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ATTORNEY disciplinary proceeding.
Attorney publicly reprimanded.
¶1 PER CURIAM. We review the report
filed by Referee Kim M. Peterson, adopting a
stipulation between the Office of Lawyer
Regulation (OLR) and Attorney Thomas R.
Napierala. The referee agreed that Attorney
Napierala committed three counts of
misconduct, as alleged in the OLR's
complaint. The referee further agreed with
the parties that a public reprimand is an
appropriate level of discipline for Attorney
Napierala's misconduct, that Attorney
Napierala should be ordered to pay
restitution in the amount of $15,021.66 to a
former client, T.A, and should be assessed
the full costs of the proceeding, which are
$1,677.53 as of August 14, 2018.
¶2 After careful review of the matter,
we conclude that the referee's findings of
fact are supported by clear, satisfactory,
and convincing evidence. We adopt the
referee's conclusions of law. We agree that
the appropriate discipline for Attorney
Napierala's misconduct is a public
reprimand, and we agree that Attorney
Napierala should pay restitution to T.A.,
and bear the full costs of this proceeding.
¶3 Attorney Napierala was admitted to
the practice of law in Wisconsin in 1990.
He practices in Milwaukee. He has not
previously been the subject of professional
discipline.
¶4 On June 30, 2017, the OLR filed a
three-count complaint against Attorney
Napierala. Attorney Napierala filed an
answer and this court appointed Referee
Peterson.
¶5 On March 29, 2018, the parties
submitted a stipulation in which Attorney
Napierala withdrew his answer to the
complaint, admitted the facts and misconduct
alleged in the complaint, and authorized the
referee to make findings of fact and
conclusions of law based on these
allegations. The parties stipulated that
Attorney Napierala should be ordered to make
restitution in the amount of $15,021.66 to
T.A., and that a public reprimand was
appropriate.
¶6 The referee filed her findings of
fact, conclusions of law, and recommendation
for discipline on July 26, 2018. The
referee determined that the OLR had met its
burden of proof with respect to the three
counts of misconduct alleged in the
complaint, and recommends that we accept the
stipulation. No appeal was filed so we
consider this matter pursuant to Supreme
Court Rule (SCR) 22.17(2).
¶7 All three of the charges stem from
Attorney Napierala's representation of a
single client, T.A. In February 2012, T.A.
retained Attorney Napierala and another
attorney who worked in a different office to
collaborate to challenge a mediation
agreement and settlement in a Milwaukee case
to which T.A. was a party. If the mediation
agreement could be set aside, the lawyers
were to proceed with litigation seeking to
prove that T.A. was the biological son of
T.J., and therefore entitled to inherit
T.J.'s estate.
¶8 In March 2012, Attorney Napierala
and T.A. entered into a fee agreement that
disclosed Attorney Napierala's billing rate
but did not state that Attorney Napierala
would bill T.A. for services performed by
non-lawyer staff or the rate at which those
services would be billed. The complaint
alleges that T.A. suffers from some
cognitive impairment of which Attorney
Napierala was aware, and that T.A.
frequently sought legal advice from Attorney
Napierala on a number of diverse issues,
many of which were unrelated to the
mediation/settlement matter.
¶9 In November 2012, T.A., Attorney
Napierala, and the other attorney executed
an "Appellate Fee Agreement" wherein T.A.
agreed that his counsel could withhold and
"set aside" from an expected settlement,
$25,000 for appellate litigation; each
attorney would be paid a flat fee of $6,000
for this representation. The Appellate Fee
Agreement provided that Attorney Napierala
was to pay the other attorney a referral fee
of one-third of the hourly fees Attorney
Napierala earned for representing T.A. in
this matter.
¶10 In practice, sometimes the other
attorney would pay Attorney Napierala the
total amount that Attorney Napierala was due
at any given time, and Attorney Napierala
would in turn write a check to the other
attorney for the one-third referral fee.
Sometimes, the other attorney would subtract
the one-third referral fee before remitting
payment to Attorney Napierala.
¶11 In a nutshell, Attorney Napierala
failed to keep track of his billing and
payments relating to his representation of
T.A. He failed to diligently maintain
records of payments he received from T.A.,
or from the other attorney on behalf of
T.A., thereby causing Attorney Napierala at
various times to bill T.A. for amounts
beyond what Attorney Napierala was due.
¶12 Between approximately November 2012
and December 2014, Attorney Napierala
overbilled and was overpaid by T.A. various
amounts. It appears the greatest
discrepancy existed in May 2014, when
Attorney Napierala had been overpaid at
least $16,763.44. Attorney Napierala had
also billed T.A. for non-lawyer services and
various other legal or administrative advice
for which T.A. did not authorize Attorney
Napierala to incur fees.
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¶13 The OLR complaint alleged, the parties
stipulated, and the referee determined that by
failing to credit T.A. for all payments
Attorney Napierala received from T.A.'s funds,
and by failing to credit T.A. for all of the
referral fees retained by the other attorney,
Attorney Napierala billed T.A. for amounts
that Attorney Napierala was not due, Attorney
Napierala violated SCR 20:1.5(a) (Count One).
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¶14 The OLR complaint alleged, the parties
stipulated, and the referee determined that by
billing T.A. at Attorney Napierala's hourly
rate for services that were not reasonably
billable to T.A., Attorney Napierala again
violated SCR 20:1.5(a) (Count Two).
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¶15 The OLR complaint alleged, the
parties stipulated, and the referee
determined that by failing to communicate to
T.A. at the beginning of the representation
that Attorney Napierala intended to bill
T.A. for services provided by Attorney
Napierala's nonlawyer staff and the rate at
which those services would be billed,
Attorney Napierala violated SCR 20:1.5(b)(1)
(Count Three).
¶16 The referee considered the
stipulation for a public reprimand, mindful
of the need to consider the seriousness,
nature, and extent of misconduct, the level
of discipline needed to protect the public
and the legal system from repetition of the
misconduct, the need to impress on the
attorney the seriousness of the misconduct,
and the need to deter others from committing
similar acts. See In re Disciplinary
Proceedings Against Steinberg, 2007 WI
113,
¶20, 304 Wis. 2d 577, 735 N.W.2d 527.
¶17 The referee considered prior case
law, aggravating and mitigating factors, and
the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer
Sanctions. In re Disciplinary Proceedings
Against Arthur, 2005 WI 40, 279 Wis. 2d
583,
694 N.W.2d 910, see ABA Standards for
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, sec. 3.0 (1992)
(stating that the court should consider the
duty violated; the lawyer's mental state;
potential or actual injury caused; and the
existence of aggravating and mitigating
factors, including prior discipline and a
dishonest or selfish motive).
¶18 In this case, the referee agreed
that a public reprimand was sufficient. As
the referee observed, the misconduct is
serious, but involved only one client
matter, and this is the first time that
Attorney Napierala has been disciplined in
over 25 years of practice. The referee
noted that it appears that the misconduct
was not intentional, but resulted from a
lack of attention to detail and failure to
clearly delineate the various interests of
the actors involved.
¶19 The referee opined that the case law
supports the sanction of a public reprimand.
In In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against
Schuster, 2007 WI 131, 305 Wis. 2d 120,
741
N.W.2d 471, an attorney repeatedly submitted
bills overcharging her client, failed to
credit the client with payments made, and
made false representations to a tribunal.
Further, the attorney had been the subject
of prior discipline on similar matters. The
court ordered a 90-day suspension of the
attorney's license. The referee reasoned
that Attorney Napierala's misconduct is
substantially less serious, he has no prior
discipline, and there is no evidence of
dishonesty or fraud.
¶20 The referee further recommends that
the court order Attorney Napierala to pay
the stipulated restitution to T.A., and that
the court follow its general policy and
impose the full costs of the proceeding on
Attorney Napierala.
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¶21 A referee's findings of fact are
affirmed unless clearly erroneous.
Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo.
See In re Disciplinary Proceedings
Against
Eisenberg, 2004 WI 14, ¶5, 269 Wis. 2d 43,
675 N.W.2d 747. The court may impose
whatever sanction it sees fit, regardless of
the referee's recommendation. See In
re
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Widule,
2003 WI 34, ¶44, 261 Wis. 2d 45, 660 N.W.2d
686.
¶22 There is no showing that any of the
referee's findings of fact are erroneous.
Accordingly, we adopt them. We also agree
with the referee's conclusions of law that
Attorney Napierala violated the supreme
court rules set forth above. We accept the
referee's recommendation that a public
reprimand is an appropriate sanction for
Attorney Napierala's misconduct. Although
no two fact situations are identical, a
public reprimand is generally consistent
with the sanction imposed in somewhat
analogous cases.
¶23 Finally, we agree that Attorney
Napierala should be required to pay
restitution to T.A. and shall pay the full
costs of this proceeding, which are
$1,677.53.
¶24 IT IS ORDERED that Thomas R.
Napierala is publicly reprimanded for
professional misconduct.
¶25 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60
days of the date of this order, Thomas R.
Napierala shall pay restitution to T.A. in
the stipulated amount of $15,021.66.
¶26 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60
days of the date of this order, Thomas R.
Napierala shall pay to the Office of Lawyer
Regulation the costs of this proceeding,
which are $1,677.53 as of August 14, 2018.
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¶27 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the
restitution specified above is to be
completed prior to paying costs to the
Office of Lawyer Regulation.
¶28 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the
director of the Office of Lawyer Regulation
shall advise the court if there has not been
full compliance with all conditions of this
order.
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