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In February of 2015, a man hired Attorney
Michele Anne Tjader to represent him after
being cited by a municipality for OWI-1st
and refusing to submit to a chemical test.
The client paid Tjader an advanced fee
covering representation through a municipal
court trial; the fee did not cover an
appeal. The fee agreement described the
advanced fee as a flat fee, and stated that
the fee would be deposited into Tjader’s
business account upon receipt. The fee
agreement contained provisions required
under former SCR 20:1.15(b)(4m)a (effective
prior to July 1, 2016) and current SCR
20:1.5(g), allowing for deposit of an
advanced fee into a business account.
At an April 4, 2016 municipal court trial,
Tjader’s client was convicted on both
counts. The next day, Tjader, on her
client’s behalf, signed a form indicating
that her client was requesting a new trial
in circuit court before a 6-person jury.
The Notice of Right to Appeal signed by
Tjader stated that the appellant must “pay
the statutorily required appeal fees and
costs within 20 days from the [municipal
trial date].” The cost for the six-person
jury was paid within 20 days of the
municipal court trial.
On April 28, 2016, Tjader informed her
client that she had been told by the
municipal court clerk that, in order for his
appeal to be forwarded to the circuit court,
the client’s fine needed to be paid. April
28, 2016 was several days past the 20-day
deadline.
Because her client did not pay his fine
within the 20-day deadline, his appeal was
not forwarded to the circuit court. Tjader
filed a motion for reconsideration in the
municipal court, arguing that it was not
required that the fine be paid within the 20
days. That motion was denied.
By order dated October 18, 2016, the circuit
court affirmed the decision of the municipal
court.
On January 17, 2017, Tjader filed a Notice
of Appeal with the circuit court. On
February 13, 2017, the municipality filed a
motion to dismiss the appeal as untimely
filed. The Notice of Appeal had been filed
one day late, with Tjader arguing that she
believed the circuit court clerk’s office
was closed on January 16, 2017 in
recognition of the Martin Luther King, Jr.
Holiday.
On March 13, 2017, Tjader was ordered by the
Court of Appeals to provide evidence within
21 days of March 8, 2017 that the circuit
court clerk’s office was in fact closed on
January 16, 2017. Tjader failed to comply
with the order and her client’s appeal was
dismissed by the Court of Appeals as
untimely filed. Tjader’s representation
ended at that time.
Tjader failed to adequately communicate with
her client throughout the representation.
Tjader failed to respond to client e-mails
and phone calls regarding the status of the
case, including failing to communicate with
her client after the dismissal of his
appeal.
Tjader did not comply with the post-
representation notice provisions stated in
former SCR 20:1.15(b)(4m)b. The provisions
allowing for deposit of an advanced fee into
a business account, formerly stated in SCR
20:1.15(b)(4m), are now stated in SCR
20:1.5(g), effective July 1, 2016.
On December 5, 2017, OLR sent Tjader a
letter, via first class U.S. mail, informing
her of the nature of the investigation of
her client’s grievance. OLR informed Tjader
that, pursuant to SCR 22.03(2), she was
required to provide a written response by
December 28, 2017. The letter further
advised Tjader of her duty to cooperate with
OLR’s investigation under SCR 21.15(4) and
SCR 22.03(6). Tjader failed to respond.
On January 9, 2018, OLR sent Tjader a second
letter, via first class U.S. mail and
certified mail, reminding her of her duty to
cooperate with OLR and informing her of the
possible consequences of not cooperating,
including OLR’s Director seeking the
suspension of her license for willful non-
cooperation. The letter requested a
response by January 19, 2018. The certified
mail receipt was not returned to OLR, nor
was the letter sent via U.S. mail. Tjader
failed to respond.
On February 6, 2018, OLR sent Tjader a third
letter, via first class U.S. mail and
personal service, reminding her of her duty
to cooperate with OLR and requesting a
response by February 13, 2018.
On February 9, 2018, Tjader was personally
served with OLR’s letter of February 6,
2018. Tjader failed to respond.
On February 23, 2018, pursuant to
SCR 22.03(4), OLR filed a Notice of Motion
and Motion Requesting Order to Show Cause,
seeking an order requiring Tjader to show
cause why her license should not be
suspended for her willful failure to
cooperate in an OLR investigation concerning
her conduct.
On February 26, 2018, the Court
ordered Tjader to show cause, in writing,
within 20 days why OLR’s motion should not
be granted.
On March 16, 2016, OLR received from Tjader
a response to her client’s grievance.
On March 19, 2018, OLR filed a Report of
Attorney Tjader’s Cooperation, withdrawing
its February 23, 2018 motion.
By order dated March 21, 2018, OLR’s motion
was dismissed.
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By failing to timely file her client’s appeals
at both the circuit court and appellate
levels, Tjader violated SCR 20:1.3, which
states, “A lawyer shall act with reasonable
diligence and promptness in representing a
client.”
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By failing to respond to her client’s
inquiries regarding the status of his case,
Tjader violated SCR 20:1.4(a)(4), which
states, “A lawyer shall promptly comply with
reasonable requests by the client for
information.”
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By failing to abide by the Court of Appeals
March 13, 2017 order, Tjader violated SCR
20:3.4(c), which states, “A lawyer shall not
knowingly disobey an obligation under the
rules of a tribunal, except for an open
refusal based on an assertion that no valid
obligation exists.”
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Upon termination of representation, by
failing to provide her client with the
notices required under SCR 20:1.5(g)(2),
effective July 1, 2016, and formerly stated
under SCR 20:1.5(b)(4m)b, Tjader violated
SCR 20:1.5(g)(2), which states, “A lawyer
who accepts advanced payments of fees may
deposit the funds in the lawyer's business
account, provided that review of the
lawyer’s fee by a court of competent
jurisdiction is available in the proceeding
to which the fee relates, or provided that
the lawyer complies with each of the
following requirements:…Upon termination of
the representation, the lawyer shall deliver
to the client in writing all of the
following: a. A final accounting, or an
accounting from the date of the lawyer's
most recent statement to the end of the
representation, regarding the client's
advanced fee payment with a refund of any
unearned advanced fees; b. A refund of any
unearned advanced fees and costs; c. Notice
that, if the client disputes the amount of
the fee and wants that dispute to be
submitted to binding arbitration, the client
must provide written notice of the dispute
to the lawyer within 30 days of the mailing
of the accounting; and d. Notice that, if
the lawyer is unable to resolve the dispute
to the satisfaction of the client within 30
days after receiving notice of the dispute
from the client, the lawyer shall submit the
dispute to binding arbitration.”
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By willfully failing to provide OLR with a
timely written response to her client’s
grievance, Tjader violated SCR 22.03(2) and
22.03(6), enforceable via SCR 20:8.4(h).
SCR 22.03(2) states, “Upon commencing an
investigation, the director shall notify the
respondent of the matter being investigated
unless in the opinion of the director the
investigation of the matter requires
otherwise. The respondent shall fully and
fairly disclose all facts and circumstances
pertaining to the alleged misconduct within
20 days after being served by ordinary mail
a request for a written response. The
director may allow additional time to
respond. Following receipt of the response,
the director may conduct further
investigation and may compel the respondent
to answer questions, furnish documents, and
present any information deemed relevant to
the investigation.” SCR 22.03(6) states,
“In the course of the investigation, the
respondent's wilful failure to provide
relevant information, to answer questions
fully, or to furnish documents and the
respondent's misrepresentation in a
disclosure are misconduct, regardless of the
merits of the matters asserted in the
grievance.” SCR 20:8.4(h) states, “It is
professional misconduct for a lawyer to
violate a statute, supreme court rule,
supreme court order or supreme court
decision regulating the conduct of lawyers.”
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Tjader was privately reprimanded in 2006 and
2014. She was publicly reprimanded in 2002
and 2018.
In accordance with SCR 22.09(3), Attorney
Michele Anne Tjader is hereby publicly
reprimanded.
Dated this 31st day of January, 2020.
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