¶4 Effective February 20, 2006, we suspended Attorney Crandall's Wisconsin law license for three months as reciprocal discipline to that imposed by the Minnesota Supreme Court for neglecting client matters, failing to communicate with clients, failing to appear at court hearings, failing to comply with discovery rules, and failing to cooperate with the disciplinary investigation. In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Crandall, 2006 WI 6, 287 Wis. 2d 102, 708 N.W.2d 690.

¶5 On March 4, 2008, we publicly reprimanded Attorney Crandall for advancing a frivolous claim, failing to file a client's affidavit or a brief in opposition to a summary judgment motion, failing to keep clients reasonably informed, failing to return clients' files in a timely manner, and failing to cooperate with the OLR's investigation. In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Crandall, 2008 WI 14, 307 Wis. 2d 536, 745 N.W.2d 679.

¶6 Effective September 2, 2008, we suspended Attorney Crandall's Wisconsin law license for 30 days as reciprocal discipline to that imposed by the Minnesota Supreme Court for failing to act with diligence and promptness, failing to communicate with clients, engaging in conduct involving dishonesty and misrepresentation, and failing to cooperate with the Minnesota disciplinary investigation. In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Crandall, 2008 WI 112, 314 Wis. 2d 33, 754 N.W.2d 501.

¶7 Effective May 31, 2011, we suspended Attorney Crandall's Wisconsin law license for five months for failing to hold advance fees in trust, failing to refund unearned fees, and failing to cooperate with the OLR's investigation. In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Crandall, 2011 WI 21, 332 Wis. 2d 698, 798 N.W.2d 183. Attorney Crandall was reinstated to the practice of law on January 5, 2012.

¶8 On October 27, 2014, the OLR filed a five-count complaint against Attorney Crandall alleging (1) that Attorney Crandall had failed to comply with the requirements of Supreme Court Rule (SCR) 22.26 relating to the duties of an attorney whose license has been suspended and (2) that he had failed to cooperate with OLR's investigation into his alleged misconduct.

¶9 Attorney Crandall filed an answer and this court appointed Referee Curtis. We subsequently denied Attorney Crandall's untimely motion to substitute a different referee. On or about April 29, 2014, the parties submitted a stipulation in which Attorney Crandall admitted the facts and misconduct alleged in the complaint and authorized the referee to make findings of fact and conclusions of law based on these allegations. The parties requested an evidentiary hearing on the appropriate sanction.

¶10 Before the scheduled hearing, the parties reached a second stipulation regarding the appropriate sanction. On August 7, 2015, the parties stipulated to a public reprimand as an appropriate sanction.

¶11 The referee filed his findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendation for discipline on August 18, 2015. The referee determined that the OLR had met its burden of proof with respect to the five counts of misconduct alleged in the complaint, and recommended that we accept the stipulations. We summarize those counts now.

¶12 As previously stated, on April 26, 2011, Attorney Crandall's license to practice law in Wisconsin was suspended for a period of five months, effective May 31, 2011. The order suspending Attorney Crandall mandated that he comply with the requirements of SCR 22.26 pertaining to the duties of an attorney whose license has been suspended.

¶13 In April and May of 2011, Attorney Crandall was listed as attorney of record for J.M., a party to an appeal then-pending before the Wisconsin Court of Appeals. On June 30, 2011, the Court of Appeals certified the appeal to this court.

¶20 The referee then considered the stipulation for a public reprimand, mindful of his need to consider the seriousness, nature, and extent of misconduct, the level of discipline needed to protect the public and the legal system from repetition of the misconduct, the need to impress on the attorney the seriousness of the misconduct, and the need to deter others from committing similar acts. See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Scanlan, 2006 WI 38, ¶72, 290 Wis. 2d 30, 712 N.W.2d 877, citing In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Charlton, 174 Wis. 2d 844, 875-76, 498 N.W.2d 380 (1993). The referee noted that he considered Attorney Crandall's prior disciplinary history and the concept of progressive discipline. See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Nussberger, 2006 WI 111, ¶27, 296 Wis. 2d 47, 719 N.W.2d 501.

¶21 The referee noted that the OLR relied on three prior cases in support of the recommended discipline. Public Reprimand of Arik J. Guenther, 2007-3 (imposing public reprimand where attorney failed to notify two clients of his suspension, failed to include the two clients on his affidavit of compliance filed with the OLR, and also failed to cooperate with the OLR); Public Reprimand of Michael G. Trewin, 2006-6 (imposing public reprimand where lawyer failed to notify the court and opposing counsel of his suspension in several cases, failed to include those cases on his affidavit of compliance filed with the OLR, and had a conflict of interest on a matter); Public Reprimand of Hazel J. Washington, 2007-10 (imposing public reprimand for lawyer's failure to inform a client, opposing counsel, and the court of her suspension; failure to list the client, court, and file number on the affidavit of compliance filed with the OLR; and failure to provide competent representation). The referee observed that Attorney Crandall's ethical violations in this matter reflect a level of indifference to the requirements of the supreme court rules. The referee concluded that public discipline is appropriate and recommends that we publicly reprimand Attorney Crandall in this matter.

¶23 A referee's findings of fact are affirmed unless clearly erroneous. Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Eisenberg, 2004 WI 14, ¶5, 269 Wis. 2d 43, 675 N.W.2d 747. The court may impose whatever sanction it sees fit, regardless of the referee's recommendation. See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Widule, 2003 WI 34, ¶44, 261 Wis. 2d 45, 660 N.W.2d 686.

¶24 There is no showing that any of the referee's findings of fact are erroneous. Accordingly, we adopt them. We also agree with the referee's conclusions of law that Attorney Crandall violated the supreme court rules set forth above. In view of Attorney Crandall's fairly extensive prior disciplinary history, we considered whether suspension is necessary to impress upon Attorney Crandall the seriousness of his misconduct and the importance of abiding by the rules of professional conduct. On balance, we accept the referee's recommendation that a public reprimand is an appropriate sanction for Attorney Crandall's misconduct. Although no two fact situations are identical, a public reprimand is generally consistent with the sanction imposed in somewhat analogous cases. See Public Reprimand of Ronald J. Thompson, 2012-18 (imposing public reprimand for failure to comply with SCR 22.26 following license suspension); see also In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Mulligan, 2009 WI 12, 315 Wis. 2d 605, 759 N.W.2d 766 (imposing public reprimand on lawyer with two prior reprimands).

¶25 We also agree that Attorney Crandall should be required to pay the full costs of the proceeding, which are $4,182.17.

¶26 IT IS ORDERED that Eric L. Crandall is publicly reprimanded for professional misconduct.

¶27 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date of this order, Eric L. Crandall shall pay to the Office of Lawyer Regulation the costs of this proceeding.

¶29 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J. (dissenting). I write in dissent in several attorney discipline cases because I have concerns about the discipline imposed.

¶30 This is Attorney Crandall's fifth brush with the OLR in the seven years since 2008. He has been disciplined four times previously: a three-month suspension, a public reprimand, a 30-day suspension, and a five-month suspension. It does not appear that the previous discipline had the impact the court intended. Nevertheless, the court now imposes another public reprimand. This sanction is too light. The court professes that it has "long adhered to progressive discipline." OLR v. Netzer, 2014 WI 7, ¶49, 352 Wis. 2d 310, 841 N.W.2d 820. The principle of progressive discipline should be applied here. It is not.

¶31 Moreover, I write to state my difficulty reconciling the significantly different levels of discipline imposed in the instant case (public reprimand) and in OLR v. Boyle, 2015 WI 110, _ Wis. 2d _, _ N.W.2d _.

¶32 In OLR v. Boyle, the referee found (and the court agreed) that the respondent attorney committed all six charged offenses (including two trust account violations). The discipline: a 60- day suspension plus conditions. The respondent attorney had received three private reprimands between 2002 and 2012. How does the court justify imposing harsher discipline on Attorney Boyle than on Attorney Crandall?

¶33 I also have difficulty reconciling the significantly different levels of discipline imposed in the following three cases. The first two cases are based on a stipulation of the parties. The third case is a default by the respondent attorney:

¶34 For the reasons set forth, I write in each of these cases.