¶7 On June 14, 2017, the OLR and Attorney Heins executed and filed a stipulation. In the stipulation, Attorney Heins states that she:

¶8 The stipulation further provides that the parties agree that a public reprimand is the appropriate level of discipline for Attorney Heins' misconduct and that she should be ordered to submit her fee dispute with J.R. to binding arbitration before the State Bar Fee Arbitration Program and comply with any arbitration award, subject to any rights and remedies provided for by the Program's rules.

¶10 The referee noted that this stipulation was filed after all discovery was completed, shortly before the hearing. The referee observed that the effect of the stipulation was essentially an admission to all of the material allegations of the complaint. The referee construed the stipulation as a withdrawal of all defenses to the complaint and a plea of no contest. Proceeding consistent with SCR 22.14(2), the referee ascertained whether there was an adequate factual basis for each allegation, then made a determination of misconduct with respect to each allegation.

¶11 The first two counts of the complaint involve Attorney Heins' representation of J.R. The complaint alleged and the parties stipulated that Attorney Heins represented J.R. in an employment matter. On February 16, 2012, they entered into a written fee agreement providing that $25,000 in advance fees paid by J.R. would be placed in Attorney Heins' business account. The written agreement further provided that Attorney Heins would provide an accounting of the fees earned. The agreement provided that if there was any dispute about fees, she would give notice to J.R. and, if the dispute was not resolved, she would submit the dispute to binding arbitration through the State Bar Fee Arbitration Program.

¶12 By December 2014, all but $645.23 of the $25,000 in advance fees had been billed. J.R. made a second advance payment of fees in the amount of $3,000.

¶13 In January 2015, Attorney Heins sought to withdraw as counsel for J.R., citing health issues. On February 12, 2015, she sent J.R a "Final Statement" of fees. Attorney Heins indicated that a refund in the amount of $1,411.53 was due and she paid that amount to him. The statement did not contain the notices required by former SCR 20:1.15(b)(4m)b.

¶14 Ten days later, on February 22, 2015, J.R. notified Attorney Heins that he disputed the fees charged and asked for a "significant refund" of the total $28,000 he had paid.

¶15 On February 24, 2015, Attorney Heins indicated she would not be making an additional refund. On March 2, 2015, J.R. again disputed the fees. In the summer of 2015, J.R. submitted the fee dispute with Attorney Heins to the State Bar Fee Arbitration Program.

¶18 Count Two alleged that, by failing to submit the fee dispute with J.R. to arbitration, Attorney Heins violated former SCR 20:1.15(b)(4m)c., which provided that upon timely receipt of written notice of a dispute from the client, the lawyer shall attempt to resolve that dispute with the client, and if the dispute is not resolved, the lawyer shall submit the dispute to binding arbitration with the State Bar Fee Arbitration Program or a similar local bar association program.

¶19 The referee found that, based upon Attorney Heins' admission that her final statement to J.R. of February 12, 2015, "did not contain the notices required by former SCR 20:l.15(b)(4m)b.2. and 3." and based upon the absence of any information in the record that a court of competent jurisdiction approved Attorney Heins' fee, the referee found there was an adequate factual basis in the record to support the misconduct alleged in Count One.

¶20 The referee found that, based upon Attorney Heins' admission that she did not respond to or participate in the State Bar Fee Arbitration Program, there was an adequate factual basis in the record to support the misconduct alleged in Count Two.

¶21 Counts Three through Five of the complaint involved Attorney Heins' representation of M.I. in connection with an employment matter. In early November 2015, M.I. opted to settle; settlement funds were deposited into Attorney Heins' trust account on November 3, 2015. M.I. was entitled to $3,750 of the funds.

¶22 By early December 2015, M.I. had not received his portion of the settlement. Over the next month, M.I. exchanged several emails with Attorney Heins regarding the funds.

¶23 On January 19, 2016, Attorney Heins drafted a check from her client trust account to M.I. for the funds. The check was twice rejected for insufficient funds, resulting in fees charged to M.I. by his own bank.

¶24 On March 1, 2016, Attorney Heins drafted a second check which included the bank charges M.I. had incurred, plus his portion of the fees. That check was honored.

¶25 The OLR examined Attorney Heins' bank records and determined that between November 3, 2015, and January 31, 2016, the balance in her trust account was below the amount that was owed to M.I.

¶27 Count Three alleged that by failing to hold in trust funds belonging to M.I., Attorney Heins violated SCR 20:1.15(b)(l).

¶29 Count Four alleged that by failing to promptly deliver to M.I. the settlement funds belonging to him, Attorney Heins violated former SCR 20:1.15(d)(1).

¶31 Count Five alleged that by failing to timely respond to the OLR's investigative letters of February 17 and February 22, 2016, Attorney Heins violated SCR 22.03(2), enforceable by SCR 20:8.4(h), and, by willfully failing to timely provide the trust account records requested in the OLR's letters of February 17 and March 25, 2016, Attorney Heins violated SCR 22.03(2) and (6), enforceable by SCR 20:8.4(h).

¶32 The referee found that based upon the undisputed facts in the record that Attorney Heins refused on several occasions to furnish information requested by the OLR in correspondence, and only supplied the complete information after the OLR was required to file a Motion and Order to Show Cause, there was an adequate factual basis in the record to support the misconduct alleged in Count Five.

¶33 Count Six of the complaint alleged that on September 10, 2015, another of Attorney Heins' clients, M.J., presented for payment a check from Attorney Heins' trust account in the amount of $600, representing his portion of a settlement. The check was returned for insufficient funds. On that date Attorney Heins had a zero balance in her trust account.

¶35 Count Six alleged that by failing to hold in trust funds belonging to M.J., Attorney Heins violated SCR 20:l.15(b)(1). The referee found that, based upon the undisputed evidence in the record, that the $600, which was owed to M.J., was not in Attorney Heins' trust account when the check was first presented for payment, there was an adequate factual basis in the record to support misconduct as alleged in Count Six.

¶37 No appeal from the referee's report was filed so our review proceeds under SCR 22.17(2). In conducting our review, we uphold a referee's findings of fact unless they are shown to be clearly erroneous, and we review the referee's conclusions of law de novo. See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Carroll, 2001 WI 130, ¶29, 248 Wis. 2d 662, 636 N.W.2d 718; In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Sosnay, 209 Wis. 2d 241, 243, 562 N.W.2d 137 (1997). We determine the appropriate level of discipline to be imposed under the circumstances, independent of the referee's recommendation. See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Widule, 2003 WI 34, ¶44, 261 Wis. 2d 45, 660 N.W.2d 686.

¶38 There is no showing that any of the referee's findings of fact, which are derived from the parties' stipulation, are clearly erroneous. Accordingly, we adopt them. We also agree with the referee's conclusions of law that Attorney Heins violated the supreme court rules set forth above.

¶39 The referee then considered the appropriate discipline for Attorney Heins' misconduct. The parties jointly requested the referee recommend a public reprimand and that Attorney Heins be ordered to submit her fee dispute with J.R. to binding arbitration before the State Bar Fee Arbitration Program and comply with any arbitration award, subject to any rights or remedies provided for by the Program's rules.

¶40 The referee conducted an independent assessment of whether the stipulated discipline was appropriate. The referee set forth the relevant factors to be considered when ascertaining the appropriate sanction for misconduct, including the seriousness, nature, and extent of misconduct, the level of discipline needed to protect the public and the legal system from repetition of the misconduct, the need to impress on the attorney the seriousness of the misconduct, and the need to deter others from committing similar acts. In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Hammis, 2011 WI 3, 331 Wis. 2d 19, 793 N.W.2d 884.

¶41 The referee observed that there was no evidence of prior disciplinary proceedings against Attorney Heins. The referee noted that this proceeding involves misconduct in three separate client matters, including failure to abide by agreements with a client, failure to obey supreme court rules concerning fee disputes, several trust account violations, including being "out of trust" on numerous occasions, and failure to cooperate with the OLR's investigation. The referee deemed these "serious allegations of misconduct extending over several years." The referee deemed particularly troublesome Attorney Heins' refusal to follow through on both her written agreement and supreme court rule requiring participation in the State Bar Fee Arbitration Program.

¶42 The referee observed that on previous occasions, this court has imposed public reprimands in similar cases. In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Halverson, 225 Wis. 2d 215, 591 N.W.2d 821 (1999) (public reprimand imposed on attorney with no prior discipline who failed to supply requested information to clients, failed to refund fees, and failed to cooperate with OLR); In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Grapsas, 174 Wis. 2d 816, 498 N.W.2d 400 (1993) (imposing public reprimand on attorney with no prior discipline who failed to cooperate with OLR, failed to refund fees to a client, and failed to respond to requests for information from the client); In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Adent, 2016 WI 19, 367 Wis. 2d 372, 877 N.W.2d 364 (accepting stipulation and imposing public reprimand on attorney for trust account violations).

¶43 On balance, the referee determined that a public reprimand is appropriate discipline here and that the court should order Attorney Heins to submit her fee dispute with J.R. to binding arbitration before the State Bar Fee Arbitration Program, and to fully and promptly comply with that proceeding as well as with any arbitration award or other orders that may be made in connection with those proceedings. The referee added that if Attorney Heins fails to comply, the OLR should be authorized to request the court re-open this matter to consider additional discipline. Finally, the referee recommends we impose the full costs of this proceeding on Attorney Heins. We agree with the referee's analysis.

¶44 IT IS ORDERED that Janet L. Heins is publicly reprimanded.

¶45 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Janet L. Heins shall, if she has not already done so, promptly submit her fee dispute with J.R. to binding arbitration before the State Bar Fee Arbitration Program, and shall fully and promptly comply with that proceeding as well as with any arbitration award or other orders that may be made in connection with those proceedings.

¶46 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date of this order, Janet L. Heins shall pay to the Office of Lawyer Regulation the costs of this proceeding, which are $2,378.02 as of July 24, 2017.