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ATTORNEY disciplinary proceeding.
Attorney's license suspended.
¶1 PER CURIAM. We review the report
and recommendation of Referee Sue E.
Bischel. Based on a stipulation by the
parties, Referee Bischel determined that
Attorney Mark M. Ditter committed four
counts of professional misconduct. The
referee, however, concluded that the level
of discipline jointly requested by the
parties, a 60-day suspension, was
insufficient under the circumstances.
Referee Bischel recommended that this court
impose a 120-day suspension. She also
recommended that the court require Attorney
Ditter to pay the full costs of this
disciplinary proceeding, which are $3,896.68
as of August 26, 2020.
¶2 As neither party has appealed the
referee's report and recommendation, we
review this matter pursuant to Supreme Court
Rule (SCR) 22.17(2). We agree with the
referee's conclusion that Attorney Ditter
committed the four counts of professional
misconduct alleged in the complaint filed by
the Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR). We
conclude that Attorney Ditter's conduct in
this matter requires a 90-day suspension of
his license to practice law in this state.
Because the Office of the State Public
Defender (SPD) has already recouped the
funds that Attorney Ditter failed to forward
to a third party, we do not impose any
restitution award in this matter. Finally,
because Attorney Ditter did not enter into a
stipulation until after both the OLR and the
referee had expended time and money in
proceeding with this matter, we require
Attorney Ditter to pay the full costs of
this disciplinary proceeding.
¶3 The referee found the facts set
forth below. In addition to the facts to
which Attorney Ditter stipulated, the
referee made factual findings regarding
Attorney Ditter's interactions with the OLR
during its investigation and events that
occurred during this disciplinary
proceeding. The referee gave Attorney
Ditter the opportunity to object to any of
her proposed factual findings, but he did
not object.
¶4 We will begin with the stipulated
facts regarding Attorney Ditter's underlying
conduct and his response to the OLR's
investigation. Then we will set forth the
pertinent facts regarding Attorney Ditter's
conduct during this disciplinary
proceeding.
¶5 Attorney Ditter was initially
admitted to the practice of law in this
state in May 1983. He most recently
operated a small law practice in Kaukauna.
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¶6 Attorney Ditter has been the subject
of professional discipline on two previous
occasions, both of which were quite some
time ago. In 1994 Attorney Ditter's law
license was suspended for 60 days for
engaging in the practice of law while his
license had been administratively suspended
for failure to comply with continuing legal
education requirements. In re
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Ditter,
187 Wis. 2d 337, 523 Wis. 2d 105 (1994). In
1996 Attorney Ditter consented to the
imposition of a private reprimand for
failing to act with reasonable diligence and
for failing to communicate with a client.
Private Reprimand No. 1996-17 (electronic
copy available at
https://compendium.wicourts.gov/app/raw/
000179.html).
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¶7 Attorney Ditter's license is
currently suspended for multiple reasons.
First, this court temporarily suspended his
license as of May 14, 2019, due to his
willful failure to cooperate with the OLR's
investigation of his conduct that is the
subject of this disciplinary proceeding.
Second, Attorney Ditter's license is also
administratively suspended due to his non-
payment of bar dues, his failure to file a
trust account certification, and his
noncompliance with continuing legal
education requirements. See SCRs
10.03(6),
20:1.15(i)(4), and 31.02.
¶8 The facts underlying the counts of
misconduct in this matter relate to Attorney
Ditter's handling of funds in two cases in
which he was appointed to represent indigent
criminal defendants in the Outagamie County
circuit court by the SPD. In both cases
Attorney Ditter hired an investigator to
prepare alternative pre-sentence reports.
The investigator completed his work, and the
alternative reports were filed with the
circuit court in those two cases.
¶9 In the first case the SPD approved
payment to Attorney Ditter and issued a
check to Attorney Ditter in the amount of
$2,463.70 on June 29, 2018. That amount
included $1,200 for the work performed by
the investigator, which Attorney Ditter was
obligated to forward to him.
¶10 In the second case the SPD also
approved payment to Attorney Ditter and
issued a check to Attorney Ditter in the
amount of $3,227.62 on July 20, 2018. That
amount again included $1,200 for the work
performed by the investigator, which
Attorney Ditter was obligated to forward to
him.
¶11 Attorney Ditter did not deliver to
the investigator the $2,400 that he had
received from the SPD and that he owed to
the investigator. The investigator and the
SPD made repeated requests for payment to
Attorney Ditter by email, letter, and
telephone calls. Attorney Ditter, however,
did not respond. Ultimately, the
investigator filed a grievance with the OLR
regarding Attorney Ditter's failure to
forward the funds he had received from the
SPD.
¶12 Members of the OLR's intake
department attempted to contact Attorney
Ditter regarding the grievance. On December
7, 2018, Attorney Ditter sent an email to an
OLR intake representative, in which he made
the following statement: "I am working to
get [the investigator] paid quickly. I sent
him a payment this week towards one of the
two outstanding bills, and expect to be able
to take care of the rest very soon."
Attorney Ditter's claim that he had sent a
payment to the investigator was a false
statement. He did not ever send a payment
to the investigator for his work on the two
cases. He converted to his own use the
funds due to the investigator.
¶13 The OLR opened a formal
investigation of the grievance against
Attorney Ditter. On December 19, 2018, the
OLR Trust Account Program Administrator,
Travis Stieren, sent a letter to Attorney
Ditter via first class mail advising him of
the formal investigation and giving him a
deadline of January 14, 2019, to provide a
written response to the grievance against
him. Attorney Ditter did not respond.
¶14 On January 29, 2019, Mr. Stieren
sent a second letter, via both first class
and certified mail, seeking a written
response to the grievance by February 8,
2019. The January 29, 2019 letter also
advised Attorney Ditter that in the event he
failed to respond, the OLR Director was
authorized to file a motion seeking the
temporary suspension of his license for a
willful failure to cooperate. The certified
letter was returned to the OLR unclaimed.
The letter sent via first class mail was not
returned. Attorney Ditter again did not
respond.
¶15 On February 15, 2019, Mr. Stieren
sent an email to Attorney Ditter. He
attached copies of his prior letters and
requested a written response to the
grievance by February 22, 2019. Attorney
Ditter still did not respond.
¶16 Attorney Ditter finally spoke with
Mr. Stieren via telephone on February 22,
2019. During that call, Attorney Ditter
confirmed that he had received at least one
of the OLR's letters. He stated that he
would prepare and submit to the OLR a
written response to the grievance by the
following week. Later that same day,
Attorney Ditter sent an email to Mr.
Stieren, in which he stated, "Pursuant to
our phone conversation this AM, I have
prepared a response and have mailed it."
Attorney Ditter's representation was false,
as the OLR never received any written
response to the grievance against him.
¶17 On March 12, 2019, the OLR filed a
motion seeking the temporary suspension of
Attorney Ditter's license to practice law in
Wisconsin due to his willful failure to
cooperate with its investigation. This
court subsequently issued an order directing
Attorney Ditter to show cause in writing by
April 3, 2019, why the OLR's motion should
not be granted. Attorney Ditter did not
respond to the court's order to show cause.
Accordingly, on May 14, 2019, this court
issued an order temporarily suspending
Attorney Ditter's license to practice law in
Wisconsin.
¶18 On March 27, 2019, due to Attorney
Ditter's conversion of the funds, the SPD
sent $2,400 directly to the investigator to
pay him for the work he had performed on the
two matters. In order to recoup the $2,400
owed to the investigator that Attorney
Ditter had wrongfully converted, the SPD
withheld that sum from subsequent payments
made to Attorney Ditter on other cases.
¶19 The OLR filed a formal complaint
against Attorney Ditter in this court on
January 23, 2020. The referee's report
contains additional factual findings
regarding events that occurred during the
disciplinary proceeding.
¶20 Attorney Ditter was personally
served with the complaint and the order to
answer on February 20, 2020. The order to
answer required him to file an answer to the
complaint within 20 days. Attorney Ditter
did not file an answer or otherwise respond
to the complaint.
¶21 After Referee Bischel was appointed,
she sent an email to the parties on April
14, 2020, advising them of a telephonic
scheduling conference to take place on April
22, 2020. Attorney Ditter did not respond
to the referee's email, nor did he appear
for the telephonic scheduling conference.
At that conference, the OLR's counsel
advised the referee that he had made
multiple attempts to contact Attorney
Ditter, but had received no response.
¶22 Although Attorney Ditter's time for
filing an answer had expired, the referee
issued a scheduling order that granted him a
period of additional eight days to file an
answer. Attorney Ditter never filed an
answer. Accordingly, the OLR filed a motion
for a default.
¶23 The referee's scheduling order set a
second scheduling conference for May 8,
2020. After difficulties reaching Attorney
Ditter on both May 7, 2020, and May 8, 2020,
the OLR's counsel did reach Attorney Ditter,
and the parties then informed the referee
that they wished to enter into a
comprehensive stipulation. The referee
issued an order directing the parties to
file such a stipulation by June 1, 2020.
¶24 The referee did not receive a
stipulation by the deadline. On June 2,
2020, the referee sent an email to the
parties stating that unless they advised her
that a stipulation was being filed, she
would proceed with deciding the motion for a
default. The OLR's counsel responded that
he had sent the proposed stipulation to
Attorney Ditter on May 11, 2020, with a
request for a quick response, but that he
had not received any response. Later that
afternoon, Attorney Ditter sent a reply
email to the referee, which stated, "My
apologies. It's on the way by mail."
¶25 The next morning the referee sent
Attorney Ditter an email asking him to
advise to whom, from where, and on what date
he had mailed the stipulation. Attorney
Ditter responded, but did not provide the
information requested by the referee.
Attorney Ditter stated that he had signed
the stipulation over the weekend, which the
referee understood to mean the previous
weekend (May 30-31), and had then mailed it
(presumably to the OLR). The OLR's counsel,
however, advised the referee that he had not
received the original in the mail from
Attorney Ditter as of June 4, 2020, when
counsel sent a scanned version of the
stipulation to the referee. The scanned
version indicated that Attorney Ditter had
signed the stipulation as of May 26, 2020,
which was actually the preceding Tuesday
(not the previous weekend). Ultimately, the
OLR's counsel filed a printout of the
scanned version of the stipulation with the
clerk of this court on June 12, 2020. The
cover letter accompanying that scanned
version indicated that the OLR had still not
received the original signed stipulation
from Attorney Ditter so it was filing a
printout of the scanned version.
¶26 The referee did not make a specific
finding that Attorney Ditter had
intentionally misrepresented to her when he
had signed and mailed the original
stipulation to the OLR. She includes the
facts regarding Attorney Ditter's
representation and his conduct regarding the
stipulation because she had concerns about
Attorney Ditter's veracity and his continued
lack of cooperation with the disciplinary
process during the formal disciplinary
proceeding.
¶27 The stipulation provides that
Attorney Ditter pleads no contest to the
four counts of professional misconduct
alleged in the OLR's complaint and that the
referee may use the allegations in the
complaint as an adequate factual basis for a
determination of misconduct as to each count
of the complaint. Further, Attorney Ditter
agrees with the OLR's director that the
appropriate level of discipline in this
matter would be a 60-day suspension of
Attorney Ditter's license to practice law in
Wisconsin. The stipulation states that it
is not the result of plea bargaining. In
addition, in the stipulation Attorney Ditter
verifies that he fully understands the
misconduct allegations which he is
admitting; that he fully understands his
right to contest the allegations of the
complaint; that he fully understands the
ramifications of his entry into the
stipulation; that he fully understands his
right to consult counsel about entering into
the stipulation; and that his entry into the
stipulation is knowing and voluntary.
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¶28 Based on these facts, the referee
concluded that the OLR had sufficiently
proven that Attorney Ditter had engaged in
four counts of professional misconduct.
First, by failing to deliver funds he
received from the SPD to the investigator to
pay for his services on behalf of Attorney
Ditter's clients, Attorney Ditter violated
SCR 20:1.15(e)(1). Second, by converting to
his own purposes those funds that he was
required to hold in trust, Attorney Ditter
violated SCR 20:8.4(c). Next, by
misrepresenting to the OLR's representative
that he had sent a partial payment to the
investigator when he had not done so,
Attorney Ditter again violated SCR
20:8.4(c). Finally, by willfully failing to
cooperate with the OLR's investigation when
he failed to respond to the OLR's multiple
written requests for information, Attorney
Ditter violated SCR 22.03(2) and SCR
22.03(6), which also constitutes a violation
of SCR 20:8.4(h).
¶29 The referee invited the parties to
submit memoranda to her regarding the
appropriate sanction in this matter. The
OLR filed such a memorandum, in which it
asked the referee to recommend a 60-day
suspension. Attorney Ditter did not file a
sanction memorandum.
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¶30 Concluding that the 60-day
suspension requested by the OLR was not
sufficient, the referee ultimately
recommended a 120-day suspension of Attorney
Ditter's license to practice law in
Wisconsin. She pointed to a number of
factors that supported her recommendation.
She found Attorney Ditter's misconduct,
which involved converting funds belonging to
an investigator, as well as failing to
cooperate with and lying to the OLR, to be
serious and to involve more than a single
instance of misconduct. She emphasized that
Attorney Ditter's conduct in lying to the
OLR and generally failing to cooperate with
the OLR's investigation and this
disciplinary proceeding indicated that he
did not understand the seriousness of his
misconduct or its impact on the judicial
system and the public. Moreover, Attorney
Ditter's previous misconduct involved
continuing to engage in the practice of law
for nearly 11 months after his license had
been administratively suspended and a
failure to cooperate with the ensuing
disciplinary investigation, which
demonstrated a cavalier attitude toward his
obligation to comply with this court's rules
of conduct. His conduct in this matter
demonstrated a similar attitude. As one of
the prior disciplinary proceedings involved
the imposition of a 60-day suspension, the
referee indicated that the principle of
progressive discipline required a longer
suspension in this matter. The referee
considered the disciplinary decisions cited
by the OLR, but concluded that they did not
match the circumstances and extent of
Attorney Ditter's misconduct.
¶31 Because the SPD had paid the
investigator the amounts due and had then
deducted those amounts from other funds due
to Attorney Ditter, the OLR did not request
and the referee did not recommend that the
court order Attorney Ditter to pay any
restitution.
¶32 The referee recommended that
Attorney Ditter be required to pay the full
costs of this disciplinary proceeding.
Although Attorney Ditter did ultimately
enter into a comprehensive stipulation, the
referee emphasized that Attorney Ditter's
ongoing failure to cooperate with the OLR or
to respond in a timely manner in this
disciplinary proceeding had required the OLR
to incur costs and had necessitated the
appointment of a referee.
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¶33 As Attorney Ditter has not appealed
the referee's report or recommendation, our
review of this matter proceeds pursuant to
SCR 22.17(2). When we review a referee's
report, we will affirm a referee's findings
of fact unless they are found to be clearly
erroneous, but we review the referee's
conclusions of law on a de novo basis. In
re Disciplinary Proceedings Against
Inglimo, 2007 WI 126, ¶5, 305 Wis. 2d 71,
740 N.W.2d 125. We determine the
appropriate level of discipline to impose
given the particular facts of each case,
independent of the referee's recommendation,
but benefiting from it. In re
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Widule,
2003 WI 34, ¶44, 261 Wis. 2d 45, 660 N.W.2d
686.
¶34 In this case Attorney Ditter has
stipulated to the facts and acknowledges
that those facts support conclusions of law
that he committed the four counts of
professional misconduct alleged in the OLR's
complaint. There is no dispute about
Attorney Ditter's underlying misconduct. In
addition, to the extent that the referee's
preliminary and final report contain factual
findings about events that occurred during
the disciplinary proceeding before the
referee, Attorney Ditter also has not
contested those facts. We therefore adopt
the referee's factual findings, and we agree
that he committed the four counts of
misconduct alleged by the OLR.
¶35 The issue that this court must
decide in this matter is the appropriate
level of discipline to impose. We agree
with the referee that the 60-day suspension
jointly requested by the parties would be
insufficient under all of the circumstances
of this case. The operative question is
whether the suspension here should be for 90
days or 120 days.
¶36 In its sanction memorandum to the
referee, the OLR cited four prior cases that
it considered analogous to the present case
and that supported its request for a 60-day
suspension. We again agree with the referee
that the most analogous of those four cases
is In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against
Alfredson, 2019 WI 17, 385 Wis. 2d 565,
923 N.W.2d 869 (Alfredson II). In that
case Attorney Alfredson failed to hold in
trust and then converted funds that she had
received from her client and that were to be
held in trust and ultimately paid to her
client's ex-spouse. She also failed to
respond to multiple requests for information
from the OLR, responding only when the OLR
threatened to move for a temporary
suspension of her license. When Attorney
Alfredson did finally respond to one OLR
request, her response was misleading because
she failed to include the fact there was an
outstanding issue with her alleged payment
of the remaining trust funds. In a second
client matter, Attorney Alfredson failed to
communicate with her client and then failed
for three months to provide her client's
file to successor counsel.
¶37 The referee, however, believed that
Attorney Ditter's misconduct merited a
longer suspension than the 90-day suspension
imposed on Attorney Alfredson in Alfredson
II. She pointed to the fact that Attorney
Ditter's case included a count of lying to
the OLR during its investigation about
whether he had sent a payment to the
investigator, which was not present in
Alfredson II. Indeed, the factual
findings indicated that Attorney Ditter had
also made a second misrepresentation to the
OLR when he said he had mailed a written
response to the investigator's grievance.
Most importantly, the referee believed that
Attorney Ditter's ongoing lack of
cooperation with the OLR's investigation and
the disciplinary proceeding merited a longer
suspension.
¶38 Although we agree that Attorney
Ditter's lack of cooperation with the
investigation and disciplinary proceeding is
troubling, we do not think that the facts of
Attorney Alfredson's case are so different
that Attorney Ditter should be treated
differently. Like Attorney Ditter, Attorney
Alfredson repeatedly failed to respond to
the OLR's requests for information during
its investigation. She responded to the OLR
only when it threatened to seek a temporary
suspension of her license. When the OLR
sought additional information, she again did
not respond until the OLR threatened once
more to seek a temporary suspension. Like
Attorney Ditter, Attorney Alfredson did not
enter into a stipulation until after the
disciplinary proceeding had begun and a
referee had been appointed. Attorney Ditter
did not file an answer to the OLR's
complaint, leading the OLR to file a motion
for a default, but Attorney Ditter, like
Attorney Alfredson, did ultimately stipulate
to the facts and acknowledge his misconduct.
The fact that Attorney Alfredson filed an
answer before entering into a stipulation is
not a significant difference in the level of
cooperation.
¶39 It is also true that the OLR charged
Attorney Ditter with a count of making a
false statement to it while there was no
such count alleged against Attorney
Alfredson. Our decision in the Alfredson
II
case, however, shows that she also was not
truthful to the OLR. When she finally did
provide a response to the grievance against
her, she failed to disclose the fact that
successor counsel had not received the check
she claimed to have sent and that the
client's money was still in her possession
(and not in her client trust account). In
addition, although it did not include a
specific charge of making a false statement,
the OLR advised the referee that Attorney
Alfredson had "engaged in a pattern of
neglect, dishonesty, and failure to
cooperate." Alfredson II, 388 Wis. 2d
565,
¶25 (emphasis added).
¶40 We certainly do not condone Attorney
Ditter's failure to cooperate or his false
statements to the OLR. His response to the
OLR's investigation and this disciplinary
proceeding should factor into the sanction
determination. Nevertheless, although each
case must be decided based on its unique
facts, we endeavor to impose similar
discipline in similar cases. We conclude
that it is appropriate here to impose a 90-
day suspension on Attorney Ditter for his
professional misconduct, as we did with
respect to Attorney Alfredson. Imposing a
90-day suspension in this case will still
comport with our general policy of imposing
progressive discipline for subsequent
misconduct. See, e.g., In re
Disciplinary
Proceedings Against Nora, 2020 WI 70, ¶91,
393 Wis. 2d 359, 945 N.W.2d 559; In re
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Netzer,
2014 WI 7, ¶49, 352 Wis. 2d 310, 841 N.W.2d
820; In re Disciplinary Proceedings
Against
Nussberger, 2006 WI 111, ¶27, 296 Wis. 2d
47, 719 N.W.2d 501.
¶41 Although Attorney Ditter did
ultimately enter into a comprehensive
stipulation, we agree that he should be
required to pay the full costs of this
disciplinary hearing. His failure to
cooperate with the disciplinary process
required the OLR to file a complaint and a
motion for a default, and it required the
court to appoint a referee. The costs of
this proceeding are therefore appropriately
the responsibility of Attorney Ditter.
¶42 We do not impose a restitution
obligation on Attorney Ditter. The SPD
already recouped the $2,400 that it was
required to pay directly to the investigator
by deducting that amount from the fees owed
to Attorney Ditter in other cases.
¶43 IT IS ORDERED that, as discipline
for his professional misconduct, the license
of Mark M. Ditter to practice law in
Wisconsin is suspended for a period of 90
days, effective as of the date of this
order.
¶44 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the May
14, 2019 temporary suspension in Case No.
2019XX428-D of Mark M. Ditter's license to
practice law in Wisconsin, due to his
willful failure to cooperate with the
grievance investigation in this matter by
the Office of Lawyer Regulation, is lifted.
¶45 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60
days of the date of this order, Mark M.
Ditter shall pay to the Office of Lawyer
Regulation the costs of this proceeding,
which are $3,896.68 as of August 26, 2020.
¶46 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, to the
extent he has not done so, Mark M. Ditter
shall comply with the provisions of SCR
22.26 concerning the duties of a person
whose license to practice law in Wisconsin
has been suspended.
¶47 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the
administrative suspension of Mark M.
Ditter's license to practice law in
Wisconsin, due to his failure to pay
mandatory bar dues, his failure to file
Office of Lawyer Regulation trust account
certification, and his noncompliance with
continuing legal education requirements,
will remain in effect until each reason for
the administrative suspension has been
rectified pursuant to SCR 22.28(1).
¶48 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that
compliance with all conditions of this order
is required for reinstatement. See SCR
22.28(2).
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