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ATTORNEY disciplinary proceeding.
Attorney's license suspended.
¶1 PER CURIAM. We review the report
of Referee Christine Harris Taylor,
concluding that Attorney Shawn G. Rice
committed one count of professional
misconduct as alleged in the Office of
Lawyer Regulation's (OLR) complaint.
Referee Taylor recommends the court suspend
Attorney Rice's license for a period of 60
days and that we order Attorney Rice to pay
the full costs of this disciplinary
proceeding.
¶2 No appeal was filed from the
referee's report so we review this matter
pursuant to SCR 22.17(2). After completing
our review, we agree that the stipulated
facts and the record are sufficient to
establish that Attorney Rice violated SCR
20:8.4(c). We further agree that Attorney
Rice's license should be suspended for 60
days. We accede to the OLR's conclusion
that restitution is not warranted. We deny
Attorney Rice's objection to costs and
direct him to pay the full costs of this
disciplinary proceeding which are $14,064.72
as of August 29, 2016.
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¶3 Attorney Rice was admitted to
practice law in Wisconsin in 1993. He has
been subject to professional discipline on
one prior occasion. In 2007, he received a
public reprimand for three counts of
professional misconduct related to his
personal involvement in a commercial real
estate transaction in which he made false
statements in a deposition and executed a
document falsely reflecting an individual as
a member of an LLC. In re Disciplinary
Proceedings Against Rice, 2007 WI 68, 301
Wis. 2d 94, 732 N.W.2d 440.
¶4 This matter came to the OLR's
attention during Rice's acrimonious divorce
proceeding. In 1996, Attorney Rice and Ms.
Liesl M. Testwuide (Ms. Testwuide) were
married. In 1992, when Ms. Testwuide was
still unmarried and childless, Ms.
Testwuide's parents created a trust for the
benefit of Ms. Testwuide and her children.
Ms. Testwuide was co-trustee of the trust
along with Kenneth Kazmierczak, a business
associate of Ms. Testwuide's father.
¶5 In 2010, Ms. Testwuide filed for
divorce. In July 2011, while the divorce
was pending, Ms. Testwuide filed a grievance
with the OLR alleging that Attorney Rice had
removed over $600,000 from the trust without
proper authorization by forging Ms.
Testwuide's signature and the signature of
her co-trustee. Attorney Rice self-reported
the same misconduct and, in October 2011,
Attorney Rice submitted a lengthy written
response to the grievance acknowledging that
he signed documents without proper
authorization but asserting Ms. Testwuide
knew and tacitly approved his actions. Ms.
Testwuide and Attorney Rice's divorce
judgment was entered in October 2011; they
continued to litigate custody, placement,
and other issues.
¶6 On November 21, 2011, Ms. Testwuide
filed a civil action against Attorney Rice
and his former law firm, alleging fraud,
conversion, and legal malpractice.
Testwuide v. Rice, 2011CV1184, Sheboygan
County. On December 18, 2012, the circuit
court granted Rice's motion for summary
judgment, ruling that several claims were
barred by the statute of limitations. In
May 2013, a stipulation and order dismissing
the remaining claims against Rice was
entered.
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¶7 On October 2, 2014, the OLR filed a
disciplinary complaint alleging that
Attorney Rice violated SCR 20:8.4(c) by
forging the signatures of the co-trustees of
the Liesl M. Testwuide 1992 Trust on various
checks and documents. Initially, the OLR
sought a six month license suspension. In
July 2015, after pretrial discovery, the OLR
and Attorney Rice executed a "Stipulation
Regarding Factual Allegations and
Disciplinary Charge." Attorney Rice
admitted that he violated SCR 20:8.4(c) by
preparing and executing, without
authorization, numerous forms, checks and
other Trust documents for a 12-year period
during the marriage and continuing until Ms.
Testwuide filed for divorce in 2010.
¶8 The referee accepted the
stipulation. The parties continued to
dispute the appropriate discipline and
conducted additional discovery, including
depositions.
¶9 Attorney Rice maintained that, under
the circumstances, a public reprimand was
sufficient. On April 15, 2016, days before
a scheduled evidentiary hearing, the OLR
reduced its recommendation from a six-month
license suspension to a 60-day license
suspension. Attorney Rice continued to
assert that a public reprimand was
sufficient, but the parties agreed to waive
the scheduled hearing and permit the referee
to resolve the question of appropriate
discipline based on the stipulation, the
existing record, and the parties' written
submissions.
¶10 The referee issued her report and
recommendation dated August 9, 2016.
Neither party appealed.
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¶11 When we review a referee's report
and recommendation in an attorney
disciplinary case, we affirm the referee's
findings of fact unless they are found to be
clearly erroneous, but we review the
referee's conclusions of law on a de novo
basis. In re Disciplinary Proceedings
Against Inglimo, 2007 WI 126, ¶5, 305 Wis.
2d 71, 740 N.W.2d 125. We determine the
appropriate level of discipline to impose
given the particular facts of each case,
independent of the referee's recommendation,
but benefiting from it. In re
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Widule,
2003 WI 34, ¶44, 261 Wis. 2d 45, 660 N.W.2d
686.
¶12 There is no showing that the
referee's factual findings are clearly
erroneous and we accept them. The complaint
alleges, Attorney Rice has stipulated, and
the record supports the finding that
Attorney Rice arranged for numerous checks
and disbursals from the trust account,
without authorization, the aggregate amount
of which was several hundred thousand
dollars.
¶13 Supreme Court Rule 20:8.4(c)
provides that it is professional misconduct
for a lawyer to engage in conduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation. The stipulation and the
record before the court are sufficient to
support a legal conclusion that Attorney
Rice violated SCR 20:8.4(c).
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¶14 The primary question in this matter
is the appropriate discipline for Attorney
Rice's misconduct. Factors relevant to
determining appropriate attorney discipline
include the seriousness, nature and extent
of the misconduct; the level of discipline
needed to protect the public, the courts,
and the legal system from repetition of the
attorney's misconduct; the need to impress
upon the attorney the seriousness of the
misconduct; and the need to deter other
attorneys from committing similar
misconduct. See In re Disciplinary
Proceedings Against Hammis, 2011 WI 3,
¶39, 331 Wis. 2d 19, 793 N.W.2d 884; In re
Disciplinary Proceedings Against
Eisenberg, 2004 WI 14, ¶5, 269 Wis. 2d 43,
675 N.W.2d 747.
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¶15 The referee identified as
aggravating factors, Attorney Rice's prior
discipline, a dishonest or selfish motive,
and the fact that the misconduct spanned
years. As mitigating factors, the referee
noted that Attorney Rice self-reported his
misconduct and that he was cooperative in
these proceedings.
¶16 After itemizing a number of
unauthorized trust transactions, the referee
stated that she was not persuaded by
Attorney Rice's claim that it was
"impossible" to locate the co-trustee after
the co-trustee relocated to Minneapolis, and
found further that the "overwhelming
information in this record supports the fact
that [Rice's] misconduct in accessing Trust
funds, without authorization was well in
excess of any dollar amounts necessary to
'pay bills.'." However, the referee
acknowledged the "personal nature of the
issues leading [Rice] to engage in the
misconduct that he admits to" and found
credible Attorney Rice's assertion that he
sincerely believed that he was acting as a
"de facto" trustee.
¶17 Throughout these proceedings
Attorney Rice has maintained that he engaged
in the trust transactions, albeit
unauthorized, but with the knowledge and
consent of his wife, who was both a co-
trustee and a beneficiary of the trust. He
claims that she did not want to be involved
in the marital finances. He maintains that
the trust funds were used to support a
marital lifestyle that exceeded their
employment income, and paid for, among other
things, property taxes, vacations, and the
remodeling of a vacation home. He claims
that Ms. Testwuide's grievance was both
selective and incomplete in terms of the
trust transactions it identified. The
referee did not make specific findings in
this regard, however, merely noting the
"conflicting" evidence provided. There is
no finding that Attorney Rice misused the
trust funds.
¶18 In terms of the appropriate
discipline, the referee described Attorney
Rice's misconduct as serious, but ultimately
accepted the OLR's recommendation for a 60-
day suspension. She deemed analogous In
re Disciplinary Proceedings Against
Riegleman, 2003 WI 3, 259 Wis. 2d 1, 657
N.W.2d 339, in which this court imposed a
60-day suspension upon a lawyer who endorsed
a settlement check without the insurance
company's consent, failed to inform the
insurance company the lawyer was in
possession of the funds, and distributed
settlement funds despite knowing there was a
dispute regarding the funds. See
also In re Disciplinary Proceedings
Against Glesner, 2000 WI 18, 233 Wis. 2d
35, 606 N.W.2d 173 (imposing 60-day
suspension for adding unearned charges to a
client's billing and creating an invoice
with fabricated time entries); In re
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Krueger,
2006 WI 17, 288 Wis. 2d 586, 709 N.W.2d 857
(imposing 60-day suspension for preparing
and filing inaccurate bankruptcy schedules
and failing to disclose a pre-bankruptcy
debt owed to him by the debtor of over
$7,000). The referee thus recommends the
court suspend Attorney Rice's license for 60
days and further recommends that we impose
the full costs of this proceeding on
Attorney Rice.
¶19 Attorney Rice filed an objection to
the OLR's statement of costs. He contends
that he conceded all along that he committed
the alleged misconduct but felt compelled to
litigate the case because the OLR
"overreached with respect to the punishment"
it initially sought, namely, a six-month
suspension. He contends that he was
effectively left with "no viable course of
action other than fully litigating the case"
as occurred in In re Disciplinary
Proceedings Against Frisch, 2010 WI 60,
326 Wis. 2d 128, 784 N.W.2d 670. He points
out that the OLR reduced its requested
discipline to a 60-day suspension a mere two
days before a scheduled hearing, whereupon
he agreed to have the referee consider the
matter on written submissions. He asks the
court to impose only half the costs upon
him.
¶20 The OLR maintains that full costs
are appropriate. The OLR reminds the court
that Attorney Rice continued to seek a
public reprimand; that is, he did not
"acquiesce" when the OLR reduced the
recommended sanction, nor did he stipulate
to discipline. The OLR maintains that its
costs were incurred in the normal course of
litigating this case.
¶21 We agree. We find no reason to
depart from our general practice of imposing
full costs on attorneys found to have
committed misconduct. See SCR 22.25.
While Attorney Rice did admit his misconduct
and ultimately stipulated to certain facts,
disagreement regarding the appropriate
sanction resulted in the parties litigating
this matter for some time and required the
preparation of a referee's report.
¶22 Finally, we impose no restitution
obligation on Attorney Rice. The OLR has
not sought restitution and we accede to its
determination that restitution is not
appropriate in this case. See SCR
21.16(1m)(em) and (2m)(a)1.
¶23 IT IS ORDERED that the license of
Shawn G. Rice to practice law in Wisconsin
is suspended for a period of 60 days,
effective February 17, 2017.
¶24 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Shawn G.
Rice shall comply with the provisions of SCR
22.26 concerning the duties of a person
whose license to practice law in Wisconsin
has been suspended.
¶25 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60
days of the date of this order, Shawn G.
Rice shall pay to the Office of Lawyer
Regulation the costs of this proceeding,
which are $14,064.72 as of August 29, 2016.
¶26 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that
compliance with all conditions of this order
is required for reinstatement. See SCR
22.29(4)(c).
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¶27 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.
(dissenting). I cannot join this per
curiam because the stipulation, the referee's
report, and this per curiam do not make clear
the nature and extent of Attorney Rice's
conduct that is charged as a violation of SCR
20:8.4(c). Without knowing the nature and
extent of the conduct I cannot determine
whether a violation of the Code occurred and,
if there was a violation, the appropriate
discipline. Accordingly, I dissent.
¶28 I am authorized to state that Justice
ANN WALSH BRADLEY joins this dissent.
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