¶2 Attorney Carranza was admitted to the practice of law in Wisconsin in 2005. He has no prior disciplinary violations. His license is, however, currently administratively suspended for failure to pay mandatory bar dues, failure to comply with reporting requirements for continuing legal education, and failure to cooperate with OLR investigations.

¶3 The OLR asks this court to order restitution in two matters. Attorney Carranza acknowledges that restitution is appropriate. The multiple allegations of misconduct will be briefly summarized.

¶5 In a subsequent investigative interview with the OLR, Attorney Carranza stated he had not yet prepared a final accounting but agreed A.E. was entitled to a refund. Attorney Carranza repeatedly promised and failed to provide a final accounting and failed to refund the $500 advanced fee to A.E. The PRC found cause to proceed against Attorney Carranza for alleged violations of SCR 20:1.15(b)(4m), SCR 20:1.15(b)(4m)b., SCR 20:1.16(d), and SCR 22.03(6), enforced via SCR 20:8.4(h). We direct Attorney Carranza to pay restitution to A.E. in the amount of $500.

¶6 On January 21, 2013, C.S.S. retained Attorney Carranza to help him renew his visa. C.S.S. paid Attorney Carranza a $300 advanced fee. Attorney Carranza took copies of all of C.S.S.'s documents and told C.S.S. that he would contact him in about two weeks and "get things filed." Attorney Carranza thereafter failed to either communicate with C.S.S. or take any action on C.S.S.'s behalf, despite C.S.S.'s numerous attempts to contact Attorney Carranza by telephone, text, and email. He also failed to return C.S.S.'s documents.

¶8 The PRC found cause to proceed against Attorney Carranza for alleged violations of SCR 20:1.3, SCR 20:1.4(a), two counts of SCR 20:1.16(d), and SCR 22.03(2), enforced via SCR 20:8.4(h). On May 13, 2014, the Wisconsin Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection (Fund) approved payment of $300 to C.S.S. The parties agreed that restitution to the Fund is appropriate, and we direct Attorney Carranza to pay restitution to the Fund in the amount of $300.

¶9 The PRC also found cause to proceed in six client matters in which restitution might be appropriate, but because Attorney Carranza failed to provide a final accounting, the amount potentially owed to each client cannot be determined. Those matters are summarized as follows.

¶10 In January 2012, M.M. retained Attorney Carranza to represent her in a divorce. She paid Attorney Carranza a $2,000 advanced fee. There was no written fee agreement. Attorney Carranza attended three motion hearings between January and May 2013, then his communication with M.M. ceased. A pre-trial conference was scheduled for August 14, 2013. Attorney Carranza failed to keep M.M. informed of the status of her case and failed to inform her that his license was suspended on August 1, 2013, for failing to cooperate in other OLR investigations.

¶12 On August 15, 2013, M.M. filed a grievance with the OLR against Attorney Carranza. Attorney Carranza then failed to respond to several letters from the OLR seeking information. The PRC found cause to proceed against Attorney Carranza for alleged violations of SCR 20:1.4(a)(3), two counts of SCR 20:1.16(d), SCR 22.26(1)(a) and (b), SCR 20:1.5(b)(2), SCR 20:8.4(c), and SCR 22.03(2), enforced via SCR 20:8.4 (h). To date, because Attorney Carranza has not submitted an accounting, the amount of a refund, if any, owed to M.M. is unknown.

¶13 In February 2013, C.S. retained Attorney Carranza to represent her in relation to pending charges of Operating While Intoxicated-Second and Operating with Prohibited Blood Alcohol Content-Second. She paid Attorney Carranza a $1,000 advanced fee. Attorney Carranza was present at C.S.'s initial appearance on February 28, 2013, and attended her status conferences on May 14, 2013, and June 26, 2013. The next status conference was scheduled for August 20, 2013.

¶14 Attorney Carranza failed to keep C.S. informed of the status of her case. For the most part, he only contacted her on the day of her court appearances, despite the fact that C.S. called and left multiple messages with Attorney Carranza and sent him several emails. Attorney Carranza also failed to inform C.S. that his license was suspended, effective August 1, 2013.

¶16 On August 21, 2013, C.S. filed a grievance with the OLR against Attorney Carranza. Attorney Carranza then failed to respond to multiple letters from the OLR seeking information. The PRC found cause to proceed against Attorney Carranza for alleged violations of SCR 20:1.4(a)(3) and (4), two counts of SCR 20:1.16(d), SCR 22.26 (1)(a) and (b), SCR 20:8.4(c), and SCR 22.03 (2), enforced via SCR 20:8.4(h). To date, because Attorney Carranza has not submitted an accounting, the amount of a refund, if any, owed to C.S. is unknown.

¶18 On December 22, 2011, R.A. contacted the OLR to file a grievance. The PRC found cause to proceed against Attorney Carranza on an alleged violation of SCR 20:1.4(a) (3). To date, Attorney Carranza has not submitted an accounting in this matter, so the amount of a refund, if any, owed to R.A. is unknown.

¶19 On June 2, 2009, A.A. hired Attorney Carranza to represent his brother in connection with a criminal sexual assault case filed in Jefferson County. Because a jury trial was scheduled within nine days, Attorney Carranza informed A.A. that he would only represent the brother if the judge agreed to reschedule the trial date. A.A. paid Attorney Carranza an advanced fee of $2,500. The trial court declined to reschedule the trial. Attorney Carranza then agreed to act in a consultation capacity. After the brother entered a no contest plea, Attorney Carranza agreed to represent him in a subsequent immigration deportation case.

¶21 On March 26, 2012, A.A. filed a grievance with the OLR against Attorney Carranza. The PRC found cause to proceed against Attorney Carranza for alleged violations of SCR 20:1.4(a)(3) and (4), SCR 20:1.l5(b)(4m)b, and SCR 22.03(6), enforced via SCR 20:8.4(h). Attorney Carranza promised and failed to prepare a final accounting, so the amount of restitution owed, if any, to A.A. is unknown.

¶22 In January 2012, G.S. and his wife (collectively, G.S.) retained Attorney Carranza to prepare and file a Chapter 7 bankruptcy on their behalf. G.S. paid Attorney Carranza an advanced fee of $1,200. In late May or early June 2012, G.S. informed Attorney Carranza that he wanted the bankruptcy filed immediately. Attorney Carranza informed G.S. that there were information and documents still needed before the bankruptcy could be filed.

¶23 On June 15, 2012, G.S. contacted the OLR to file a grievance against Attorney Carranza, complaining that Attorney Carranza had taken no action on the bankruptcy and had failed to respond to requests for information during the representation. On June 21, 2012, Attorney Carranza filed the Chapter 7 bankruptcy. However, Attorney Carranza then failed to respond to several requests for information from the OLR, resulting in this court issuing an order directing Attorney Carranza to respond or face temporary license suspension for willful failure to cooperate in an OLR investigation.

¶25 The PRC found cause to proceed against Attorney Carranza for alleged violations of SCR 20:1.4(a)(4), SCR 22.03 (2), enforced via SCR 20:8.4(h), and SCR 22.03(6), enforced via SCR 20:8.4(h). To date, because Attorney Carranza has not submitted an accounting, the amount of a refund, if any, owed to G.S. is unknown.

¶26 On January 16, 2012, K.M. retained Attorney Carranza to prepare and file a Chapter 7 bankruptcy. K.M. paid Attorney Carranza a $600 advanced fee. Attorney Carranza represented K.M. for about six months. On June 20, 2012, K.M. left a voicemail message informing Attorney Carranza that she was discharging him and requesting that Attorney Carranza forward her $600 advanced fee to her new attorney.

¶28 At a subsequent investigative interview, Attorney Carranza admitted that K.M. was entitled to a refund, but also stated that he had not yet prepared a final billing. Attorney Carranza then failed to provide the promised final accounting to the OLR despite receiving several written reminders from the OLR. The PRC found cause to proceed against Attorney Carranza for alleged violations of SCR 20:1.16(d), SCR 22.03(2), enforced via SCR 20:8.4(h), and SCR 22.03(6), enforced via SCR 20:8.4(h). To date, because Attorney Carranza has not submitted an accounting, the amount of a refund, if any, owed to K.M. is unknown.

¶29 The PRC also found cause to proceed in three matters in which restitution is not an issue.

¶30 In December 2006, Attorney Carranza was appointed by the Office of the State Public Defender (SPD) to represent J.S. in a Dane County criminal case and probation revocation proceedings. On May 7, 2007, pursuant to a plea agreement, J.S. was convicted. His probation was revoked. On May 26, 2012, J.S. filed a grievance with the OLR complaining that Attorney Carranza had failed to respond to requests from himself and the SPD to send copies of his case file to J.S.

¶31 Attorney Carranza then failed to respond to several letters from the OLR, ultimately resulting in this court issuing an order directing Attorney Carranza to respond within 20 days of the order or face temporary license suspension. Attorney Carranza then emailed a response to the OLR indicating that he had forwarded the requested documents to J.S.

¶33 The PRC found cause to proceed against Attorney Carranza for alleged violations of SCR 20:1.16(d), SCR 22.03(2), enforced via SCR 20:8.4(h), and SCR 22.03 (6), enforced via SCR 20:8.4(h). Restitution is not sought in this matter.

¶34 In April 2009, Attorney Carranza was appointed by the SPD to represent V.G. on several charges, including felony armed robbery. On March 9, 2010, V.G. was found guilty on all counts. On July 25, 2012, V.G. filed an appeal, and shortly thereafter he asked Attorney Carranza to send him a copy of his case file. After not receiving a response, on August 12, 2012, V.G. sent Attorney Carranza another letter requesting his case file.

¶35 On September 11, 2012, V.G. filed a grievance with the OLR because Attorney Carranza had failed to respond to his letters or send him a copy of his file.

¶36 Meanwhile, in V.G.'s pending criminal appeal, the court of appeals ordered Attorney Carranza to advise the court of the status of V.G.'s request for his court file. Attorney Carranza failed to respond. The court of appeals again ordered Attorney Carranza to advise the court of the status of V.G.'s request for his case file, and Attorney Carranza again failed to respond.

¶39 In April 2013, Attorney Carranza was convicted, following entry of a no contest plea, to misdemeanor Operating While Under Influence-Second. Attorney Carranza did not report his conviction to the OLR or to the clerk of the supreme court and, when the OLR learned of the conviction, failed to respond to several notices from the OLR directing him to respond. The PRC found cause to proceed against Attorney Carranza for alleged violations of SCR 20:8.4(b), SCR 21.15(5), enforced via SCR 20:8.4(f), and SCR 22.03(2), enforced via SCR 20:8.4(h). Restitution is not an issue in this matter.

¶40 There are also two matters in which the OLR's investigation is still pending; one may warrant restitution.

¶41 In July 2012, M.F. retained Attorney Carranza to represent her husband, G.F., regarding his immigration status after he was convicted of misappropriating identification information.

¶42 M.F. paid Attorney Carranza a $2,500 advanced fee, and Attorney Carranza prepared a notice of retainer for both the state criminal case and the immigration matter. Attorney Carranza did not appear at G.F.'s initial immigration hearing on August 23, 2012. After Attorney Carranza failed to appear at the immigration hearing, M.F. attempted to contact him to ask for a refund of at least part of the advanced fee. Attorney Carranza failed to respond.

¶43 On October 10, 2013, M.F. filed a grievance with the OLR complaining that Attorney Carranza failed to take any action on her husband's immigration matter, failed to respond to requests for information, and failed to respond to her requests for a return of unearned fees. Attorney Carranza then failed to respond to the OLR's requests for information.

¶44 The OLR is investigating allegations that Attorney Carranza's conduct may have violated SCR 20:1.3, SCR 20:1.4(a), SCR 20:1.16(d), and SCR 22.03(2). To date, because Attorney Carranza has not submitted an accounting, the amount of a refund, if any, owed to M.F. is unknown.

¶45 In July 2012, Attorney Carranza retained L.W. to provide expert witness testimony. L.W. initially requested a $1,000 retainer. Attorney Carranza told L.W. that because his client was a Mexican citizen, the Mexican Consulate would pay the fee. L.W. agreed to handle the case with the expectation that his fees would be paid by the Mexican authorities. Beginning in February 2013, L.W. submitted bills to Attorney Carranza via email. When L.W. did not receive payment, he inquired if Attorney Carranza had received any payments from the Mexican Consulate. Attorney Carranza did not respond nor has L.W. ever received any payment for his work.

¶46 On October 3, 2013, L.W. filed a grievance with the OLR against Attorney Carranza. Attorney Carranza then failed to respond to the OLR's requests for information. The OLR is investigating allegations that Attorney Carranza's conduct may have violated SCR 20:1.15(b), SCR 20:8.4 (c), and SCR 22.03(2).

¶48 Attorney Carranza's petition for consensual revocation states that he cannot successfully defend against the allegations of professional misconduct set forth in the OLR's summary of the matters being investigated. His petition asserts that he is seeking consensual revocation freely, voluntarily, and knowingly. He states that he understands he is giving up his right to contest the OLR's allegations. He states that he knows he has the right to counsel in this matter but has opted to proceed pro se. The OLR supports Attorney Carranza's petition for consensual license revocation. See SCR 22.19(3). The OLR asks this court to order restitution in the matter of A.E. and C.S.S.

¶50 Concerning restitution, we determine that Attorney Carranza should be required to pay $300 to the Fund in connection with the losses caused by his actions as counsel for C.S.S. We further determine that Attorney Carranza should be required to pay restitution to A.E. in the amount of $500.

¶51 Finally, we note that there are several matters in which the OLR has advised the court that because Attorney Carranza failed to provide a final accounting, the appropriate amount of restitution owed, if any, cannot be determined. We will proceed with this revocation. Should Attorney Carranza ever seek reinstatement, we order that, as a condition of reinstatement of Attorney Carranza's license, Attorney Carranza shall furnish a complete accounting and prove that he has settled all claims related to funds potentially owed to his former clients, specifically including M.M., C.S., R.A., A.A., G.S., K.M., and M.F. See SCR 22.29(4m) (a lawyer petitioning for reinstatement must prove that he or she has made restitution to or settled all claims of persons harmed by the lawyer's misconduct, or must explain the failure or inability to do so); see also In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Mularski, 2010 WI 113, ¶¶35, 37, 329 Wis. 2d 273, 787 N.W.2d 834 (revoking attorney's license and requiring attorney to show he made full restitution to his clients at such time as he would seek reinstatement).

¶52 IT IS ORDERED that Attorney Pablo Carranza's petition for consensual license revocation is granted.

¶53 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the license of Pablo Carranza to practice law in Wisconsin is revoked, effective the date of this order.

¶54 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date of this order, Pablo Carranza shall pay restitution in the amount of $300 to the Wisconsin Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection and in the amount of $500 to A.E.

¶55 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, as a condition of reinstatement of Pablo Carranza's license, Pablo Carranza shall furnish a complete accounting and prove that he has settled all claims related to funds potentially owed to his former clients, specifically including M.M., C.S., R.A., A.A., G.S., K.M., and M.F.

¶58 The majority in essence is simply following the recommendation of the OLR on the issue of restitution. The recommendation, however, makes little sense to me. I think that restitution should be ordered to all of Attorney Carranza's victims and not merely to two.

¶59 The OLR recommends and the majority orders restitution in the Matter of A.E. The majority notes that A.E. paid $500 in advanced fees. It appropriately orders $500 in restitution, even though Attorney Carranza has not yet prepared a final accounting and there was no written fee agreement.

¶60 In the second case, Matter of C.S.S., the majority appropriately orders $300 in restitution paid to the Wisconsin Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection because the Fund has already approved payment of $300 to the victim.

¶61 So far, so good. It is the majority's failure to order restitution in some of the remaining cases that causes me to pause. And what is the reason for the majority's denial of the requested restitution? "[B]ecause Attorney Carranza failed to prepare a final accounting." Per curiam, ¶9; see also ¶16 (Matter of C.S.); ¶18 (Matter of R.A.); ¶21 (Matter of A.A.); ¶25 (Matter of G.S.); and ¶28 (Matter of K.M.).

¶62 It appears inconsistent to me that in the first case, Matter of A.E., restitution is ordered even though no final accounting has been submitted. Yet in other cases restitution is denied because no final accounting has been submitted.

¶63 In the first case Attorney Carranza apparently has agreed that restitution should be paid. Yet, a policy that rests a restitution decision on the acquiescence of the disciplined lawyer is flawed. Further, a policy that rests a restitution decision on whether the disciplined lawyer has yet prepared a final accounting is subject to all sorts of mischief. There is little incentive to do so, where, as here, the discipline is revocation.