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ATTORNEY disciplinary
proceeding. Attorney's license revoked.
¶1 PER CURIAM. Attorney Michael G.
Trewin has appealed from the report of the
referee, Reserve Judge Robert E. Kinney,
which concluded that Attorney Trewin had
committed ethical violations as alleged in
14 counts of the Office of Lawyer
Regulation's (OLR) complaint and recommended
the revocation of Attorney Trewin's license
to practice law in Wisconsin. The referee
also recommended that Attorney Trewin be
ordered to pay the full costs of this
proceeding, which were $33,145.83 as of
April 24, 2014.
¶2 Having heard oral argument and
having fully reviewed this matter, we
determine that the referee was correct in
concluding, after a three-day evidentiary
hearing, that Attorney Trewin had committed
14 counts of professional misconduct. Many
of those counts of misconduct fall into the
same pattern of using knowledge of clients'
financial weaknesses to take advantage of
those clients in business transactions with
them. We therefore determine that Attorney
Trewin's license to practice law in this
state must be revoked. Given the disarray
in Attorney Trewin's records, we are unable
to impose specific restitution amounts in
this disciplinary proceeding, although we
note that two sets of clients have pursued
civil actions against Attorney Trewin.
Finally, we require Attorney Trewin to pay
the full costs of this proceeding.
¶3 Attorney Trewin was admitted to the
practice of law in Wisconsin in June 1985.
He has maintained a law practice in New
London. He has historically focused his
practice on bankruptcy and debt
reorganization.
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¶4 Attorney Trewin has been the subject
of professional discipline on two prior
occasions. In 2004 this court suspended
Attorney Trewin's law license for a period
of five months. In re Disciplinary
Proceedings Against Trewin, 2004 WI 116,
275 Wis. 2d 116, 684 N.W.2d 121 (Trewin
I). The misconduct that led to that
suspension included (1) entering into loan
transactions with at least seven clients
without obtaining written, informed conflict
waivers, in violation of SCR 20:1.8(a); (2)
entering into such loan transactions without
having advised his clients of the potential
adverse consequences, in violation of SCR
20:1.7(b); (3) having engaged in conduct
involving dishonesty or misrepresentation by
assigning his interest in a loan to his
brother-in-law in order to avoid disclosing
that he was the real party in interest, in
violation of SCR 20:8.4(c); (4) failing to
file timely income tax returns, in violation
of prior case law and SCR 20:8.4(f); and (5)
having deposited a client check into his
business account rather than his client
trust account, in violation of SCR 20:l.15
(a). In our Trewin I decision, we
quoted the referee's comment that the
frequency and magnitude of Attorney Trewin's
loan and business transactions with his
clients were such common occurrences that
they made it "look as though he was more of
a banker than a lawyer." 275 Wis. 2d 116,
¶40.
¶5 In 2006 Attorney Trewin received a
public reprimand with his consent. The
misconduct underlying that reprimand
consisted of failing to list all of his
pending matters in the affidavit he was
required to file with the OLR following his
2004 disciplinary suspension, failing to
notify courts and opposing counsel of his
disciplinary suspension, and engaging in a
conflict of interest by representing two
clients in a bankruptcy proceeding when that
representation was directly adverse to the
interests of another client. Public
Reprimand of Michael G. Trewin, No. 2006-6.
¶6 The present disciplinary proceeding
relates to Attorney Trewin's relationships
and business transactions with three married
couples: (1) R.V.S. and B.V.S.
(collectively, Mr. and Mrs. V.S. or the
V.S.s); (2) D.H. and M.H. (collectively, Mr.
and Mrs. H. or the H.s); and (3) Francis and
Karen Groshek (collectively, the Grosheks).
The referee in this matter issued a thorough
58-page report with detailed findings of
fact and conclusions of law regarding
Attorney Trewin's actions concerning each of
the three sets of clients. We will not
repeat all of those factual findings in this
opinion. It is sufficient here to summarize
the pattern that Attorney Trewin generally
followed in dealing with the three couples
whose grievances led to this disciplinary
proceeding and to set forth the rule
violations that arose from that conduct.
¶7 The referee found that Attorney
Trewin had attorney-client relationships
with all three couples during the relevant
time periods. The attorney-client
relationships with Mr. and Mrs. V.S. and
with Mr. and Mrs. H. were long-standing
ones, stretching back to points before the
filing of the complaint in Trewin I.
Indeed, the referee found that Attorney
Trewin's attorney-client relationship with
Mr. and Mrs. H. extended back to 1991. The
referee made clear in his report, however,
that he was not considering any specific
facts that pre-dated the filing of the
complaint in Trewin I.
¶8 The referee found that each of the
three couples was financially
unsophisticated, which caused them to rely
on Attorney Trewin's recommendations. He
stated that Attorney Trewin had followed a
similar pattern of conduct with respect to
each client couple.
¶9 Each couple initially retained
Attorney Trewin when they were facing legal
problems regarding their debts, either in
the context of a foreclosure proceeding or a
possible bankruptcy. Because of each
couple's financial problems, they had
difficulty obtaining loans in traditional
credit markets—i.e., from banks, credit
unions, etc.
¶10 Attorney Trewin usually loaned the
couples money, often at relatively high
interest rates (12-14%), starting with
fairly small amounts and increasing the
amount of the loans over time as the couples
needed additional funds. The referee
further found that because Attorney Trewin
was not constrained by standard banking
regulations, the clients did not receive
many of the pieces of information and the
warnings that they would have received when
borrowing from traditional lenders.
Moreover, there were many errors in the
documentation of the loans and the tracking
of payments.
¶11 In some instances, either there were
no signed promissory notes and conflict
waivers, or Attorney Trewin lost those
documents since he was unable to produce
them during this disciplinary proceeding.
In at least one other instance, the date on
the conflict waiver was months apart from
the date of the purportedly corresponding
promissory note. Also, when Attorney Trewin
was able to produce a signed document
purporting to be a conflict waiver, the
description of the transaction in the
conflict waiver was, at times, not even
consistent with the loan terms set forth in
the promissory note. Further, the referee
specifically found that the conflict waivers
did not disclose all of the true facts
regarding the transactions, did not provide
any meaningful explanation of the
disadvantages of entering into these
transactions with the clients' lawyer, and
did not include a discussion of the
alternatives available to the clients.
¶12 Attorney Trewin's haphazard manner
of handling these transactions left the
clients confused about which loans were
outstanding, what payments they had made
toward which loans, and the balances of
their loans. For example, both Mr. and Mrs.
V.S. and Mr. and Mrs. H. repeatedly asked
Attorney Trewin for an accounting, but he
did not provide them with one. When counsel
for the OLR asked Attorney Trewin at the
evidentiary hearing whether he had ever
produced an accounting to Mr. and Mrs. V.S.,
he responded that he did not know. He
claimed that he had a spreadsheet on his
computer that showed a running tally or
documentation of the loans to Mr. and Mrs.
V.S. Attorney Trewin then referenced an
exhibit, which he claimed was a printed
version of this spreadsheet. The referee,
however, found that the exhibit "is replete
with omissions and unexplained entries, and
is essentially undecipherable, even by
[Attorney Trewin]." When Attorney Trewin
was asked at another point during the
evidentiary hearing how much money he had
loaned Mr. and Mrs. V.S., he did not provide
an answer but promised he would provide the
information to the referee the following day
after putting all of their payments into a
spreadsheet. No further documentation on
this subject was provided by Attorney Trewin
during the proceedings before the referee.
Since Attorney Trewin was not subject to
regulations imposed on commercial lenders,
these practices and errors were not
corrected over rather lengthy periods.
¶13 The referee found that the clients
usually did not negotiate with Attorney
Trewin regarding their business transactions
because they viewed him as their attorney.
They relied on his expertise and judgment,
and believed that he was acting in good
faith and looking out for their best
interests.
¶14 When the clients fell behind on
their loan payments, Attorney Trewin's
practice was not to telephone the clients,
to deliver a notice of delinquency, or to
sue the clients for eviction or a money
judgment. The referee found that Attorney
Trewin operated in this manner because he
intentionally and consistently wanted to
avoid judicial scrutiny of his conduct.
Instead of attempting to enforce the terms
of the existing notes and mortgages,
Attorney Trewin's preferred course of action
was to create another loan to those
clients. Often the new loan was a mixture
of existing indebtedness and new money.
When prior loans were paid off or replaced
by a new loan, Attorney Trewin did not
return the promissory notes for the prior
loans.
¶15 Ultimately, when the couples had
difficulties making their payments to
Attorney Trewin or to another creditor, he
would persuade the couple to transfer their
property over to him, with the promise that
he would lease the property back to them and
they could reacquire the property if they
were current on their payments to him and
could also pay a specified amount to him for
their property. The couples, however, were
not in a financial condition where they
could ever regain ownership of their
property. Nonetheless, because of Attorney
Trewin's actions, some couples continued to
hold the mistaken belief that they really
did retain ownership or control of the
property even after they had transferred
ownership of it to Attorney Trewin. In the
end, Attorney Trewin ended up with the title
to the clients' real property.
¶16 The referee was particularly moved
by one of the exhibits in the Groshek case.
The exhibit contained excerpts from three
letters that Attorney Trewin wrote to three
different recipients within a span of ten
days around the time he was entering into an
agreement to buy the Grosheks' property in
August 2004, just prior to his law license
being suspended. In the first letter, which
was sent to the bank from which he was
seeking financing for the transaction,
Attorney Trewin said that he had negotiated
a purchase price for the Grosheks' property
that was below the appraised value of the
land and well below what he believed was the
fair market value of the land. He further
indicated that he intended to sell 40 acres
of the land for an amount that was twice the
appraised value to some neighbors of the
Grosheks immediately after buying the land
from the Grosheks. Finally, he stated that
his intention for the rest of the land was
to subdivide most of it into large lots and
to rent a small portion, including the
existing farmhouse, to the Grosheks. When
Attorney Trewin wrote to the Grosheks just
three days later, however, he stated that he
would be willing to buy their land for
enough money to pay off their existing bank
loans, sell approximately 40 acres to the
neighbors, and then give them a lease on all
the rest of the land with an option to
repurchase it. There was no mention of the
sale price being well below fair market
value or of subdividing most of the land
into lots that would be sold to third
parties. Finally, in the third letter,
Attorney Trewin told the Grosheks' current
lender that he would be willing to pay that
bank for either an assignment of their
judgment against the Grosheks or a complete
release of the bank's claims. He also
claimed (1) that the commitment letter from
his own bank referred to the transaction as
a purchase of the Grosheks' real property by
Attorney Trewin because that was simply his
lender's practice and (2) that he really
intended to sell the real estate back to the
Grosheks. Thus, Attorney Trewin gave three
different versions of what would happen in
the transaction to three different parties
involved in the transaction, depending on
what he thought they wanted to hear.
¶17 With respect to two of the client
couples, Attorney Trewin contacted them
after learning that they had filed
grievances against him with the OLR. Mr.
V.S. testified that during a couple of
telephone calls, Attorney Trewin stated that
he was suicidal and asked Mr. V.S. to sign
a "waiver," which Mr. V.S. understood to
mean that he would not pursue his grievance
against Attorney Trewin. Mr. H. described
Attorney Trewin's demeanor during a post-
grievance telephone call with him
as "ugly." Mr. and Mrs. V.S. refused to
sign any "waiver" of the grievance, but Mr.
and Mrs. H. did sign a document drafted by
Attorney Trewin, which stated that they
agreed that "the amount owed under the note
is $109,643.25" and that they had an option
to purchase their former real property for
$50,000.00. Mr. and Mrs. H. signed the
document, even though they did not know
whether it was accurate, because they felt
sorry for Attorney Trewin.
¶18 Attorney Trewin also failed to
provide documents and information requested
by the OLR during its grievance
investigation concerning Mr. and Mrs. H.
This occurred both when the OLR wrote
letters to Attorney Trewin asking for
certain information and when a member of a
district committee tried to meet with
Attorney Trewin. Attorney Trewin cancelled
the meeting, claiming that he was sick.
When the district committee member
subsequently wrote to Attorney Trewin asking
for documentation of his various
transactions with Mr. and Mrs. H., Attorney
Trewin asked for an extension of time to
respond to the request, but he never
followed through with providing the
requested documents during the investigation.
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¶19 The referee concluded that the OLR
had proven four counts of misconduct arising
out of Attorney Trewin's actions with
respect to Mr. and Mrs. V.S. On Count One,
the referee concluded that Attorney Trewin
had failed to fully disclose the terms of
the various transactions with Mr. and Mrs.
V.S. in a manner that they could reasonably
understand, in violation of former SCR 20:1.8
(a). On Count Two, the referee found that
Attorney Trewin's ongoing representation of
Mr. and Mrs. V.S. while he had adverse
personal interests as a result of his
business transactions with them, without
obtaining proper waivers, constituted an
improper conflict of interest under both
former SCR 20:1.7(b) and current SCR 20:1.7
(a)(2). On Count Three, the referee
determined that by having Mr. and Mrs. V.S.
sign over the deed to their real property
when he believed there had been no meeting
of the minds, Attorney Trewin had engaged in
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit,
or misrepresentation, in violation of SCR
20:8.4(c). On Count Four, the referee
concluded that Attorney Trewin's attempt to
persuade Mr. and Mrs. V.S. to cease
cooperating with the OLR's investigation had
violated SCRs 22.03(6) and 21.15(4), which
are enforceable via SCR 20:8.4(h).
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¶20 The referee further concluded that
the OLR had proven professional misconduct
by Attorney Trewin on eight of the nine
counts in the complaint that related to Mr.
and Mrs. H. Five of those eight counts
concern Attorney Trewin's multiple business
transactions with Mr. and Mrs. H. On Count
Five, the referee determined that Attorney
Trewin had violated SCR 20:1.8(a) by
disbursing funds to himself as both creditor
and attorney from a May 2003 transaction
without fully disclosing his adverse
interests and without obtaining a written
consent for the conflict and the
transaction. On Count Six, the referee
found that Attorney Trewin had violated both
former and current SCR 20:1.8(b) by using in
subsequent loan transactions with Mr. and
Mrs. H. information regarding their finances
that he had gained from representing them as
their lawyer. On Count Seven, the referee
concluded that Attorney Trewin had violated
SCR 20:1.7(a)(2) by continuing to represent
Mr. and Mrs. H. when he had a personal
interest in their finances and property,
by "representing" them in a sale of real
property to third parties when he had not
obtained a written conflict waiver of his
personal interests, by paying himself
$83,000 in "anticipated taxes" out of the
proceeds of a real estate transaction when
he never paid those taxes, and by assigning
a value to their option to repurchase their
land when he had never obtained a prior
written agreement with them concerning such
a value. On Count Eight, the referee
determined that Attorney Trewin had engaged
in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,
deceit, or misrepresentation, in violation
of SCR 20:8.4(c), including (1) having Mr.
and Mrs. H. deed their farm to him when he
knew that many of the terms of the sale were
incomplete and the transaction was invalid
under the Statute of Frauds, (2) paying them
far less than the value of the property, and
(3) reselling the property at a profit for
himself. On Count Nine, the referee found
that Attorney Trewin had also violated SCR
20:8.4(c) when he had claimed that the deed
of the H.s' land was exempt from the real
estate transfer tax and had not paid any
such tax to the government, but had still
collected the amount of the tax from Mr. and
Mrs. H. and had subsequently refused to
return it.
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¶21 The final three counts regarding Mr.
and Mrs. H. involve Attorney Trewin's
misconduct after they filed a grievance with
the OLR. On Count Eleven, the referee
concluded that Attorney Trewin had violated
SCRs 22.03(6) and 21.15(4), which are
enforceable via SCR 20:8.4(h), when he had
attempted to persuade Mr. and Mrs. H. to
withdraw their grievance or cease
cooperating with the OLR's investigation.
On Count Twelve, the referee determined that
Attorney Trewin's failure to provide
information requested by the district
committee had violated SCR 22.04(1). On
Count Thirteen, the referee found that
Attorney Trewin had again violated SCR 22.03
(6), enforced via SCR 20:8.4(h), when he had
failed to provide information and documents
requested by the OLR in a timely manner.
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¶22 The OLR's complaint alleged only two
counts related to Attorney Trewin's conduct
concerning the Grosheks. On Count Fourteen,
the referee concluded that Attorney Trewin
had violated former SCR 20:1.8(a) by
engaging in multiple business transactions
with the Grosheks and acquiring their
property when (1) the terms of the
transactions were not fair and reasonable to
the Grosheks, (2) Attorney Trewin had failed
to fully and clearly disclose the terms of
the proposed transactions to the Grosheks in
writing and in a manner they could
reasonably understand, and (3) Attorney
Trewin had failed to obtain the Grosheks'
voluntary written consent to each
transaction after consultation. On Count
Fifteen, the referee found that by engaging
in a course of conduct that involved
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation in order to serve his own
interests rather than the interests of his
clients, Attorney Trewin had again violated
SCR 20:8.4(c).
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¶23 With respect to the proper level of
discipline, the referee stated that he had
considered Attorney Trewin's prior
disciplinary history, his pattern of
misconduct in this proceeding, prior
precedent, this court's discussions of the
concept of progressive discipline, and both
aggravating and mitigating factors. The
result of the referee's analysis was a
conclusion that Attorney Trewin was unfit to
practice law in this state and a
recommendation that his license should be
revoked.
¶24 The referee believed that, in light
of the fact that this court has described
restitution as the payment of money, see
SCR 21.16(2m), monetary restitution would
not be appropriate here. The referee agreed
with the OLR that monetary restitution is
not readily ascertainable in this matter "[d]
ue to the mess that [Attorney Trewin] has
created."
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¶25 Under our longstanding standards for
reviewing referee reports in attorney
disciplinary proceedings, we will affirm the
referee's findings of fact unless they are
found to be clearly erroneous, but we review
the referee's conclusions of law on a de
novo basis. In re Disciplinary
Proceedings Against Inglimo, 2007 WI 126,
¶5, 305 Wis. 2d 71, 740 N.W.2d 125. We
determine the appropriate level of
discipline to impose given the particular
facts of each case, independent of the
referee's recommendation, but benefiting
from it. In re Disciplinary Proceedings
Against Widule, 2003 WI 34, ¶44, 261 Wis.
2d 45, 660 N.W.2d 686.
¶26 Attorney Trewin challenges most of
the referee's conclusions of misconduct in
his appeal. Although he claims that he is
challenging the referee's conclusions of
law, many of Attorney Trewin's appellate
arguments are focused on criticizing the way
in which the referee viewed the facts of
this case.
¶27 For example, Attorney Trewin
contends that the referee erred on Counts
One, Five, and Fourteen in determining that
he had violated SCR 20:1.8(a), which
prohibits a lawyer from entering into
business transactions with clients except in
certain specified circumstances. Attorney
Trewin contends that the "basic facts"
regarding these alleged violations have been
undisputed throughout this proceeding. He
then proceeds, however, to describe the
facts as he believes them to be rather than
as found by the referee. Specifically, he
asserts, based on his own testimony, that he
put the terms of every transaction into
writing, gave that writing to the clients,
and then advised the clients through a
separate conflict of interest document that
they had a right to seek independent
counsel. He further asserts that both
R.V.S. and D.H. also testified that conflict
waivers were signed for every transaction.
¶28 The referee specifically discounted
the oral testimony in this respect. He
agreed with Attorney Trewin that both R.V.S.
and D.H. gave muddled, contradictory, and
unreliable testimony on many issues,
including what documents they had signed.
Although Attorney Trewin claimed that he
always had clients sign conflict waivers (or
consents), the referee noted that his
testimony was also contradictory and that he
acknowledged that he could not find conflict
waivers for some transactions and that he
was not sure they were prepared for other
transactions.
¶29 Moreover, the referee correctly
noted that SCR 20:1.8(a) requires written
notices providing certain information to the
client and then a written consent to the
transaction that is signed by the client.
The referee concluded that Attorney Trewin's
self-serving testimony that his practice
after 2002 was always to provide written
conflict waivers was not enough to
demonstrate that he had complied with the
requirements of SCR 20:1.8(a) on a
substantial number of transactions.
¶30 In addition, merely claiming that
the clients always signed conflict waivers
does not establish what was in those
conflict waivers or that the contents of
those waivers provided all of the required
information. The referee specifically
concluded that even for the conflict waivers
produced by Attorney Trewin, they did not
contain an adequate explanation of the risks
of entering into the business transactions
with Attorney Trewin while continuing to be
represented by him.
¶31 We find no basis to overturn the
referee's findings of fact regarding the
conflict waivers, or lack thereof. We also
agree with the referee's analysis that
Attorney Trewin failed to adequately consult
with his clients about the risks attendant
to the transactions and the conflicts of
interest and to prepare a sufficient writing
containing the information required by SCR
20:1.8(a).
¶32 Attorney Trewin also argues that the
referee erred in finding violations of
former and current SCR 20:1.8(b) in Count
Six. He focuses on the referee's reference
to the fact that he did not provide to the
clients the normal safeguards that are
provided by commercial lending institutions
to their customers. Attorney Trewin further
claims that he did, in fact, explain the
transactions to D.H. in a way he could
understand. The referee, however, found
that there was no record of Attorney Trewin
orally discussing with D.H. certain matters
related to a transaction. The referee also
found D.H. to be credible when he testified
that he was baffled by the transaction.
¶33 We again find no basis to overturn
any of the referee's factual findings with
respect to Attorney Trewin's transactions
with Mr. and Mrs. H. Attorney Trewin's
argument focusing on the lack of banking
safeguards misses the point of the violation
found by the referee. The crux of the
violation of SCR 20:1.8(b) was that Attorney
Trewin used the information he had gained
from his representation of Mr. and Mrs. H.
to their disadvantage by engaging in a
series of transactions that ultimately led
to Attorney Trewin owning their property.
We conclude that Attorney Trewin did violate
both former and current SCR 20:1.8(b).
¶34 Attorney Trewin also challenges the
referee's conclusions that he violated SCR
20:8.4(c) on Counts Three, Eight, Nine, and
Fifteen. His arguments in this regard again
rely in large part on his view of the facts
surrounding various transactions with each
of the three client couples. Attorney
Trewin's arguments do not rise to the level
of demonstrating clear error in the
referee's view of the relevant facts.
¶35 Attorney Trewin acknowledges that he
claimed an exemption from the transfer tax
and did not pay any such tax to the
applicable government entity, but he still
collected the amount of the tax from Mr. and
Mrs. H. He also acknowledges that he did
not return the money when he was confronted
with this discrepancy. He attempts to
excuse his act of collecting money to which
he was not entitled and then refusing to
return it by claiming that he was ultimately
entitled to offset that amount against the
amount Mr. and Mrs. H. owed him. He
conveniently omits from his argument,
however, that there was no finding of fact
that he did offset the amount he improperly
collected against their indebtedness or that
he notified Mr. and Mrs. H. of such an
offset. His after-the-fact excuse does not
convince us that the referee erred in
concluding that this conduct violated SCR
20:8.4(c).
¶36 Attorney Trewin also contends that
the referee erred in concluding that he had
violated SCR 20:8.4(c) when he had Mr. and
Mrs. H. deed over their land to him despite
the transaction failing to satisfy the
Statute of Frauds and when the value of
their property exceeded what Attorney Trewin
was paying them for it. We need not conduct
a detailed analysis of the Statute of
Frauds. Attorney Trewin acknowledges that
he testified to a value of the land that was
in excess of what he paid his clients for
it. He contends that the referee erred in
relying on this testimony because he did not
say what someone would have needed to do to
the land to raise it to that value. His
attempt to claim that his valuation
testimony was conditioned in some
undisclosed manner is unavailing. We
conclude that there was sufficient evidence
to conclude that Attorney Trewin engaged in
dishonesty, deceit, fraud, or
misrepresentation when he purchased the
property of Mr. and Mrs. H.
¶37 His challenge to the violation found
on Count Three also is based on his view of
what the evidence showed. The referee
determined that Attorney Trewin had violated
SCR 20:8.4(c) by having Mr. and Mrs. V.S.
deed a piece of their land to him when there
had been no meeting of the minds on the
overall transaction. Attorney Trewin claims
that the referee should have found a meeting
of the minds because Mr. and Mrs. V.S.
subsequently paid rent to him for that land,
which was consistent with his view that they
had signed a "life lease" as part of the
transaction. He ignores the referee's
findings that Mr. and Mrs. V.S. denied ever
signing a "life lease" and that no such
document was ever produced or introduced
into evidence. Relying on one piece of
evidence while ignoring other findings of
fact does not convince us that the referee
erred in either his findings of fact or his
conclusion of law on this count. We agree
with the referee's conclusion of a violation
of SCR 20:8.4(c).
¶38 With respect to the finding of a
violation of SCR 20:8.4(c) on Count Fifteen
regarding his purchase of the Grosheks'
property, Attorney Trewin again relies on
his version of what occurred. He ignores
the transaction documents he had the
Grosheks sign just before his license
suspension was to take effect in August 2004
and claims that they were represented by
separate counsel when the only valid
transaction took place later in the fall.
He disregards, however, the finding of the
circuit court in the civil action that the
other attorney retained by the Grosheks
acted merely as a scrivener. Moreover,
there is no dispute that Attorney Trewin did
have the Grosheks sign sale documents in
August at a time when he was characterizing
the transaction to them in a manner that was
contradictory to what he was telling other
people and that he never made them aware at
that time of the various stories he was
telling to others. Whether or not the
transaction was ultimately modified at a
later date, there is no doubt that Attorney
Trewin's conduct prior to his suspension
violated SCR 20:8.4(c).
¶39 Attorney Trewin also challenges the
referee's conclusions that he interfered
with the OLR's investigation by attempting
to persuade Mr. and Mrs. V.S. and Mr. and
Mrs. H. to withdraw their grievances and
cease cooperating with the OLR. The referee
found, however, based on the testimony of
R.V.S., that Attorney Trewin wanted him to
sign a "waiver" that he would not pursue a
grievance against Attorney Trewin. The
referee likewise found that Attorney Trewin
persuaded Mr. and Mrs. H. to sign a document
stating their agreement to an amount owed to
Attorney Trewin even though they did not
know whether that amount was accurate or
inaccurate. These findings are sufficient
to support the conclusion of improper
interference with an ongoing grievance
investigation.
¶40 We do not find it necessary to
address every claim and argument by Attorney
Trewin in this opinion. To the extent we
have not addressed arguments here, it is
sufficient to say that we have considered
them and have rejected them.
¶41 We now turn to the issue of the
proper level of discipline. We conclude
that the revocation of Attorney Trewin's
license to practice law in this state is
appropriate and required. Attorney Trewin
was already put on notice of the perils of
engaging in transactions with clients in the
Trewin I disciplinary proceeding. He
nonetheless continued to engage in such
transactions without meeting the very strict
requirements that protect clients from
overreaching by more sophisticated
attorneys. Moreover, he used the knowledge
he had gained from handling the clients'
legal matters to structure those
transactions in a manner that ensured he
would benefit and the clients would not.
Those transactions ultimately resulted in
Attorney Trewin acquiring the clients'
property and enriching himself at their
expense. It is clear that the public needs
to be protected from this type of conduct
and that, as the referee commented, Attorney
Trewin is unfit to engage in the practice of
law in this state.
¶42 We do not include a restitution
award in our order. As noted by the OLR and
the referee, there is not a basis in the
record of this proceeding to readily
ascertain what amount of money should be
paid to the three client couples to make
them whole.
¶43 Finally, we impose the full costs of
this proceeding on Attorney Trewin.
Attorney Trewin has been found to have
engaged in multiple counts of misconduct.
He clearly has litigated this matter
aggressively, which has necessitated the
expenses incurred by the OLR and the
referee. Consequently, we find no basis to
depart from our general policy of imposing
the full costs on an attorney who has been
found guilty of misconduct. See SCR
22.24(1m).
¶44 IT IS ORDERED that the license of
Michael G. Trewin to practice law in
Wisconsin is revoked, effective November 7,
2014.
¶45 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60
days of the date of this order, Michael G.
Trewin shall pay to the Office of Lawyer
Regulation the costs of this proceeding.
¶46 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Michael
G. Trewin shall comply with the requirements
of SCR 22.26 pertaining to the duties of a
person whose license to practice law in
Wisconsin has been revoked.
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