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ATTORNEY disciplinary proceeding.
Attorney publicly reprimanded.
¶1 PER CURIAM. We review the report
of Referee Robert E. Kinney who concluded
that Attorney Ty Christopher Willihnganz's
professional misconduct warrants a public
reprimand and recommends that we require him
to pay the full costs of this disciplinary
proceeding.
¶2 No appeal has been filed from the
referee's report and recommendation so we
review the matter pursuant to Supreme Court
Rule (SCR) 22.17(2). After considering the
referee's report, the parties' stipulation,
and the record in this matter, we agree that
Attorney Willihnganz engaged in some, but
not all, of the acts of professional
misconduct alleged in the Office of Lawyer
Regulation's (OLR) complaint. We agree that
a public reprimand is appropriate and we
require Attorney Willihnganz to pay the full
costs of this proceeding, which were
$5,028.97 as of October 6, 2016.
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¶3 Attorney Willihnganz was admitted to
practice law in Wisconsin on April 11, 1996.
In 2001, his license was administratively
suspended for failure to comply with
continuing legal education (CLE)
requirements. In 2004, he received a public
reprimand for failing to abide by a client's
decision concerning the objectives of
representation and failing to consult with
the client in violation of SCR 20:1.2(a),
and for failure to cooperate with the OLR's
investigation into the matter. In re
Disciplinary Proceedings Against
Willihnganz, 2004 WI 31, 270 Wis. 2d 229,
676 N.W.2d 473. His law license was
reinstated in June 2007. In 2008, this
court imposed a private reprimand on
Attorney Willihnganz for practicing law
during the administrative suspension for
non-compliance with CLE requirements. In
re Disciplinary Proceedings Against
Willihnganz, No. 2008AP180, unpublished
order (S. Ct. July 28, 2008).
¶4 This proceeding arises from Attorney
Willihnganz's professional involvement with
a Green Bay businessman and family friend,
R.V.
¶5 In approximately 2010, Attorney
Willihnganz, who had taken a break from the
practice of law to pursue other career
interests, returned to Green Bay and the
practice of law. He negotiated an agreement
with R.V., whereby R.V. agreed to provide
Attorney Willihnganz with office space for
his legal practice and to pay his State Bar
of Wisconsin bar dues and CLE expenses in
exchange for Attorney Willihnganz providing
certain legal services to R.V. and his new
energy startup, Green Box.
¶6 The working arrangement proved
stressful and Attorney Willihnganz described
it as a "pretty desperate time" when, in
March of 2013, an individual who had
invested $600,000 in Green Box filed a
lawsuit in Brown County circuit court
against R.V. and Green Box, alleging that
his investment was obtained by fraudulent
misrepresentation. Attorney Willihnganz's
brief representation of R.V. and Green Box
during his administrative license suspension
gave rise to this disciplinary proceeding.
¶7 On December 30, 2015, the OLR filed
a formal disciplinary complaint against
Attorney Willihnganz seeking a 60-day
suspension of his license to practice law.
First, it alleged that Attorney Willihnganz
violated SCR 20:1.16(d) by failing to take
steps to protect the interests of R.V. and
Green Box upon the termination of his
representation of them. Second, it alleged
that Attorney Willihnganz violated SCR
22.26(1)(c) by failing to promptly provide
written notification to the court and
opposing counsel of a June 4, 2013, law
license suspension. Third, it alleged that
Attorney Willihnganz violated SCR 31.10(1)
and 22.26(2) by practicing law after his law
license was suspended. Fourth and finally,
it alleged that Attorney Willihnganz
violated SCR 20:8.4(c) by giving false
testimony in a deposition.
¶8 The Honorable Robert E. Kinney was
appointed as referee. The OLR filed a
motion for summary judgment. At a July 2016
telephonic hearing on the OLR's motion,
Attorney Willihnganz admitted to count one
of the complaint. The parties indicated
that a comprehensive stipulation of facts
would follow.
¶9 Referee Kinney accepted Attorney
Willihnganz's admission to count one of the
complaint, found that the complaint alleged
sufficient facts to support the misconduct
charge, and concluded that Attorney
Willihnganz committed the misconduct alleged
in count one. The parties reserved the
right to argue whether the stipulated facts
substantiated the remaining allegations of
misconduct and the appropriate sanction.
¶10 The referee conducted a hearing on
August 15, 2016. At the hearing, the
parties submitted a comprehensive
stipulation of facts, whereby Attorney
Willihnganz reiterated his admission to the
misconduct alleged in count one of the
complaint and agreed that the referee could
use the stipulated facts to determine
whether Attorney Willihnganz committed the
misconduct alleged in counts two through
four of the complaint. Attorney Willihnganz
testified at the evidentiary hearing.
¶11 The parties' stipulation and the
testimony from the evidentiary hearing
focused on events between March 2013 and
January 2014.
¶12 In March 2013, M.A. filed a
complaint in Brown County circuit court
against R.V. and Green Box alleging that
R.V. used misrepresentations and false
promises to induce M.A. to invest $600,000
in Green Box. Attorney Willihnganz filed an
Answer on behalf of the defendants.
Discovery commenced.
¶13 On June 4, 2013, Attorney
Willihnganz's law license was
administratively suspended for failure to
comply with 2011-2012 CLE requirements.
Attorney Willihnganz told R.V. about the
suspension and urged him to retain new
counsel, but did not promptly provide formal
written notification to the court or to
opposing counsel.
¶14 In a June 5, 2013, letter to
opposing counsel, Attorney Willihnganz sent
some undated discovery answers, stating:
"Attached are the answers to Plaintiffs
First Set of Interrogatories. I will
provide you with a signed version as soon as
[R.V.] returns to town."
¶15 In a June 27, 2013 letter, opposing
counsel responded, informing Attorney
Willihnganz that the defendants' discovery
responses were deficient and reminding him
that defendants had failed to respond to a
document request. A July 12, 2013, letter
from opposing counsel reiterated these
issues.
¶16 Attorney Willihnganz did not inform
R.V. of this correspondence. A motion to
compel ensued; Attorney Willihnganz received
notice of a September 20, 2013 scheduling
conference.
¶17 On August 13, 2013, Attorney
Willihnganz filed a motion to withdraw as
counsel. A hearing on the withdrawal motion
was scheduled for September 30, 2013.
¶18 On September 20, 2013, Attorney
Willihnganz appeared on behalf of R.V. and
Green Box for the telephonic scheduling
conference on the scheduling conference.
During the conference, Attorney Willihnganz
stated that he was not intending to withdraw
his motion, and the scheduling conference
proceeded. Attorney Willihnganz did not
inform the court, the clerk, or opposing
counsel that his license was
administratively suspended.
¶19 On September 30, 2013, opposing
counsel appeared at the scheduled hearing on
Attorney Willihnganz's motion to withdraw as
counsel. Attorney Willihnganz did not
appear.
¶20 On October 4, 2013, the circuit
court granted the plaintiff's motion to
compel and ordered R.V. and Green Box to
produce the requested documents and to serve
responses to the Interrogatories on or
before November 1, 2013.
¶21 On or about November 1, 2013,
another administrative suspension was
imposed on Attorney Willihnganz's law
license for failure to pay State Bar of
Wisconsin dues and failure to certify
compliance with trust account recordkeeping
requirements.
¶22 On November 5, 2013, with discovery
still not forthcoming, plaintiff's counsel
moved to strike the defendants' answer and
sought a default judgment.
¶23 On January 2, 2014, a new lawyer
filed a notice of appearance on behalf of
Green Box. On January 21, 2014, another
attorney filed a notice of appearance on
behalf of R.V.
¶24 In a January 22, 2014 deposition in
the Green Box litigation, Attorney
Willihnganz was asked the following
questions and gave the following answers:
Q. Did you tell him ([R.V.]) why it
was you participated in the scheduling
conference when you didn't have a license to
practice law?
A. Yes, I just said, you know, I felt
uncomfortable about it; but since I took the
call, I just went through with it.
Q. So did you tell him even though you
did that you can't represent him, he needs
to get some other lawyer?
A. I don't remember if I specifically
said that. Again, I thought it was
understood that since I did not have a
license I was not the lawyer.
. . .
Q. I looked you up on the State Bar of
Wisconsin website, and it indicated that
you're currently suspended?
A. That is correct.
Q. And if I recall correctly, you have
been subjected to discipline by the Supreme
Court on at least one occasion?
A. Yes.
Q. And when was that?
A. That was 2004, I believe.
¶25 After testifying to the facts of his
2004 discipline, Attorney Willihnganz was
asked the following question and gave the
following answer:
Q. Is that the only time you have been
disciplined by the Supreme Court?
A. Yes.
Attorney Willihnganz did not disclose his
2008 private reprimand.
¶26 R.V. maintained that "neither he nor
Green Box knew, or had reason to know, that
Attorney Ty Willihnganz was failing to
properly manage the case, failing to respond
to the Plaintiff's communications and
failing to comply with the orders of this
court."
¶27 In his accompanying affidavit, R.V.
stated:
In or around June 2013, Attorney
Willihnganz informed me that his license was
suspended due to his failure to complete
continuing education classes and pay state
bar dues. I was informed that Attorney
Willihnganz was working towards having his
license reinstated.
¶28 R.V. also stated:
Following the filing of the Motion to
Withdraw, I did not receive any mail from
either the plaintiffs counsel or the court.
At the time of Attorney Willihnganz's
withdrawal, I also did not receive any
documents from him that were provided to him
from plaintiff's counsel regarding the
discovery issues.
¶29 Attorney Willihnganz complied with
his CLE requirements in April 2014; his law
license remained suspended until June, 2014,
when he resolved all remaining
administrative obligations and his law
license was reinstated.
¶30 On October 23, 2014, nine months
after successor counsel replaced Attorney
Willihnganz, the circuit court granted
plaintiff's motion for default judgment
against R.V. and Green Box and entered
judgment against them in the amount of
$813,735.34. The defendants appealed but
the court of appeals affirmed, noting that
after retaining replacement counsel, the
defendants did not attempt to rectify the
discovery violation for almost eleven
months. The court remanded the case,
directing the circuit court to amend the
judgment to require the plaintiff to
transfer his membership units back to Green
Box upon payment of the judgment.
¶31 In its decision, the court of
appeals stated:
At his deposition, Willihnganz
testified that, around the time of his
motion, he strongly advised [R.V.] and Green
Box to obtain new counsel. Nonetheless,
because he expected to be reinstated, he
participated in a scheduling conference on
September 20, 2013. After the scheduling
conference, Willihnganz failed to open his
mail, did not respond to telephone calls,
and did not provide any additional discovery
to [plaintiff's counsel].
Araujo v. Van Den Heuvel, No.
2014AP2846-FT unpublished slip op., ¶3 (Wis.
Ct. App. Aug. 25, 2015).
¶32 The referee rendered his report and
recommendation in this disciplinary
proceeding on September 20, 2016. The
referee had already accepted Attorney
Willihnganz's admission to the misconduct
alleged in count one of the OLR complaint so
the report focused on the remaining
allegations and the appropriate sanction.
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¶33 The complaint alleged that Attorney
Willihnganz failed to promptly provide
written notification to the court and
opposing counsel of his law license
suspension, in violation of SCR 22.26(1)(c).
An attorney who fails to abide by mandatory
continuing legal education requirements may
be suspended. See SCR 31.01(1). Supreme
Court Rule 22.26(1) provides that an
attorney whose license is suspended shall -
on or before the effective date of license
suspension - do a number of things,
including, as pertinent here, promptly
providing:
[W]ritten notification to the court or
administrative agency and the attorney for
each party in a matter pending before a
court or administrative agency of the
suspension or revocation and of the
attorney's consequent inability to act as an
attorney following the effective date of the
suspension or revocation. The notice shall
identify the successor attorney of the
attorney's client or, if there is none at
the time notice is given, shall state the
client's place of residence.
SCR 22.26(1)(c).
¶34 It is undisputed that Attorney
Willihnganz's law license was
administratively suspended on June 4, 2013,
and that he filed a motion to withdraw as
counsel on August 13, 2013.
¶35 Attorney Willihnganz testified that
he thought he had a "reasonable amount of
time" before he provided notice of his
license suspension. The referee observed
that "even under the most liberal
interpretation" of the rule, Attorney
Willihnganz's delay in this matter was
unreasonable. Moreover, the referee noted
that "the record is devoid of any evidence
that [Attorney Willihnganz] furnished notice
of his suspension in the manner contemplated
by the rule." The referee thus concluded
that by failing to promptly provide written
notification to the court and opposing
counsel of his June 4, 2013, law license
suspension and his consequent inability to
act as an attorney after June 4, 2013,
Attorney Willihnganz violated SCR 22.26(1)
(c) as alleged in count two of the OLR
complaint.
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¶36 The referee next considered whether
Attorney Willihnganz practiced law after his
license had been suspended in violation of
SCRs 31.10(1) and 22.26(2). Specifically,
as alleged in the complaint and as
stipulated by the parties, Attorney
Willihnganz sent a letter and answers to
interrogatories to opposing counsel on June
5, 2013, one day after his administrative
license suspension, and he appeared on his
clients' behalf at a September 20, 2013
telephone scheduling conference, during that
suspension.
¶37 Attorney Willihnganz argued that he
qualified for a narrow exception to the
prohibition against a suspended lawyer
practicing law, on the theory that he was
engaged in law related work for a commercial
employer itself not engaged in the practice
of law, namely Green Box. Supreme Court Rule
22.26(2) provides:
An attorney whose license to practice
law is suspended or revoked or who is
suspended from the practice of law may not
engage in this state in the practice of law
or in any law work activity customarily done
by law students, law clerks, or other
paralegal personnel, except that the
attorney may engage in law related work in
this state for a commercial employer itself
not engaged in the practice of law.
(Emphasis added). See also In re
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Hyndman,
2002 WI 6, 249 Wis. 2d 650, 638 N.W.2d 293.
¶38 The referee was not persuaded. The
referee specifically found that Attorney
Willihnganz was not an employee of Green
Box. The referee thus rejected Attorney
Willihnganz's contention that his work for
Green Box fell within the exception to SCR
22.26(2).
¶39 The referee also rejected Attorney
Willihnganz's effort to characterize his
actions as permissible because they were
"purely administrative." For example,
Attorney Willihnganz claimed he had drafted
the discovery responses before his
suspension and merely mailed them after the
suspension and noted that lay persons
sometimes attend scheduling conferences.
¶40 The referee rejected these
arguments. He noted that SCR 22.26(2)
broadly encompasses "any law work activity
customarily done by law students, law
clerks, or other paralegal personnel" and
concluded that it was impermissible for
Attorney Willihnganz to send the discovery
responses or participate in the scheduling
conference while suspended. Accordingly,
the referee concluded that Attorney
Willihnganz practiced law after his
privilege to do so had been suspended,
thereby violating SCRs 31.10(1) and
22.26(2).
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¶41 The referee next considered whether
Attorney Willihnganz violated SCR 20:8.4(c)
by giving false testimony at his January 22,
2014, deposition. Specifically, when asked
about his professional disciplinary history,
Attorney Willihnganz did not affirmatively
disclose having received a private reprimand
in 2008.
¶42 At the evidentiary hearing, Attorney
Willihnganz testified that he was nervous
during the deposition and he just "forgot"
about the private reprimand. He said he had
nothing to gain by not disclosing it, noting
he had disclosed the public reprimand which
he considered more serious. The OLR argued
this was "just not credible."
¶43 The referee stated, "I frankly do
not know, based on this record, whether
[Attorney Willihnganz] remembered or forgot
that he had been privately reprimanded." At
the hearing and in his report, the referee
raised questions about the scope of a
lawyer's obligation to affirmatively
disclose a private reprimand. Ultimately,
the referee recommended the court dismiss
count four of the complaint.
¶44 Supreme Court Rule 22.17(1) provides
that within 20 days after the filing of the
referee's report, the director or the
respondent may file with the supreme court
an appeal from the referee's report. Neither
party appealed. Accordingly, we review this
matter pursuant to SCR 22.17(2).
¶45 This court will affirm a referee's
findings of fact unless they are found to be
clearly erroneous, but we review the
referee's conclusions of law on a de novo
basis. In re Disciplinary Proceedings
Against Inglimo, 2007 WI 126, ¶5, 305 Wis.
2d 71, 740 N.W.2d 125. We determine the
appropriate level of discipline given the
particular facts of each case, independent
of the referee's recommendation, but
benefitting from it. In re Disciplinary
Proceedings Against Widule, 2003 WI 34,
¶44, 261 Wis. 2d 45, 660 N.W.2d 686.
¶46 There is no showing that any of the
referee's findings of fact, which are
largely derived from the parties'
stipulation and the referee's credibility
determinations, are clearly erroneous.
Accordingly, we adopt them.
¶47 We also accept the referee's
conclusions with respect to the alleged
misconduct. We agree with the referee's
analysis and share his conclusion that
Attorney Willihnganz committed the
misconduct alleged in counts one, two, and
three of the complaint.
¶48 The facts of record in this case do
not support a conclusion that Attorney
Willihnganz's deposition testimony
constituted conduct involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation, in
violation of SCR 20:8.4(c). Omissions that
cause a statement to be false can constitute
unethical conduct in violation of SCR
20:8.4(c). See, e.g., In re
Disciplinary Proceedings Against
Knickmeier, 2004 WI 115, 275 Wis. 2d 69,
683 N.W.2d 445, cert. denied, 544 U.S.
1041 (2005); In re Disciplinary
Proceedings Against Urban, 2002 WI 63, 253
Wis. 2d 194, 645 N.W.2d 612. Here, the
referee did not find that Attorney
Willihnganz's omission was dishonest,
fraudulent, deceitful, or that he
communicated an untruth, either knowingly or
with reckless disregard. See SCR
20:1.0(h) (defining misrepresentation).
Mindful that the referee is the ultimate
arbiter of witness credibility, In re
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Riordan,
2012 WI 125, ¶28, 345 Wis. 2d 42, 824 N.W.2d
441, we conclude that there is insufficient
evidence on this record to establish that
Attorney Willihnganz's deposition testimony
constituted conduct involving dishonestly,
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation in
violation of SCR 20:8.4(c). Accordingly, we
dismiss count four of the OLR's complaint.
¶49 We next consider the appropriate
discipline for Attorney Willihnganz's
misconduct. The referee properly considered
relevant factors, including, (1) the
seriousness, nature and extent of the
misconduct; (2) the level of discipline
needed to protect the public, the courts and
the legal system from repetition of the
attorney's misconduct; (3) the need to
impress upon the attorney the seriousness of
the misconduct; and (4) the need to deter
other attorneys from committing similar
misconduct. In re Disciplinary
Proceedings Against Hammis, 2011 WI 3,
¶39, 331 Wis. 2d 19, 793 N.W.2d 884; see
also In re Disciplinary Proceedings
Against Grogan, 2011 WI 7, ¶15, 331 Wis.
2d 341, 795 N.W.2d 745 (recognizing the ABA
Standards as a guidepost).
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¶50 The referee acknowledged that this
court generally follows a policy of
progressive discipline. In re
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Ray, 2004
WI 45, 270 Wis. 2d 651, 678 N.W.2d 246; In
re Disciplinary Proceedings Against
Louderman, 230 Wis. 2d 200, 601 N.W.2d 625
(1999).
¶51 Indeed, in this case, the OLR's
recommendation for a 60-day suspension was
predicated on the OLR's policy of
progressive discipline. The OLR acknowledged
that Attorney Willihnganz's conduct in this
matter was not egregious. The OLR observed:
In and of themselves in a vacuum,
these violations are relatively minor in
that they don't involve harming anyone,
stealing any money or anything of that
severity. The reason for the recommendation
of a 60-day suspension is in weighing the
pros and cons, the merits and the balancing
test, there is a desire in the system that,
for attorneys like Mr. Willihnganz, that
there be a system of progressive discipline.
Progressive discipline meaning that where,
unfortunately, there are subsequent
violations, that the penalties become
increasingly more severe, Mr. Willihnganz's
first violation was - resulted in a private
reprimand. His second violation resulted in
a public reprimand. Had it not been for
those two cases, the OLR's recommendation in
this case would probably be for either a
private or public reprimand because that's
the level of severity in a vacuum which they
reach.
¶52 The referee declined to impose
progressive discipline in this case. The
referee opined that the cases cited by the
OLR involved more serious misconduct than
was committed here. He observed that
Attorney Willihnganz provided representation
in only one case, over a brief period of
time, and performed minimal legal work. The
referee found Attorney Willihnganz's
testimony credible when he said that he
repeatedly urged the client to provide more
extensive discovery responses. The referee
also believed that Attorney Willihnganz
"repeatedly urged the client to engage the
services of another lawyer."
¶53 The referee cited several cases
where this court opted to impose a
successive public reprimand despite the
OLR's recommendation for progressive
discipline in the form of a license
suspension. See In re Disciplinary
Proceedings Against Kremkoski, 2006 WI 59,
291 Wis. 2d 1, 715 N.W.2d 594 (imposing
public reprimand despite prior private and
public reprimand); In re Disciplinary
Proceedings Against Brandt, 2009 WI 43,
317 Wis. 2d 266, 766 N.W.2d 194 (imposing
public reprimand despite two private
reprimands and a public reprimand); In re
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Hudec,
2014 WI 46, 354 Wis. 2d 728, 848 N.W.2d 287
(imposing public reprimand despite three
prior private reprimands and one public
reprimand). The referee noted the absence
of other aggravating factors and the
presence of mitigating factors, including
his cooperativeness and remorse. The OLR
has not appealed this recommendation and we
accede to the referee's recommendation that
a public reprimand is sufficient discipline
for Attorney Willihnganz's misconduct.
¶54 Finally, although the referee
recommends we dismiss one of the alleged
counts of misconduct, he recommends that we
impose all of the costs of this disciplinary
proceeding. In re Disciplinary
Proceedings Against Polich, 2005 WI 36,
¶¶29-30, 279 Wis. 2d 266, 694 N.W.2d 367
(holding that even when a respondent
prevails on a number of counts, it is still
the court's policy to assess full costs).
We agree. Nothing about this case warrants
deviating from our general policy of
imposing all costs upon the respondent.
See SCR 22.12. Attorney Willihnganz is
ordered to pay the full costs of the
proceeding, which are $5,028.97 as of
October 6, 2016.
¶55 We accept the OLR's October 6, 2016
statement that restitution is not warranted
in this matter.
¶56 IT IS ORDERED that count four of the
complaint is dismissed.
¶57 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Ty
Christopher Willihnganz is publicly
reprimanded for his professional misconduct.
¶58 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60
days of the date of this order, Ty
Christopher Willihnganz shall pay to the
Office of Lawyer Regulation the costs of
this proceeding, which total $5,028.97 as of
October 6, 2016.
¶59 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the
director of the Office of Lawyer Regulation
shall advise the court if there has not been
full compliance with all conditions of this
order.
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¶60 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.
(concurring). I join the per curiam but
write separately to state that I would have
the court address count 4, namely giving
false testimony at a deposition.
¶61 When Attorney Willihnganz was asked
at a deposition if he had been disciplined
only once by this court, he responded "Yes,"
apparently referring to a public reprimand
he had received from this court.
¶62 In addition to the public reprimand,
Attorney Willihnganz had received a private
reprimand from this court.
¶63 The referee decided to dismiss count
4 but raised questions about the scope of a
lawyer's obligation to affirmatively
disclose a private reprimand to a tribunal.
¶64 I do not object to the referee's
recommendation to dismiss count 4. I do,
however, conclude that the court ought to
answer whether an attorney should consider a
private reprimand as discipline by this
court in answering questions about court
discipline. Lawyers, as well as the Office
of Lawyer Regulation and referees, ought to
know the answer to this question for the
future.
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