her firm. In particular, Attorney Boyle claims she is being unfairly punished for her lack of success in that particular client matter, and that her efforts in that case demonstrate that she did not procure the $5,000 by dishonest conduct.

¶13 The OLR argues that a 60-day suspension is appropriate. It argues that the record fails to disclose any legitimate mitigating factors. It claims that suspensions are frequently predicated on misconduct like that at issue here; i.e., misconduct that spans multiple clients, incorporates multiple counts of professional wrongdoing, and involves uncooperativeness during an OLR investigation. The OLR also argues that the referee's report contains sufficient factual findings to justify the recommended $5,000 restitution award.

¶14 This court concludes there is no claim that the referee's findings are clearly erroneous. The findings are supported by the record and are adopted. See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Eisenberg, 2004 WI 14, ¶5, 269 Wis. 2d 43, 675 N.W.2d 747. We also agree with the referee that those factual findings demonstrate that Attorney Boyle committed each of the 11 counts of professional misconduct alleged in the complaint.

¶15 With respect to the discipline to be imposed, we determine the appropriate level of discipline given the particular facts of each case, independent of the referee's recommendation, but benefiting from it. See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Widule, 2003 WI 34, ¶44, 261 Wis. 2d 45, 660 N.W.2d 686. After careful consideration of the report and recommendation, the record in this matter, and the written statements of the parties, we accept the referee's recommendation regarding suspension, restitution, and costs. The misconduct at issue here was serious, and Attorney Boyle offers no legitimate excuse for her failure to diligently represent her clients and her failure to provide them with information about their cases, fees, and expenses in spite of their numerous requests that she do so. Nor does she offer a legitimate excuse for her failure to fully and honestly cooperate with the OLR's investigation into her conduct. Given the length of time over which the misconduct occurred and the number of instances of misconduct involved, Attorney Boyle's excuses for her behavior ring hollow. The fact that, as the referee noted, Attorney Boyle expresses little remorse for her misconduct suggests that Attorney Boyle may not appreciate the seriousness of her misconduct. A period of suspension is necessary in this case to impress upon Attorney Boyle the seriousness of her professional misconduct and to protect the public from similar misconduct in the future.

¶16 In light of the circumstances presented, we are persuaded that the referee's reasoning is sound. We conclude that a 60-day license suspension is sufficient to advance the objectives of lawyer discipline.

¶18 We further conclude that Attorney Boyle must make a restitution payment to the Fund in the amount of $5,000 plus legal interest. Although Attorney Boyle challenges whether the Fund should have reimbursed her client for his $5,000 advance fee payment, the Fund's decision to reimburse this client is not appealable. SCR 12.12. In any event, in light of Attorney Boyle's failure to provide any meaningful services to this client, we agree with the referee that Attorney Boyle should be required to pay the Fund restitution in the amount of $5,000 plus legal interest.

¶19 IT IS ORDERED that the license of Bridget E. Boyle to practice law in Wisconsin is suspended for a period of 60 days, effective June 27, 2012.

¶20 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Bridget E. Boyle shall comply with the provisions of SCR 22.26 concerning the duties of a person whose license to practice law in Wisconsin has been suspended.

¶21 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date of this order, Bridget E. Boyle shall pay the Wisconsin Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection $5,000 restitution plus interest at the legal rate. See Wis. Stat. § 138.04.

¶22 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date of this order, Bridget E. Boyle shall pay to the Office of Lawyer Regulation the imposed costs of this proceeding. If the imposed costs are not paid within the time specified and Bridget E. Boyle has not entered into a payment plan approved by the Office of Lawyer Regulation, then the Office of Lawyer Regulation is authorized to move this court for a further suspension of the license of Bridget E. Boyle to practice law in Wisconsin.

¶24 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J. (dissenting) I agree with the referee and the justices joining the per curiam opinion that Attorney Bridget Boyle committed 11 counts of misconduct involving three clients. She failed to perform services for her clients. She engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. She failed to cooperate with the OLR investigations into her work. I also note, as did the per curiam, that in 2008 Attorney Boyle was privately reprimanded for misconduct in failing her clients. Furthermore, I agree that earlier this year the federal Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals disbarred Attorney Boyle from further practice in that court for her abandonment of her client in a criminal case.

¶25 The per curiam imposes a 60-day period of suspension from the practice of law in the present case. Any suspension from the practice of law imposes a serious hardship on an attorney, teaches a lesson that should be remembered, and serves to protect the public. Nevertheless, I disagree with the 60-day suspension imposed in the present case.

¶26 As a result of the per curiam opinion, Attorney Boyle will be able to resume the practice of law in Wisconsin with the passage of 60 days. She will not have to make any showing that she has taken steps to avoid similar misconduct in the future.

¶27 Any discipline imposed on Attorney Boyle should, in my opinion, require her to demonstrate to this court, before she resumes practice, that she has made efforts to remedy the causes of her repeated failures to serve her clients. Attorney Boyle must demonstrate that she is competent to practice law.

¶28 For the reasons set forth, I dissent. I conclude that a 60-day period of discipline, with automatic re-admission to the practice of law, is not adequate to protect the public in the present case.